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Summary: 
 
The United Kingdom is in a prolonged episode of constitutional unsettlement. Contemporary 
accounts have moved to analyse and explain this process as a recent phenomenon, isolated to 
the age of ‘globalisation’, and neglecting the historical aspects of the dynamics of the 
territorial constitution. This thesis seeks to investigate the historical basis of the recent shifts 
in constitutional practice, placing them in context. It aims to do this in three ways. First, it 
examines the nature of the UK’s territorial constitution; its dynamics and the relationships 
between its four constituent parts – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – and the 
historical processes that led to its formation. Second, it turns the structural elements of the 
territorial constitution into the external sphere, exploring how the influences of national 
identity and nationalism, as well as the wider construction of the global sphere, have 
influenced the development of the territorial constitution. Third, it charts the effects of 
devolution on the territorial constitution. This analysis focusses specifically on the events that 
led to the introduction of devolution in 1998, and the subsequent effects this has had on the 
traditional dynamics and arrangement of authority within the territorial constitution. This 
thesis then concludes with a discussion of the effects of the recent Brexit process on the 
territorial constitution. This thesis argues that central to understanding the dynamics of the 
territorial constitution lies the delicate balance between the legal and political conceptions of 
power and authority, in particular sovereignty. This thesis concludes that the future of the 
territorial constitution lies in understanding its past, the motivations for its construction and 
the long origins of its current turn towards unsettlement.  
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Introduction 
 
The Context of this Thesis 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland1 is suspended in a prolonged 
episode of constitutional unsettlement. Since the introduction of devolution in 1998, the 
balance of political thought and constitutional enquiry has increasingly moved to challenge the 
traditional conceptions of the UK as a unitary state, defined by a single locus of sovereign 
authority, and able to facilitate a sense of unionising identity to continually bind its four 
component parts – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.2   
Presenting themselves as distinct challenges to the UK’s constitutional order, these recent 
events have been the subject of study by political theorists, political scientists, lawyers and 
historians. The first groups has examined the overarching structure of the territorial 
constitution, focussing on its origins, context and evolution since devolution;3 the second has 
moved to consult the political significance of shifts in national identity and allegiance, and the 
constitutional arguments associated with the demands of sub-state nationalist groups;4 the third 
has focussed on the normative changes to key concepts such as sovereignty, competence and 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter the ‘United Kingdom’ or ‘UK’.  
2 Finding a single terminological classification which fits accurately for all parts of the territorial constitution of 
the United Kingdom is, to a significant extent, a task incapable of scientific definition. Traditionally, this has 
been encapsulated in the identification of the ‘home nations’ or more recently in the ‘four nations’ approach. 
Whilst useful, this approach has its limitations for, on the one hand, it simplifies the unique territorial politics in 
Northern Ireland – a territory consisting of two nationally identifying communities. Moreover, it fails to 
recognise the distinctive cultural differences which exist in England, most particular in the identification of a 
Cornish nation, and the distinctive cultural identities of other regions such as Yorkshire or the North East. In this 
regard, this thesis will, when describing the UK as a whole, use the title of ‘component parts’ to describe 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. When referring to these units separately, terms such as territory, 
nation, region, country or cultural group will be used.  
3 Oliver, D., Constitutional Reform in the UK, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Wright, A., Who 
Governs Scotland? (London: Routledge, 2005); Wicks, E., The Evolution of a Constitution, (Oxford: Hart, 
2006) 
4 Hadfield, B., (ed.) Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1992); Keating, M., Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Keating, M., The Independence of Scotland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
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capacity;5 while the fourth group has used historical methods to provide context to the political 
and structural changes taking place in the territorial constitution.6  
In the majority of these approaches, however, the applied methods of investigation have 
generally been isolated to territorialised, nation-specific frames of analysis – focussing on 
specific parts of the UK, in either a single7 or comparative8 context. Indeed, in regard to 
consulting the theme of constitutional unsettlement from a UK-wide perspective, this thesis 
notes that far fewer studies have emerged, particularly in the period after 1998.9 
To some extent, this must be seen as a reflection of the realities of the territorial constitutional 
itself, and the asymmetrical and bi-lateral nature of the devolution process. This imbalance in 
the UK’s constitutional architecture has necessitated investigations linked to constitutional 
change in certain parts of the UK, as opposed to the UK as a whole. However, while recognising 
the logic in these approaches, this thesis argues that by consulting the theme of constitutional 
                                                          
5 Loughlin, M., The Idea of Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Walker, N., ‘Late 
Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Walker, N., (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition: Essays in European Law, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2006), pp. 3-32; Bradley, A., ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’, in Jowell, J. 
and Oliver, D., (eds.) The Changing Constitution, 6th Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 25-58; 
MacCormick, N., Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Jaklic, K., Constitutional 
Pluralism in the EU, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
6 Morgan, K. O., Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Fry, M., The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707, (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2013); Devine, T., 
Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present, (London: Penguin, 2017) 
7 Hadfield, B., (ed.) Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1992); Rawlings, R., Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National 
Devolution, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003); Keating, M., The Independence of Scotland, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Wyn Jones, R., and Scully, R., Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh 
Referendum, (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2012); Devine, T., Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and 
Scotland’s Present, (London: Penguin, 2017) 
8 Tierney, S., Constitutional Law and National Pluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Elias, A., 
Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study, (London: Routledge, 2009); 
Elliott, J. H., Scots and Catalans: Union and Disunion, (London: Yale University Press, 2018) 
9 Nairn, T., The Break-up of Britain: Crisis in Neo Nationalism, (Manchester: New Left Books, 1977); 
Bogdanor, V., Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Burrows, N., 
Devolution, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000); Aughey, A., Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to 
the United Kingdom State, (London: Pluto Press, 2001); Bulpitt, J., Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: 
An Interpretation, (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2008); Mitchell, J., Devolution in the UK, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009) 
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unsettlement in the UK from a territorialised perspective, the scope for understanding the full 
essence of change taking place is distinctly reduced.  
Perhaps as a reflection of this gap in enquiry, recent additions to the literature on constitutional 
change in the UK – from both an academic and governmental perspective – have increasingly 
come to frame the need for a more joined up, UK-wide approach. In its 2016 report, the House 
of Lords Committee on the Constitution outlined explicitly the risks of continuing to address 
the effects of the devolution process on a nation-specific basis: ‘taking the wishes of the 
devolved nations as a starting point, rather than the needs of the Union, risks perpetuating the 
existing approach of focusing on diversity at the expense of UK-wide solidarity.’10 
Furthermore, contributions from leading academics in the field of constitutional theory have 
also highlighted the gap in the current literature, and the need for joined up approaches to 
constitutional unsettlement, in order to fully understand the present influences on division 
within the territorial constitution.11 
This thesis therefore seeks to fill this gap in the literature by enquiring into the issues associated 
with devolution and constitutional change, from a UK-wide perspective. To some extent, the 
execution of this task will relate to tying together the existing strands of territorialised enquiry, 
and recasting their findings onto a UK-wide frame. More significantly, in completion of this 
task, the original contribution of this thesis also seeks to identify common themes within the 
dynamics of constitutional change associated with the devolution process in the UK. In this 
                                                          
10 House of Lords, ‘The Union and devolution’, Select Committee on the Constitution, 10th Report of Session 
2015-16, HL Paper 149 (25 May 2016), para. 252 
11 Aughey, A., Nationalism, Devolution and Constitutional Change and the Challenge to the United Kingdom 
State, (London: Pluto Press, 2001); Gamble, A., ‘The Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom’, 
Publius, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2006), pp. 19-35; Jeffrey, C. ‘Devolution, Britishness and the Future of the Union’, in 
Gamble, A., and Wright, T., (eds.) Britishness: Perspectives on the British Question, (Oxford: Wiley, 2009), pp. 
112-121; McEwen, N., ‘Still better together? Purpose and power in intergovernmental councils in the UK’, 
Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 27, No 5, (2017), pp. 667-690; McHarg, A., ‘The Future of the United 
Kingdom’s Territorial Constitution: Can the Union Survive?’, (March 31, 2016) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2771614> (Accessed: 02/02/18)  
11 
 
task, the frame of analysis of this thesis will further contribute to the literature in this area by 
extending the debate on constitutional change into the historical past; contextualising the 
significance of the devolution process within the long historical development of the UK’s 
constitutional order.  
 
Research Questions 
In recognition of the gap within the literature that this thesis seeks to address, the central 
research question of this thesis asks: ‘how far has devolution changed the constitutional 
dynamics of the territorial constitution of the United Kingdom?’ In framing this question, it is 
necessary to define what is meant by reference to the dynamics of the territorial constitution, 
in the context of this thesis. Fundamentally, this thesis employs a broad understanding of 
‘constitutional dynamics’ as encompassing two decided themes within the school of 
constitutional theory.  
First, this thesis references constitutional dynamics as the political relationships within the 
territorial constitution and, in particular, between central government and the devolved 
periphery – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Second, this thesis also uses the term 
constitutional dynamics to refer to the distinct normative and theoretical relationships that exist 
within the territorial constitution in regards to the exercise of sovereign competence. On this 
point, the essence of the debate will focus on an analysis of the substantive form of the balance 
of power within the territorial constitution.  
Assisting in the completion of this research project into how far devolution has changed the 
constitutional dynamics of the UK’s territorial constitution, the essence of the debate in this 
thesis is summarised into three broad sub-research questions:  
12 
 
1) What constitutional relationships emerged after the various Unions that came to form 
the United Kingdom? 
2) What are the current challenges facing the United Kingdom’s territorial constitution 
from a theoretical and a normative perspective?  
3) How far has devolution instigated a change in the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution?  
The answers to these sub-research questions will not be chapter specific, but will relate to 
themes connected to the analysis flowing through each of the five substantive chapters of this 
thesis. A final set of thematic conclusions on these questions will be provided in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis.  
 
Methodology 
In answering the research questions outlined above, this thesis will employ an interdisciplinary 
research design. Summarised broadly, the central tenets of this approach will rely upon the 
consultation of academic literature in the disciplines of law, politics and history, employed in 
the analysis of the UK territorial constitution. Maintaining as its central totem the theoretical 
analysis of the dynamics of the territorial constitution, this thesis will employ a mix of historical 
and theoretically informed methods to investigate the various processes, challenges and 
changes taking place within the territorial constitution. 
Informing this research design, this thesis is constructed on the methodological understanding 
that in order to understand the events of the present, it is first necessary to understand their 
context and relationship to the past.12 In holding this position, it is important to make clear that 
                                                          
12 Hopkins, J., Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union, 
(London: Cavendish, 2002), p. 165; Loughlin, J., ‘Political and Administrative Asymmetries in a Devolving 
13 
 
the argument in this thesis does not seek to formulate a distinct causality as effecting the current 
period of constitutional unsettlement, but instead seeks to rely upon the position that through 
historical investigation, elements of contemporary experience and debate are able to be 
explained by reference to their wider context, and prior influences in the historical past. 
This methodology has been chosen over methods of doctrinal or comparative legal 
investigation for two reasons. First, it is recognised that the nature of this thesis is not solely 
one of legal analysis and critique, but of constitutional theory into an interdisciplinary concept 
– the territorial constitution. As a result, it is argued that the diverse nature of sources used in 
this thesis necessitates a departure from traditional methods of pure legal analysis. In this 
regard, an opinion is held that the use of historically informed methods of theoretical analysis 
offers a more malleable approach to address the range of legal and political issues associated 
with the central research question of this thesis.  
Second, it is argued that the use of an historically informed, interdisciplinary research design 
affords distinct advantages over traditional methods of legal analysis, in capturing the wider 
issues associated with constitutional unsettlement. While legal methods of doctrinal or 
comparative analysis will be used to inform certain parts of this thesis – in particular Chapters 
Four and Five – the use of a broader interdisciplinary design for the thesis as a whole, affords 
allowance for the analysis of issues in history and political theory, associated with 
constitutional change. By undertaking this approach, it is predicted that the chosen 
methodology will assist in obtaining a more rounded picture of the issues associated with the 
central research question than would be possible through traditional doctrinal or comparative 
legal methods.   
                                                          
United Kingdom’, in Requejo, F., and Nagel, K-J., Federalism beyond Federations, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 
pp. 37-59 at 37 
14 
 
In further justifying this approach, it is noted that this thesis seeks to build upon similar 
methodological approaches employed by historians, political scientists, political and legal 
theorists, in previous studies of constitutional unsettlement in the UK, and other jurisdictions.13 
In each of these studies, a premium has been placed on the value of employing methods of 
historical contextualisation and reflection to gain new insights on contemporary change; both 
in relation to substantive issues of constitutional structure,14 as well as broader normative issues 
associated with changes in the global political economic environment, and patters of national 
and political identity.15  
This thesis seeks to use these previous studies as a model of methodological practice, albeit 
reframing their design to address the issues of contemporary unsettlement from a UK-wide 
perspective. By using this approach of building upon previous studies on the territorial 
constitution, it is felt that this thesis is afforded a solid base for methodological critique, while 
also maintaining a distinct originality in the format of its UK-wide research design. With this 
in mind, the final part of this introduction will now outline the structure of this thesis.  
 
Structure of this thesis 
Chapter One will begin this thesis with an analysis of the processes and factors that led to the 
formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The objectives of this 
                                                          
13 For similar research methodologies, see: Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics 
and the European State, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988); Hopkins, J., Devolution in Context: Regional, 
Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union, (London: Cavendish, 2002); Bulpitt, J., Territory 
and Power in the United Kingdom, (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2008) 
14 Rokkan, S., and Urwin, D. W., Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries, (London: 
Sage, 1983); Keating, M., ‘Reforging the Union: Devolution and Constitutional Change in the United 
Kingdom’, Publius, Vol. 28, No. 1, (1998), pp. 217-234 
15 Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State, (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988); Elias, A., From “full national status” to “independence” in Europe: The case of 
Plaid Cymru – the Party of Wales’, in McGarry, J., and Keating, M., (eds.) European Integration and the 
Nationalities Question, (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 193-215; Hepburn, E., ‘Degrees of Independence: SNP 
Thinking in an International Context’, in Hassan, G., (ed.) The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 190-203 
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chapter may be divided into two parts. First, it seeks to lay the foundation for the later analysis 
of the dynamics of the territorial constitution by providing the necessary content and context 
from which to analyse the contemporary events and episodes of constitutional unsettlement. 
Second, it seeks to chart and analyse the formation and development of the UK through a long 
historical process – focussing in particular on the development of its constitutional structure, 
and the relationships between central government and the periphery.  
In pursuing this objective, this chapter begins from the position that in order to understand the 
formation of the UK, it is first necessary to recognise the central role played by England in that 
process.16 From this perspective, the structure of the chapter is arranged into three parts, each 
of which frames its analysis on the basis of political relations between a largely English 
orientated centre, and the three units of the Celtic periphery – Wales, Scotland and Ireland.  
In Part One, the debate will analyse the initial political relationships that developed between 
England and the periphery, in an attempt to formalise an initial definition of the relational 
character and dynamics of the territorial constitution. Central to this part of the chapter will be 
the critique of the existing theory of Jim Bulpitt. This will argue that in order to understand 
Bulpitt’s recognition of the formation of the UK as having emerged from a transition from 
formal English overlordship of the periphery, to a defined moment of political union, it is first 
necessary to understand the factors that led to England first assuming overlordship of the 
periphery.17  
In Part Two of the chapter, the debate will move to consult the Acts of Union that transformed 
the informal empire of English overlordship into a crystallised constitutional entity. This part 
of the chapter will focus specifically on the processes that led to formal political union between 
                                                          
16 Gamble, A., ‘The Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom’, Publius, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2006), pp. 19-
35 
17 Bulpitt, J., Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2008), p. 85-94 
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England and the periphery, as well as analysing the constitutional structures that emerged after 
the respective Unions. Part Three will then analyse the 19th century and early-20th century 
beginnings of nationalism in the periphery, drawing particular attention to the processes that 
led to the independence of the Irish Free State in 1922, as well as the effects of this process on 
mobilising nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales.  
The focus in Chapter Two will then move to recast the substantive debate on the structure and 
dynamics of the UK’s territorial constitution by exploring the role of identity within this 
process. Fundamentally, the essence of the analysis in this chapter will be concerned with 
locating the personality of Britishness as a state-based identity. This vein of theoretical enquiry 
is important in answering the central research question of this thesis, as it relates to the 
relationship between the individual and the state. Through understanding the personality of the 
state, and its relationship to the individual, this chapter seeks to understand the wider normative 
dynamics which influence the balance of power and stability of constitutional systems.  
In seeking to achieve this end, the overarching aim of this chapter is to anticipate cotemporary 
debates on the rise of sub-state nationalism in the non-English parts of the UK, and to provide 
the historical understanding on the factors influencing a sense of unionised state-based identity 
in the UK. In addressing this issue, the argument in this chapter will provide a contextual frame 
for the later analysis of Chapters Three and Four, which will focus on the causes and normative 
challenges that the recent rise in sub-state nationalism poses to the dynamics of the UK 
territorial constitution.  
In achieving this aim, Parts One and Two of this chapter will be framed by a theoretical 
discussion of the idea of the nation-state. Part One will chart the rise of the state as a political 
entity from the 16th century, while Part Two will deal with the theoretical interpretation of the 
nation as source of imagined political community attached to the state. Following this, Part 
17 
 
Three will then apply this theoretical core to the case study of the United Kingdom, seeking to 
identify the essence of ‘Britishness’ – its influences, tenets, and relationship to the dynamics 
of the territorial constitution. It is hoped that through such analysis of the political aspects of 
identity and allegiance within the territorial constitution, we may better understand the 
overarching logic ruling the current processes in the forecasted ‘decline in Britishness’ as a 
form of identity – discussed in Chapters Three and Four – and the impacts this may have upon 
the devolution process, and the dynamics of the territorial constitution.  
Chapter Three seeks to deal with the first of the substantive challenges to the territorial 
constitution of the United Kingdom by consulting the external factors linked to the 
reconfiguration of the global political sphere. Central to the analysis in this chapter will be a 
consultation of the overarching rubric of ‘globalisation’, which has in recent years increasingly 
been seen as embodying a distinctive challenge to the state.18  
Part One of this chapter will begin the analysis by considering what is meant by the all-
encompassing rubric of ‘globalisation’ and, more specifically, how is it associated with the 
wider movements in the global order which have come to challenge the tradition hegemony of 
the state. After considering this, Part Two of the chapter will build upon this theme by 
identifying the specific constitutional challenges associated with globalisation; dealing 
specifically with the substantive, theoretical and normative issues it poses to the state. In this 
part of the chapter, a particular premium will be placed on understanding the essence of the 
sub-state challenge, its relationship to the devolution process, and its increasing 
interconnectedness and reliance upon the processes and institutions associated with 
‘globalisation’.  
                                                          
18 Keating, M., Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Tierney, S., Constitutional Law and National Pluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Tierney, S., (ed.) Nationalism and Globalisation, (Oxford: Hart, 2015) 
18 
 
Through consulting these issues, a valuable premium will be gained into the wider context and 
interconnected web of challenges associated with the rise of multi-level governance and 
devolution in the UK. This will then contribute to answering the central research question of 
this thesis by understanding the place and significance of devolution within the wider catalogue 
of normative challenges facing the state. Following this, Part Three will then conclude this 
chapter by translating the theoretical arguments raised in Parts One and Two, into a practical 
analysis of the constitutional objectives and political challenges posed by sub-state nationalist 
groups in the UK and, in particular, the role of globalisation in influencing these challenges.  
Chapter Four deals with the substantive constitutional challenges raised by the devolution 
process. The analysis in this chapter relates directly to the central research question of this 
thesis as it explores the political processes which led to the introduction of devolution in 1998, 
and the substantive constitutional challenges devolution have since posed to the dynamics of 
the territorial constitution. With this in mind, the analysis in this chapter will be divided into 
two parts.  Part One will address the processes that led to the devolution settlements of 1998 – 
and the absence of a system of devolved government in England. The analysis in this part of 
the chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the road to 
devolution, looking at the substantive political factors which motivated attitudes towards 
devolution in each of the four component parts of the UK. The second section will then adopt 
a theoretical analysis to investigate as to whether or not an overarching ‘logic’ exists in 
explaining the move towards devolved government in the second half of the 20th century.    
In Part Two, the focus will turn to analysing the substantive elements of the devolution 
settlements. This part of the chapter will also be divided into two sections. The first section 
will explore the substantive constitutional provisions of the devolution settlements, and will 
identify four themes as indicative of the resulting personality of devolved government. The 
second section will then transfer the substantive analysis into a theoretical consideration of the 
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challenge’s devolution has raised for the arrangement of power and authority within the 
territorial constitution.   
Chapter Five concludes the substantive debate of this thesis by analysing the challenges posed 
to the UK’s territorial constitution by its recent decision to leave the European Union. The 
overarching aim of this chapter is to bring the arguments raised in this thesis into contemporary 
perspective by focussing on the unfolding events of the Brexit process. Through pursuing this 
approach, it is recognised that valuable insights can be drawn into the dynamics of the 
devolution process, and the relationships which exist between the devolved administrations 
and the UK Government – thus providing valuable contemporary analysis into the central 
research question of this thesis.  
In addressing these issues, this chapter is divided into two parts. Part One will deal with the 
substantive political challenges that have emerged within the territorial constitution as a result 
of the Brexit process. Focussing specifically on the constitutional aspects of these challenges, 
this part of the chapter will identify three key constitutional events that have emerged in 
response to Brexit – the Miller case, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the competing 
constitutional ideologies between the UK Government and the devolved administrations. This 
part of the chapter will then conclude with the recognition that overarching all three of these 
issues lies the broader concern of ensuring the equality and security of the devolution 
settlements within the territorial constitution.  
In recognition of these two issues, Part Two of the chapter will then seek to investigate the 
possible constitutional solutions available for rebalancing the territorial constitution and 
ensuring the equality and security of the devolution settlements. The debate in this part of the 
chapter will fall upon discussion of the rubric of ‘federalism’ as a category for constitutional 
change. The debate on this issue will be divided into two sections, separating out the 
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institutional and normative interpretations of the federal idea. A conclusion will then be 
reached as to the effectiveness of a federal design in the future development of the UK’s 
territorial constitution.  
 
Conclusion 
At the heart of this thesis lies the recognition of the contemporary environment of the territorial 
constitution as being in a period of decided unsettlement. This thesis seeks to contribute to the 
debate on this issue by reframing the investigation onto a UK-wide canvas, drawing on 
historical and theoretical points of analysis to better understand the factors influencing the 
current episode of constitutional unsettlement, and its relationship to the devolution process.  
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Chapter 1 
A Short History of the Territorial Constitution 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the events, processes and themes that led to the formation 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Fundamentally, this chapter is 
about context, and providing the structural basis for the later engagement with the central 
research question of this thesis. In this regard, this chapter employs a UK-wide frame of 
analysis to investigate the constitutional and political relationships which emerged between 
central government and the periphery and, in doing so, provides an historical basis from which 
later analysis of the changing dynamics of the territorial constitutional will be based.  
In moving to achieve this aim, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part One will analyse the 
initial political relationships that developed between England and the periphery, in an attempt 
to formalise an initial definition of the relational character of the territorial constitution. Part 
Two will consult the Acts of Union that transformed the informal empire of English 
overlordship into a crystallised constitutional entity. This part will focus specifically on the 
process that led to formal political union, as well as the constitutional structures that emerged 
after the respective Unions. Part Three will then analyse the 19th century and early-20th century 
beginnings of nationalism in the periphery, drawing particular attention to the processes that 
led to the independence of the Irish Free State in 1922, as well as the effects of this process on 
mobilising nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales.  
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1.2. A Time before Union 
Before considering the Acts of Union – and disunion – which came to form the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, we must first discuss the period of 
constitutional history in the British Isles before these unions took place. The aim of the first 
part of this chapter is to chart this debate. The analysis in this part of the chapter will be divided 
into two sections. The first will consider the factors which enabled England to emerge as the 
primary state actor within the British Isles, and what processes led to its initial political 
relationship with the periphery. The second will consider the interactions England had with the 
periphery and, in doing so, will seek to develop a theoretical understanding of the early origins 
of the political relationship between England and the periphery.   
 
1.2.1. England 
England developed early as a state. From as early as the 11th century, we find clear examples 
of the development of a system of common law, centralised court politics and a developing 
bureaucracy in England.19 Moreover, the economic power, military scale and territorial size of 
England – strengths significantly enhanced by the limited area of the British Isles – meant that 
it emerged from an early point as the main political actor within those islands.  
In the 13th century, this advantage was extended to include the early development of a system 
of parliamentary representation in England. While this would not reach political maturity and 
assume an axis of legislative supremacy until after the late-17th century,20 it was conducive in 
                                                          
19 Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State, (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 26; Alcock, A., A Short History of Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2002), p. 99 
20 Embarking upon a debate on the historical development of Parliamentary sovereignty lies outside of the 
objectives of this chapter. For a detailed overview of its main positions, see: Pocock, J. G. A., The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law, (Bath: Cedric Chivers, 1974), p. 152; Dickinson, H. T., ‘The Eighteenth-
Century Debate on the Sovereignty of Parliament’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 26, (1976), 
pp. 189-210 at 201-202; Goldsworthy, J., The Sovereignty of Parliament, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 
230; Wicks, E., The Evolution of a Constitution, (Oxford: Hart, 2006), p. 19; The conclusion reached by many 
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guaranteeing the relative stability and flexibility of the English state from an early period – 
giving it a distinct advantage over its continental rivals.21  
Thus, from an early stage, we find England as holding the ‘potential power’22 to exert its 
political control over the British Isles – a factor which has led many historians to attribute the 
eventual formation of the United Kingdom as a product of English expansionism within the 
provided geographical limits of the British Isles.23 
However, throughout much of the medieval period, we find the tendency of English foreign 
policy within the British Isles as favouring a policy of indirect feudal overlordship, as opposed 
to the direct territorial control of the periphery.24 Indeed, as will be analysed in this chapter, 
England’s early interaction with the periphery was largely confined to periods of brief political 
strife to reassert its authority as feudal overlord, rather than pursuing an active programme of 
territorial expansion – being more reactive than proactive.25 
Illustrative of this mentality, an emerging consensus within historical discourse has 
increasingly come to post the position that the eventual ‘Unions’ that would come to form the 
UK were far from inevitable and, instead, were strategic responses to key political junctures in 
                                                          
in the identification of parliamentary sovereignty by the 18th century was that it was a legal fiction, unlimitable 
in theory, but in practice, subject to certain conditions of practice, and the recognition that ‘it would not be wise 
for any parliament to test the full extent of its authority’ – in this regard affording a distinct advantage to the 
development of a flexible constitutional system. Dickinson, H. T., ‘The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 26, (1976), pp. 189-210 at 209-
210; See also: Goldsworthy, J., The Sovereignty of Parliament, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 232 
21 Ullmann, W., Medieval Political Thought, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 154-155; Strong, C. F., 
Modern Political Constitutions, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), p. 20-25; Elton, G. R., England under the 
Tudors, (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 166-168 
22 Bulpitt, J., Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2008), p. 84 
23 Brazier, R., ‘The Constitution of the United Kingdom’, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1 (March, 
1999), pp. 96-128 at 99 
24 Schama, S., A History of Britain: Volume 1 – At the Edge of the World? 3000BC to 1603AD, (London: BBC, 
2003), p. 161 
25 Davies, R. R., Domination and Conquest: The experience of Ireland, Scotland and Wales 1100-1300, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 69 
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England’s political history.26 Central to this approach in analysing the formation of the UK, we 
find the work of the political scientist, Jim Bulpitt.  
For Bulpitt, the processes that would come to eventually form the UK could be explained by 
two main points. First, was the fact that England was the primary and irreplaceable driver 
behind the political integration of the British Isles to form the UK.27 Second, that this process 
took place over a long period, and was not conducive to a single event or agenda, but rather 
took place between two transitionary periods – informal and formal empire.28 
During informal empire,29 Bulpitt argued the links were established whereby England assumed 
control over the periphery as a ‘satisfied imperialist’, and developed a clear constitutional 
practice in relation to the periphery, which he termed the ‘official mind’: 
‘The structure of the informal Empire followed the English “official mind” regarding 
territorial politics: indirect rule, parsimony, autonomy of court politics from peripheral 
interference and sufficient control at the margin.’30 
Indeed, for Bulpitt, it was during the period of informal empire that the essence of English 
statecraft in the British Isles first emerged.31 However, in beginning to construct his argument 
at the period of informal empire, this thesis argues that Bulpitt fails to draw attention to the 
origins of the political processes that would come to influence the development of the ‘official 
mind’, and the logic of English constitutional practice concerning the periphery. Where this 
thesis therefore seeks to extend the debate on the formation of the UK is in extending its 
                                                          
26 See, for example: Gamble, A., ‘The Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom’, Publius, Vol. 36, No. 
1, (2006), pp. 19-35 at 21; Simms, B., Britain’s Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation, 
(London: Penguin, 2016) 
27 Bulpitt, J., Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2008), p. 84 
28 Ibid., p. 85-94 
29 Bulpitt provided the following dates as conducive to the emergence of informal empire in each of the three 
peripheral parts of the British Isles: Wales (1284), Scotland (1603), Ireland (1603). Ibid., p. 83 
30 Ibid., p. 85-86 
31 Ibid., p. 86 
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understanding into the earlier historical past, beyond Bulpitt’s starting point of informal 
empire.  
To this end, this thesis argues for an extension of Bulpitt’s methodology, to the effect of the 
inclusion of a third category before ‘informal empire’, what we will term, for the interests of 
continuity: ‘pre-empire’. This title, however, must be recognised as misleading in regards to 
the fact that it does not seek to document a period before English-peripheral relations but, 
rather, hypothesises the period whereby English political authority first came to be exercised 
over the periphery – a period that is therefore vital in the explanation of the eventual move to 
informal as well as formal empire.  
Within this period, it is argued that the fundamental character of English statecraft in the British 
Isles first emerged. In the debate that follows, an argument will be recorded that the start of 
informal empire was not conducted on a clean slate bus was, instead, the thickening of the 
already established bonds of the pre-empire period. Thus, in recognition of this argument, let 
us now begin charting its course and consulting the beginning of England’s constitutional 
relationship with the periphery.   
 
1.2.2. Defining the Periphery 
The argument of this section of the chapter aims to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional 
relationship between England and the periphery in the period of ‘pre-empire’. In presenting 
this argument, the analysis in this section of the chapter will fall under three frames of analysis. 
The first will consider the emergence of the pre-empire mentality in England’s relationship 
with Wales, the second, Scotland, and the third, Ireland. This will then be followed by a 
summary and synthesis of the main points of the argument presented in this section of the 
chapter. 
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1.2.2.1. Wales 
In defining the periphery, and in particular the relationship of the periphery with England, it is 
necessary to begin our analysis in the area which first encountered conflict with England; 
Wales. Defined by some as England’s first ‘colony’,32 the relationship between England and 
Wales – or those areas later identified under those titles – has a rich history which stretches 
back to the age of the Anglo-Saxon heptarchy, and the actions of Mercian kings to secure their 
western border against marauding Welsh tribes.33 However, for the purposes of this thesis, we 
will begin our discussion of Anglo-Welsh relations in the period after 1066.  
Yet, to talk of Wales during this period is to falsely assume its structure as conforming to a 
unified territory, under one ruler, and set within the limits of today’s porous border with 
England. Rather, Wales during the medieval period, while possessing a significant degree of 
cultural and linguistic uniformity, was divided territorially into a patchwork of minor 
principalities and lordships. Writing in 1194, Gerald of Wales, defined its territorial 
composition as follows: 
‘For time immemorial Wales has been divided into three more or less equal parts. When 
I say equal I mean in value rather than in size. These are Gwynedd, or North Wales; 
South Wales, called in Welsh Deheubarth, which really means Right-Hand Wales, a 
sub-section of which, containing seven cantrefs, has been given the name of Demetia 
or Dyved; and Powys, which is in the middle and stretches eastwards.'34 
                                                          
32 Davies refers to Wales as the first example of English colonial expansion. Davies notes that during the period 
from the late 11th to the 14th Century, Wales was conquered and administered through methods of colonial 
practice, whereby unilateral actions of the English Crown stripped native Welsh lords of their lands and titles 
and forced polities of resettlement in the less fertile uplands of the Welsh hinterland. See; Davies, R. R., 
‘Colonial Wales’, Past & Present, Vol. 65, No. 1, (November 1974), pp. 3-23 at 4-9 
33 See for example the earthen work defences of Watt’s Dyke and Offa’s Dyke which were constructed along 
what is today loosely defined as the ‘Marches’, to secure the western border of Mercia. 
34 Gerald of Wales, The Journey Through Wales and The Description of Wales, translated with an introduction 
by Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 221  
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Indeed, it was only for a brief period of seven years (1057-1063), under the rule of Gruffydd 
ap Llywelyn, that Wales35 was territorially united as one, under one ruler, a feat which John 
Davies notes as having ‘neither precedent nor successor’.36  
Even under this brief period of unity, however, the borders of Wales were still impervious to a 
fixed territorial definition. Internally, dynastic feuds led to shifting boundaries between its three 
main parts. Externally, the repeated incursions of the Marcher Lords gradually shifted the 
border with England further west,37 leading to the growth of the quasi-autonomous Anglo-
Welsh borderland known as the March.38  
It is upon this latter point that we find the basis of our analysis of Anglo-Welsh relations during 
the ‘pre-empire’ period. In making this connection, and based on the above-mentioned mosaic 
structure of Wales during the medieval period, we find that it is relatively impossible to 
attribute ‘Welsh’ diplomacy to a single identifiable source of authority. Rather, the disparate 
collection of Lords and Princes in Wales meant that English foreign policy was unable to 
assume a uniform direction, or coordinate negotiations with a single source of temporal 
authority in Wales.  
Instead, we find that the system that emerged was largely colonial in nature, seeing the gradual 
creeping of English baronial conquest into Wales, led by the ambitions of the Marcher Lords, 
and not the direction of English crown authority. The culmination of this process had, by the 
                                                          
35 The lands controlled by Gruffydd ap Llywellyn, while encompassing most of North and Mid-Wales, failed to 
conquer those lands which today form the counties of Monmouthshire and Glamorgan. 
36 Davies, J., A History of Wales, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 98 
37 Strayer, J. P., Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971), p. 341 
38 The origins of the Welsh Marches date back to 1082 and the decision of William I to gift lands at strategic 
points along the Welsh border to three of his most faithful followers – Hereford to William Fitzosbern; 
Shrewsbury to Roger Montgomery; Chester to Hugh the Fat of Avranches – their charge was to defend and 
advance the border into Wales; a strategic plan which John Davies writes both helped to secure England’s 
western border, but also provided a useful distraction to the landed elite of England which helped to unify the 
realm. Davies, J., A History of Wales, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 101 
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mid-13th century, seen the growth of the March confine any definition of an independent Wales 
as solely relatable to the Principality of Gwynedd. 
However, despite the ambiguous and shifting territorial boundaries of medieval Wales, a clear 
sense of a distinct Welsh society endured in the hinterlands of the North and West. The Welsh 
language and its accompanying rich literary culture of poetry and prose saw a distinct Welsh 
high culture endure, at least within the noble and clerical elite.39 This was supported by a unique 
system of Welsh customary law, far removed from that of the English common law and which, 
while differing in substance between the various territorial parts of Wales, maintained an 
overarching legal culture through its means of practice.40  
As Wales – or rather, Gwynedd – journeyed into the 13th century, however, its territorial 
nucleus increasingly began to shrink, concentrating itself in the mountainous heartland of 
Snowdonia and Anglesey. Despite securing notable concessions from the English King Henry 
III under the Treaty of Montgomery (1267), including the recovery of Welsh lands and the 
symbolic recognition by an English King of Llywellyn ap Gruffydd as ‘Prince of Wales’, the 
overarching trend that began to appear was that of an accelerated decline in Welsh autonomy.  
Following the ascension of Henry III’s successor, Edward I, as king of England in 1272, 
English foreign policy towards Wales entered a new era. Unlike Henry III, Edward was a strong 
king, able to secure the support of the majority of the English baronial class and, from this 
effective base, more readily able to concentrate his attentions towards the periphery. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that Edward’s approach, at least initially, was more reflective of 
                                                          
39 Morgan, K. O., Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 
90 
40 First codified in the 10th century under the reign of Hywel Dda, King of Deheubarth, the system of Welsh law 
was based on a bottom-up customary legal culture of Volksrecht, as opposed to the top-down nature of the 
English Kaiserrecht. See; Jenkins, D., ‘The Medieval Welsh Idea of Law’, The Legal History Review, Vol. 49, 
No. 3 (1981), pp. 323-348 at 326 
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the developing English ‘official mind’, and in favour of indirect control of Wales through 
overlordship, as opposed to its direct territorial conquest.41 
However, when in 1274 Llywellyn refused to continue to swear fealty to the English crown, 
and instead sought to negotiate for a new relationship with England, Edward was forced to turn 
to the extremes of military action to subdue Wales. In an unprecedented show of force, in 1277 
he entered Wales at the head of a 15,000 strong army and set about the task of subjugating the 
Welsh princes. While the ensuing conflict bears little sway on the argument of this chapter, its 
culminating event, the Statute of Rhuddlan, marks a significant point in the early history of the 
territorial constitution.   
Under the unilaterally imposed terms of Rhuddlan, Wales lost any notion of independence, as 
well as the majority of its institutional distinctiveness. The dynastic line of the Welsh princes 
was distinguished; a system of English-style shires was imposed across Llywellyn’s former 
lands in Gwynedd; taxes replaced the traditional tribute of goods by citizens to their local lords; 
the English common law replaced Welsh law in all criminal matters; a network of castles were 
constructed to subdue the population of Llywellyn’s former lands in Gwynedd and, in 1301, 
Edward of Caernarfon (later Edward II), was confirmed as the first English heir to the throne 
to hold the title of ‘Prince of Wales’, a tradition which continues to this day.42  
In constitutional terms, Wales, after Rhuddlan, largely became a territorial shell. Nevertheless, 
the terms agreed at Rhuddlan are fundamental in two ways for understanding the later political 
and constitutional history of Wales, as well as the rest of the UK. First, it reflected the maturity 
of the English state and its confidence to export its administrative system to the periphery43 – 
a trend that would later be carried forward in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Scotland. Second, 
                                                          
41 Schama, S., A History of Britain: Volume 1 – At the Edge of the World? 3000BC to 1603AD, (London: BBC, 
2003), p. 161 
42 Davies, J., A History of Wales, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 162-165 
43 Ibid., p. 162 
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it marked the beginning of the end of a Welsh identity based on civic institutions, and the 
beginning of a sense of Welsh identity defined by its distinctive language and culture. In many 
respects, Rhuddlan not only marked the beginning of English informal empire in Wales, but 
also the beginning of Wales’ definition as a culturally, as opposed to an institutionally, distinct 
unit of the UK state. 
 
1.2.2.2. Scotland 
In 1237, the Treaty of York fixed the Anglo-Scottish border on the Tweed-Solway line; a line 
which while subject to some later fluctuations and areas of ‘debatable land’, continues to define 
the border to this day.44 A little under three decades later, in 1266, the Treaty of Perth – a peace 
accord signed with the Norwegians following their defeat at the Battle of Largs – transferred 
the Outer Hebrides and the Isle of Man to the Scottish crown. Thus, by the middle of the 13th 
century, Scotland’s external borders were relatively well defined – a factor which, amongst 
others noted below, would lead to Scotland experiencing a significantly different relationship 
with England than had been seen in Wales.  
However, despite the well-developed certainty of the territorial limits of the Scottish crown’s 
authority, its ability to consolidate its control within its borders was far less successful. Unlike 
England, medieval Scotland was relatively under developed in its system of local 
administration, with a weak monarchy and a comparatively decentralised – or never truly 
unified – territory.45 Indeed, the direct authority of the Scottish crown during this period was 
only effectively exercisable in the areas of the lowland belt and along the east coast up to 
Aberdeen. The rest of Scotland in the highlands, islands and along the border with England 
                                                          
44 Barrow, G. W. S., The Kingdom of the Scots, (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 139; The final settlement of 
the ‘Debeatable Lands’ took place in the Anglo-Scottish Treaty of 1551. Lynch, M., Scotland: A New History, 
(London: Century, 1991), p. 207 
45 Massie, A., The Royal Stuarts, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2010), p. 25-26 
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remained a largely clan-based society, ruled by a largely autonomous noble class that the 
Scottish crown was not in a position to challenge.46  
Nevertheless, while Scotland remained a weak state, its comparative size and early success in 
defining at least its external borders, went a long way in influencing a distinctly different 
relationship with England than had been experienced in Wales. While it must be recognised 
that England saw the leaders in both areas as subservient, an early precedent is able to be traced 
whereby English foreign policy was far more respectful of Scotland’s external borders and 
made few large-scale – unprovoked – territorial advancements into Scotland.  
In various treaties made between England and Scotland in 1057, 1157 and 1174, despite each 
of their contents being the result of the defeat of a Scottish invasion of Northumbria, the English 
crown made no demands for territorial concessions – apart from the retreat of Scottish troops 
from Northumbria – and sought only monetary compensation and, more significantly, the 
recognition of the English King as dominus rex over Scotland.47  
What is perhaps most significant about these events is the fact that, despite each resulting from 
a Scottish invasion of England, the English response in each instance left Scotland as an 
independent realm; subservient to, but not part of, England. Indeed, as we have already seen, 
this era of Anglo-Scottish relations culminated in the Treaty of York (1237) which bilaterally 
agreed the border between the two countries, a phenomenon which has no relation in the history 
of Anglo-Welsh relations. In explaining the curiously respectful nature of Anglo-Scottish 
relations during this period, we may draw three conclusions.  
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 25 
47 Mackie, J. D., A History of Scotland, (London: Allen Lane, 1978), p. 36; Barrow, G. W. S., Kingship and 
Unity: Scotland 1000-1306, (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), p. 54; Stringer, K. J., Earl David of Huntington: A 
Study in Anglo-Scottish History, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), p. 28; Lynch, M., Scotland: A 
New History, (London: Century, 1991), p. 75 
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First, the foreign policy of the English crown during this period was primarily directed south 
to interaction with France and the English Angevin Empire. Thus, for as long as Scotland 
remained relatively subservient – and the minor nature of the incursions into Northumbria 
never amounted to a serious threat – the English had neither the will or the strategic resources 
to ‘conquer’ Scotland. Moreover, the absence of an encouraged baronial conquest in the 
Scottish March similar to that in Wales and Ireland, meant that Scotland remained united.  
Second, the significance of Scotland as having one king, ruling – at least in theory – over the 
majority of the territory north of England, meant that English foreign policy could be 
effectively directed towards securing the obedience of one central figure, as opposed to the 
mosaic collection of princes and kings in Wales and Ireland.  
Third, as already mentioned, the essence of the English ‘official mind’ during this period was 
resistant to the inclusion of new territory. Instead, we find evidence of a preference for a robust 
English governmental core as distinct from its surrounding geo-political interests, without the 
burden of administering, policing and, most importantly, consulting, new territorial conquests. 
This situation was to fundamentally change by the end of the 13th century.  
The inauguration of the English nominated, Scottish noble, John Balliol, as King of Scotland 
in 1292, following the earlier successor crisis of 1290, had seemed to deliver a system of 
government ideal to the satisfaction of Edward I who had, less than a decade earlier, 
successfully completed the subjugation of Wales. However, while fostering close relations with 
England, Balliol’s actions were counterproductive in securing the support of his own nobility. 
In 1295, less than three years into his reign, a Parliament of Scottish nobles meeting at Stirling, 
usurped Balliol of his title and took direct control of Scottish affairs.48 
                                                          
48 Barrow, G. W. S., Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1988), p. 63 
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While this action was detrimental for Edward’s foreign policy towards Scotland – removing 
his puppet King and placing the obstacle of an enhanced Scottish Parliament in his way – the 
overarching essence of the Edwardian response came as a result of the Scottish Parliaments 
accompanying decision to seek an alliance with the King of France. The signing of the Auld 
Alliance in 1295 transformed Scotland in English eyes.  
The once relatively controllable acts of the Scottish kings had now been exported to the far 
more problematic external sphere, creating a scenario that not only delivered an unruly northern 
neighbour, but also created the possibility of England having to fight a coordinated war on two 
fronts.49 Moreover, it also increased Scotland to the position of a realm independent of English 
control and enmeshed within the wider European political theatre – Scotland was now a matter 
for consideration in English foreign affairs, rather than merely the pursuit of English policy 
within the British Isles. 
Unsurprisingly, in the same year as the Franco-Scottish alliance was forged, Edward I marched 
into Scotland at the head of an army intent on subduing Scotland through the use of force. As 
was the case in Wales a decade before, Edward’s campaign was unremitting in its brutality and 
etched with triumphal symbolism at every opportunity; sacking Berwick, capturing a number 
of significant Scottish castles across the lowlands and, most symbolically, removing the Stone 
of Destiny – the primordial symbol of Scottish kingship – and transporting it to London. As 
noted by Mackie, the ‘threat’ posed by the Auld Alliance had shown the extremes of Edwardian 
foreign policy when faced with a threat to the stability of the dynastic Empire.50 
Yet, despite significant English success over the first years of the invasion, Edward’s death 
while fighting in the Scottish March in 1307 resulted in a fundamental change of direction. 
This change would primarily become associated with the Scottish King who had ascended to 
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the throne the year before Edward’s death, Robert Bruce. While it is important to discuss his 
celebrated military successes over Edward II, most notably at Bannockburn in 1314, the 
significance of Robert Bruce in the case of this thesis relates more to his wider skills of 
statecraft. In 1320, after several military successes over the English, Robert Bruce, together 
with a gathering of Scottish barons, freeholders and thirty-nine ‘lay magnates’ sent a letter – 
‘The Declaration of Arbroath’ – to the Pope at Avignon seeking papal recognition of Scotland 
as a free and independent nation.  
The corpus of the Declaration, laid out the case of Scottish independence, relying on a 
primordial – and to a large extent invented – history of the Scottish nation in justifying its 
claims.51 To many contemporary writers inclined towards the position of Scottish nationalism, 
the significance of the Declaration is symbolic as the first documented claim to national 
independence in western Europe.52 To some extent, we may note these claims as correct, 
however, it is also important to recognise the nuanced understanding of independence within 
the supranational religious structure of medieval Europe, as well as underlying aim of the 
Declaration as primarily seeking the legitimacy of Bruce as King of Scots, rather than seeking 
a direct declaration of the popular independence of Scotland  – aside from confirming Scotland 
as free of English overlordship.53 
Despite an initial success, by 1321 the aims of the Declaration had failed, and the Anglo-
Scottish conflict continued.54 It was not until 1328 and the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton 
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35 
 
that hostilities were formally ended; the Treaty re-fixing the border at the earlier position 
agreed under the Treaty of York and, more significantly, recognising Scotland as independent 
of English overlordship. While another sustained period of conflict emerged between the two 
realms no less than four years later and, once again, surrounded attempts by England to subdue 
Scotland, for the remainder of the 14th century, Scotland remained independent.  
The enduring security mechanism of the Auld Alliance, as well as England’s renewed interest 
in a south facing foreign policy aimed at France and Spain, meant that for much of the 15th and 
16th centuries, Anglo-Scottish conflict remained relatively subdued. Moreover, following the 
Protestant Reformation from the mid-16th century, the geopolitical map of Europe became 
redrawn: Scotland’s positive reception of the Reformation meant that its interests increasingly 
became conjoined with those of Protestant England, and increasingly came to drift from the 
Catholic foreign policy of France, leading to the eventual collapse of the Auld Alliance in 1560.  
Symbolically, the climax of this renewed sense of Anglo-Scottish cooperation was achieved in 
1603 when the Stuart King James IV of Scotland, and cousin of the deceased Elizabeth I of 
England, ascended to the throne of England. The resulting Union of the Crowns, while 
maintaining Scotland and England as independent states, linked them in a personal union under 
a common monarch.  
The period of informal empire had now begun in Scotland, however, in contrast to the earlier 
experience of Wales, we find that its fruition was not the result of military conquest, but of the 
dynastic fortune of the House of Stuart; informal empire by way of circumstance, as opposed 
to desire, at least from an English perspective.55 
 
                                                          
55 There is significant evidence that the Stuart King, James VI of Scotland, was receptive of assuming the throne 
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1.2.2.3. Ireland 
Similar to events in Wales and Scotland, Ireland’s experience during the pre-empire period was 
devoid of explanation by way of a single English approach to the periphery. Yet, despite the 
individual circumstances in Ireland, we find clear evidence that, similar to Wales and Scotland, 
the basis of later English attitudes towards Ireland developed during the period prior to its entry 
into England’s informal empire – although in Ireland, their manifestation took a distinctly more 
severe and colonial form. 
In order to understand this experience, we are able to locate a central tenet in Ireland’s 
constitutional history as linked to religion. Indeed, in 1154, we find the first formal 
constitutional proclamation of England’s relationship with Ireland through Pope Adrian IV’s 
issuance of the Papal Bull Laudabiliter – granting the English King, Henry II, the legitimacy 
to invade Ireland to subdue the ‘rude and ignorant’ Irish, and to bring the semi-autonomous 
Catholic Church in Ireland in line with the newly ordained papal reforms.56  
What is important to note in regards to Adrian’s Bull, however, is that its legitimacy was not 
for the conquest of a formal Kingdom of Ireland, but rather for the territorial unit of Ireland 
itself – granted under the aged authority of the Donation of Constantine.57 Indeed, throughout 
the medieval period, the constitutional arrangement of Ireland was more similar to that of 
Wales than Scotland, made up of a mosaic of smaller kingdoms, periodically arranged under 
the feudal authority of a native High King of Ireland. 
Yet, despite the papal mandate for the invasion of Ireland, the first English expedition to cross 
the Irish Sea in 1166 drew its motivation more from noble ambition rather than any sense of a 
moral or religious crusade. Leading the invasion was Richard FitzGilbert de Clare, Earl of 
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Pembroke (‘Strongbow’), acting upon a promise to assist the deposed King Dermot 
MacMurrough of Leinster recover his kingdom.   
Strongbow’s offer of assistance, however, did not come without its price and, in return for 
aiding Dermot, he was guaranteed the hand of his eldest daughter in marriage and the 
succession of the Kingdom of Leinster – a title that he quickly inherited following Dermot’s 
death in 1171.58 However, the gravity of Strongbow’s success, and in particular his new title 
as King of Leinster, was to stoke significant disquiet in the Court of Henry II. In that same year, 
Henry embarked for Ireland at the head of an army. 
The overarching significance of Henry’s arrival in Ireland, was that it was not at the head of an 
army intent on the conquest of Leinster or the deposition of Strongbow, but on reconfirming 
Strongbow’s allegiance to the King of England as his feudal overlord.59 Indeed, by the time of 
his departure from Ireland in 1172, Henry had confirmed Strongbow as Lord of Leinster. 
Although, it is upon this point that we find the crucial exercise of the English ‘official mind’ 
in Ireland: the reduction of Strongbow’s titular authority from King to Lord of Leinster – 
reconfirming Henry as his feudal overlord, but maintaining the essence of peripheral autonomy 
similar to that seen in Wales and Scotland.60 
Yet, despite the possibility for comparison between Henry’s actions in Ireland and those which 
he also undertook in Scotland and Wales, there is also a distinct difference in the way Henry, 
and indeed later English monarchs, approached Ireland compared to Scotland or Wales. 
Fundamentally, this may be summarised as the existence of a heightened sense of anxiety over 
                                                          
58 In reality, Strongbow’s authority as King of Leinster failed to extend much further from the coastal 
strongholds, and the majority of the hinterland of Leinster remained under the control of those loyal to Rory 
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60 Strongbow also divided Strongbow’s demesne, creating the new Lordship of Meath out of the northern 
portion of the Kingdom of Leinster, and bestowing it upon his trusted Lord, Hugh DeLacy – an act of political 
stratagem designed as a countermeasure to Strongbow’s authority in Ireland. Ibid., p. 63 
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the political situation in Ireland. Whether down to the fact of Ireland’s unique geographical 
separation from England by the Irish Sea, or the initial precedent of potential disloyalty set by 
Strongbow, we find the emerging trend of English constitutional actions as increasingly more 
concerned with the guarantee of control than seen in Scotland or Wales.  
Less than three years after subduing Strongbow, the Treaty of Windsor (1175), ratified by the 
Papacy, confirmed Henry II as Lord of Ireland – nullifying the historical title of the native High 
King of Ireland, and providing Henry with the supreme temporal overlordship of Ireland, but 
holding the title on trust from the Papacy.61 In reality, however, the effects of Windsor did little 
to bring Ireland under the direct control of the English Crown, and the hinterland remained 
unconquered for the majority of the next century.   
Indeed, in further comparison to Wales, the system of territorial control in Ireland after 
Windsor continued primarily along the lines of the gradual advancement of the Anglo-Irish 
Marcher Lords into the hinterland. To coordinate this action, evidence pertains to the existence 
of an Irish Parliament from the late-13th century.62 Similar to the actions of its medieval 
namesake in England, the composition and purpose of the Parliament was primarily concerned 
with coordination between the Anglo-Irish elite and the English King in matters relating to the 
collection of revenues and mobilisation of armies when required.63 However, from the 
beginning of the 14th century, the Irish Parliament also came to be increasingly autonomous of 
English influence, governing Ireland with a high degree of autonomy, and an increasing sense 
of identity and custom separate from that of England.64  
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Initially, this seems not to have produced any notable response from England, either as a result 
of its distraction with events in France, or the recognition that the governance of Ireland 
required a unique style of governance, particularly for the control of the significant hinterland. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-14th century, the reality of the Irish Parliament’s increasing shift away 
from England, and the development of a clear sense of separated political identity within the 
Anglo-Irish elite, forced England to act.    
In 1366, the Irish Parliament, under the direct request of Edward II, represented by the Lord 
Deputy of Ireland, Lionel of Antwerp, passed the Statute of Kilkenny. Under the terms of the 
Statute, English-Irish marriages were forbidden and the English language was enforced upon 
all residents of English controlled areas of Ireland, as were the traditions of English law, dress 
and customs.65 Viewed retrospectively, the terms of Kilkenny marked a turning point in the 
governance of Ireland, shifting it from a conquering to a colonial administration.66 
While the success of the programme of cultural segregation instigated at Kilkenny is open to 
continued historical debate, the actions of the English Crown in Ireland over a century later 
was a further demonstration of the continued English anxiety over the governance of Ireland 
during the pre-empire period. Under the premiership of Gerald FitzGerald as Lord Deputy of 
Ireland in the late 15th century, evidence suggests of a further move in Ireland that tested the 
limits of English tolerance with the periphery. Under FitzGerald, the motions of the Irish 
Parliament became increasingly maverick, and FitzGerald himself increasingly synonymous 
with an Irish premier as opposed to the King’s representative in Ireland.  
In a response characteristic of the English ‘official mind’ and the need to control the periphery, 
an English force was swiftly sent to Ireland, FitzGerald removed, and the prominent English 
noble, Edward Poynings installed as the new Lord Deputy of Ireland. Unlike FitzGerald, 
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Poynings was a staunch follower of the English Crown and, in 1495, presided over the passage 
of the Statute of Drogheda (Poynings Law), which insisted that any future meeting of the Irish 
Parliament, or indeed any future legislation put forward by the Parliament, could only be 
enacted following the approval of the English Crown, by way of the English Parliament.67 
Poynings Law was a method of attempting to cement Westminster supremacy over the 
Parliament at Dublin Castle, and to stop Ireland from being used as a landing pad or ‘back 
door’ for an attack on England.68 However, what is perhaps most interesting in the passage of 
Poynings Law is the absence of direct territorial control by England over Ireland, as seen in 
Wales in 1294. Indeed, while undeniably subservient to the English Crown, the Irish Parliament 
and the Kingdom of Ireland remained as symbolic of the continued distinction between Ireland 
and England (and Wales).  
Yet, while the Statutes of Kilkenny and Drogheda had enforced a clear system of colonial rule 
upon Ireland, it was not until the 16th century that the true extent of cultural and societal division 
intensified in Ireland.  
Due to the inefficacy of the Henrician reformation to take hold in Ireland – arguably as a result 
of Irish resistance to the English origins of the reforms69 – a divide began to emerge between 
Protestants and Catholics in Ireland. As a result, the English response was to instigate a clear 
system of territorial control over Ireland.  
First, in 1542, Henry VIII was confirmed under the new title of King of Ireland. The 
justification for this adaptation in the titular form of the Crown in Ireland was essentially a 
response to the Henrician Reformation, and an attempt to re-legitimise English control over 
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Ireland – a matter which had previously drawn its legitimacy from Papal proclamation.70 While 
not overtly altering much in terms of the overall governance of Ireland, the 1542 declaration 
was nonetheless significant in making further reference to the fact of Ireland as constitutionally 
distinct from the rest of England – a factor which served only to enhance the idea of Ireland as 
a colonial possession of the English state.71 
Second, while producing significant effects in the territorial isolation of Ireland, the effects of 
the Henrician revolution also had significant effects on the arrangement of Irish society, and 
the crystallisation of the sense of what it was to be Irish. As noted by Ellis, in the period prior 
to the Henrician reformation, the traditional understanding of Irish identity was constructed 
through the cultural distinction between Gaedhil and the Gaill: the former being a primarily 
linguistic identity, synonymous with the label of ‘Irish’, and extended across the Gaelic 
speaking population of Ireland and, more significantly, into the Gallic speaking populations of 
the Western Isles and the Highlands of Scotland – the latter of these terms (Gaill) was used to 
distinguish the linguistic and cultural ‘others’ in these areas, namely the English and Scots 
speaking populations.72  
The ability to ascribe Irishness as a Pan-Gaelic identity was, to a large extent, aided by the 
additional shared custom of the Catholic faith – a factor which disappeared following the 
reformation.73 Thus, following 1542, we also find that the arrangement of identity in Ireland 
crystallised into a distinct territorial form, confined to the island of Ireland – following the 
positive reception of the reformation in Scotland – and dictated by the boundaries of religious 
observance as opposed to linguistic uniformity attached to the idea of Faith and Fatherland 
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within Ireland.74 Indeed, after this period, the new Gaedhil was increasingly constructed by the 
union of native Irish and Anglo-Irish Catholics against the new influx of English sponsored 
Protestantism.75 
Indicative of the newly reconfigured arrangement of social allegiance in Ireland was the events 
that took place in Ulster from 1594-1610. Owing to the new bounds of religious affiliation, the 
native Irish nobility became increasingly hostile to the will of the Protestant English. In 1594, 
the actions of the Ulster Confederacy, led by Hugh O’Neill, resulted in nearly a decade of 
conflict with England. The result was the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy, and the flight of 
the native Irish early from Ulster – to be replaced by the large-scale influx of Protestants into 
the new Ulster Plantation.  
After 1610, the island of Ireland was, in its entirety, under the control of the English crown, 
thus for the first time unifying the English Kingdom of Ireland. While not amounting to a 
formal act of statutory recognition or dynastic union as was the case in Wales and Scotland, 
the completion of the territorial annexation of Ireland was, for Bulpitt, the indication of the 
formal beginnings of the period of informal empire in Ireland.  
Under this transition into informal empire, we find that similar to Scotland, little in fact changed 
in the governance of Ireland. The Irish Parliament continued to exist, and to be legislatively 
subordinate to the English Parliament under the continuing existence of Poynings Law. 
Moreover, a clear religious and cultural divide continued, and would be further enhanced over 
the coming century through the expansion of the Ulster Plantation and the attempts to secure 
the Protestant ascendency in Ireland.  
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1.2.3. Summary  
The arguments presented in this section of the chapter may be summarised under three broad 
headings.  
First, we find the early emergence of England’s relationship with the periphery. By the 11th 
century in Wales and Scotland, and by the middle of the 12th in Ireland, England was recognised 
as the feudal overlord, certainly in theory, if not always in reality. Thus, by the end of the 12th 
century, the existence of ‘pre-empire’ was represented in each of the four constituent parts of 
the British Isles.  
Second, in all three parts of the periphery, the initial position of England was to maintain a 
preference of abstract control as opposed to intervention or direct control. While the incursions 
by Marcher Lords into the periphery, particular in Wales and Ireland, gradually extended the 
line of English controlled land into the periphery, their actions were uncoordinated, and 
arguably not part of a grand plan.  
Instead, it may be argued that the English Crown’s acquiesce in affording free reign to the 
Marcher Lords was more to safeguard the obedience of the nobility through the promise of a 
continuously expanding empire, as opposed to being part of a strategy to assume territorial 
control of the periphery. No more is this the case than in Scotland after the Treaty of York, 
where we see a clear definition of the unwillingness for English conquest – this is, of course, 
reversed by the Scottish Wars of Independence a little over two centuries later. 
Third, the arrival of ‘informal empire’ in each of the three parts of the periphery was the result 
of intense moments of military and political unsettlement, and not of the inevitable conclusion 
of a process of the gradual crystallisation of feudal relations to form a more cohesive and 
unionising set of constitutional relationships.  
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Finally, as an overall conclusion, we find a clear acknowledgement from the corpus of this first 
section of the chapter, that the bonds of political and constitutional relationship between 
England and the periphery began in a period before the arrival of informal empire. In this 
regard, we may extent Bulpitt’s analysis of the historical construction of the United Kingdom 
back to the 11th century. In the next section of the chapter, we will see how the constitutional 
processes and ideologies established in the pre-empire period continued to influence the 
eventual jump from informal to formal empire. 
 
1.3. Union and Revolution 
This section of the chapter will seek to isolate and analyse the three processes of Union that 
took place between England and the three peripheral parts of the British Isles. The three unions 
will be addressed chronologically, beginning with Wales (1536), followed by Scotland (1707) 
and Ireland (1801). Within the discussion in this section of the chapter, emphasis will be placed 
on identifying the fundamental logic within England that motivated the shift to instigating 
formal empire.  
 
1.3.1. Anglo-Welsh Union 
Under the terms of the Anglo-Welsh Union, we find what Bulpitt defined as the first example 
of the English shift from ‘informal’ to ‘formal’ Empire.76 However, unlike the later examples 
of political union and formal empire in Scotland and Ireland, the Anglo-Welsh Union shows 
far less evidence of being the result of an English response to a breach of the ‘official mind’. 
Indeed, the Union was more akin to an administrative exercise, designed to replace the failing 
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system of Marcher lordships which had become relatively lawless hinterlands, and to provide 
an effective mechanism for the better governance of Wales.77 
To this end, the terms of the Acts of Union78 formally dissolved and reconfigured the Marcher 
lordships, which came to form part of either the existing network of six Welsh counties, or five 
newly created counties along the border with England.79 In reflection of this union, twenty-
four Welsh members were admitted into the English House of Commons; the first territorial 
expansion of the English Parliament to comprise representatives from the Celtic periphery.80  
As well as providing for administrative uniformity, the Acts also made it possible for the 
completion of the application of the laws of England into Wales, removing the last vestiges of 
Welsh customary law, and creating a unified legal system between the two countries. To some 
commentators, such as the historian Glanmor Williams, the effects of the Acts in this area were 
not that significant; merely confirming what had been a gradual and relatively organic 
assimilation of the two legal systems since the passage of the Statute of Rhuddlan, three 
centuries before.81  
However, as noted by Peter R. Roberts, the provisions of the Acts did not create a system 
whereby the two legal systems were immediately congruent. Rather, the Acts expressly tasked 
the existing Council of Wales and the Marches, based at Ludlow, with breaking down the 
administrative and legal differences between the two countries, to a point at which they were 
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unnoticeable; a role which Roberts claims was not completed in full until the end of the 
century.82  
Indeed, for almost two centuries after the Acts themselves, we find that Wales retained an air 
of institutional distinctiveness within the apparatus of the English state. In administrative 
matters, the Council of Wales continued to exercise the royal prerogative in Wales, until its 
abolition in 1689. In judicial matters, the Courts of Great Session continued to sit in Wales – 
with the exclusion of Monmouthshire which was attached to the Oxford circuit – until 1830. 
In legislative affairs, Wales was routinely specified as a unit of territorial distinction 
accompanying England until the passage of the Wales and Berwick Act in 1746: 
‘in all Cases where the Kingdom of England, or that part of Great Britain called 
England, hath been or shall be mentioned in any Act of Parliament, the same has been 
and shall be from henceforth be deemed and taken to comprehend and include the 
Dominion of Wales and Town of Berwick upon Tweed.’83 
Thus, we find that while reaching a destination of complete institutional assimilation, the initial 
realties of the Anglo-Welsh Union, while creating a formal legal Union, were merely the 
beginning of the process of eventual assimilation, which was not completed in full until the 
18th century. In this regard, we may draw two important conclusions as to the nature of the 
Anglo-Welsh Union: 
First, is the lack of any notable opposition to the Union, or the later processes of further 
assimilation. Indeed, as noted by John Davies, following the disbanding of the Council of 
Wales and the Marches in 1689, the majority of the Welsh gentry simply turned their attentions 
to the growing metropolitan capital of London; a location which would become a central theatre 
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in the development of Welsh politics well into the 20th century.84 In this regard, the Union was, 
from a functional point of view, a relatively organic transition in the incorporation of Welsh 
political society into England.  
Second, the Acts failed to create – and arguably never sought to achieve – a unified culture 
between England and Wales. While the terms of the 1536 Act prohibited the use of Welsh in 
the law courts and all other processes of state – a phenomenon that would remain until 194285 
– it made little effort for any proactive assimilation. Instead, paradoxically, the accompanying 
events of the Henrician revolution in breaking with the supranational authority of the Catholic 
church provided the conditions whereby the linguistic identity of Wales was able to continue, 
following the widespread translation of the bible into Welsh after 1562.86 
Thus, in conclusion, we find that under the terms of the Union, Wales was incorporated into 
the English state, having by the 18th century lost virtually any measure of institutional 
distinctiveness. However, while congruent, we also find that Wales managed to retain a distinct 
cultural identity for much of this period; a reflection of the ‘victory’ of the Welsh language and 
culture,87 but also, of the operation of the English official mind, which sought legal unity, but 
made little effort for cultural congruency.  
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1.3.2. Anglo-Scottish Union 
As was concluded in the previous discussion on Scotland in this chapter, the beginnings of 
Scotland’s place in informal empire began in 1603 following the Union of the Crowns. Under 
this arrangement, the Stuart King, James I/VI sat on the thrones of both England and Scotland, 
thus joining the two kingdoms together in a personal union. Yet, while united under a common 
monarch, the Union of the Crowns failed to unite the two kingdoms in legal or political terms, 
a reality well identified by Dicey and Rait:  
‘Under the union the King of England was the same person as the King of Scotland. 
But, as King of England, he had, constitutionally, no authority in Scotland, and as King 
of Scotland, he had no authority in England. Hence, it resulted that no law passed by 
the English Parliament had operation in Scotland, and no law passed by the Scottish 
Parliament has operation in England.’88 
Thus, for the majority of the 17th century, while formal political union between the two 
independent kingdoms was often discussed, and even became a brief reality under the 
Cromwellian Protectorate (1653–1659), England and Scotland remained independent 
sovereign states.89 In illustrating this fact, we find that for much of the period of the Union of 
the Crowns, both kingdoms pursued distinct, and at times opposing, objectives in areas such as 
trade and foreign affairs.  
From the mid-17th century, the English Royal Navy actively enforced the terms of the 
Navigation Acts, restricting all foreign vessels from trading with England’s overseas colonies: 
a measure originally designed to counter the Dutch monopoly on transatlantic trade, but which 
owing to the constitutional reality of the Union of the Crowns, also saw the Acts’ enforcement 
against Scotland. In response to their exclusion from English overseas markets, in 1695 several 
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members of the Scottish noble and merchant elite formed the Company of Scotland, aiming to 
mitigate the effects of the Navigation Acts and establish a Scottish colony in the Isthmus of 
Panama – an area known as the ‘Darien’.90 
Whether by poor coordination, disease, or a refusal by the English to lend their support, the 
Darien scheme failed within its first few years, bankrupting many of its investors, and having 
severe economic repercussions for Scotland.91 The effects of the failure to colonise the Darien 
were further compounded by the reality of the English conflict with France, Scotland’s 
historical ally and still largest trading partner, which saw vital revenue streams restricted by an 
English blockade of French ports.92 
Reflective of this fact, the actions and ideology of the Scottish Parliament became increasingly 
protectionist. In 1703, the Scottish Parliament passed two pieces of legislation designed to 
protect Scotland’s economy and trading interests. The first, the Wine Act, declared that 
Scotland would continue to trade with France despite English hostilities. The second, the Wool 
Act, restricted English wool imports into Scotland in an attempt to defend Scotland’s woollen 
industry and promote exports.  
While the effects of this mercantilist turn had little effect on England in practical economic 
terms, the Acts had a significant symbolic impact of demonstrating the increasingly 
unpredictable and volatile actions of its partner in the Union of the Crowns. However, the long-
term significance of the 1703 legislation in influencing the English desire for political union is 
still a matter of significant contestation within the historical community.93 A factor that is less 
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contested, is the Scottish Parliament’s actions in 1704 in connection with the security of the 
protestant succession within the dynastic empire of the British Isles.94 
The inability of Queen Anne to produce a surviving heir to the throne made it increasingly 
obvious to the English that a successor must be chosen from the Protestant Kingdoms of 
Europe. In 1701, the English Parliament passed the Act of Settlement – which under the 
prerogative also extended to Ireland – safeguarding the succession of the two kingdoms to the 
protestant granddaughter of James I, Electress Sophie of Hanover.  
However, owing to the constitutional makeup of the Union of the Crowns, the English 
Parliament was unable to extend the Act of Settlement to Scotland, and thus required the 
Scottish Parliament to pass identical legislation in recognition of Sophie as heir to the Stuart 
throne in Scotland. Yet, in an act of unmistaken defiance, the Scottish Parliament refused to 
implement similar terms and, in 1704, passed the Act of Security, guaranteeing the right of the 
Scottish Parliament to elect its own successor to Anne as Queen of Scotland.  
Compounded together, the increasing economic and political hostility of the Scottish 
Parliament towards England had a watershed effect of swiftly realigning attitudes south of the 
border. Faced with the increasingly maverick actions of the Scottish Parliament to the north, 
and a protracted war with France to the south, it was with surprising ease that a majority of the 
English Parliament were so quickly converted to favour formal political union with Scotland.95 
Within a year of the Scottish Parliament passing the Act of Security, the English Parliament 
began its action for securing a Union with Scotland. 
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In an act of unashamed economic coercion designed to subdue Scottish opposition, the English 
Parliament passed the Alien Act in 1705. The terms of the Act threatened that if the Scottish 
Parliament did not come to the negotiating table on a political union by Christmas Day of that 
year, Scots would be barred from English economic markets, both colonial and domestic, and 
be treated as ‘aliens’ within England.96 Faced with such strong political and economic pressure, 
along with the dire reality of a Scottish economy that had never truly recovered from the Darien 
incident, a Scottish parliamentary delegation was quickly assembled and sent south to London 
in November 1805. 
Yet, while mindful of the reality that an agreement needed to be reached with England, the 
Scottish Parliament was far from united on how such a Union would be constructed. Those in 
the Court Party, aligned to Queen Anne, were largely receptive to the idea of an incorporating 
Union. However, they faced notable opposition from the Country Party, Jacobite Cavaliers, 
and the anti-union lobby known as Squadrone Volante, who were vehemently opposed to 
Scotland’s incorporation into England, and instead favoured the status quo, or a more dramatic 
loosening of the bonds of dynastic union.97  
For opponents of the Union such as William Seton of Pitmedden, himself an eventual convert 
to the idea of incorporating union, the initial prospect of incorporation spelt the erosion of 
ancient Scottish freedoms. Instead, Pitmedden, along with others in the Country Party, 
advocated in favour of a ‘federal union’ with England.98 We find a useful demonstration of the 
logic of the Scottish anti-incorporationist argument through the writing of Pitmedden’s ally 
and fellow Parliamentarian, James Hodges:  
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‘Now, when I speak of a Federal Union, in distinction from a Union of Incorporation, 
I do not mean such an Union, as consisting barely in Articles of Confederacy betwixt 
the two Kingdoms, otherways [sic] altogether disunited; but an Union of a closer 
Nature, whereby both Kingdoms are to be united under one common Monarch of 
both.’99 
In expanding upon this quote, we find the essential idea of Hodges’ federal union as resting on 
a Union of the Crowns, with certain additional articles of confederation in regards to foreign 
alliances, war and trade: a scheme which proposed little in the way of departure from what had 
existed between the two kingdoms since 1603.100 Indeed, in this regard, we find a distinct 
blurring of Hodges’ idea from what is in the modern sense seen as a clear division between 
federal and confederal union. When viewed from this perspective, we find that the principle of 
‘federal union’ at the time of Hodges’ writing was largely still in its infancy – at least when 
compared against its modern construction – lacking a distinctive institutional form or 
precedent, and largely reliant on the continental examples of the United Provinces and the 
Swiss Confederacy.101  
In both of these examples, the arrangement of sovereignty – itself still a developing concept – 
was still internally constructed in its absolute form; a construction that we may today 
synonymise more with the distinction between the ‘unitary state’ and the ‘confederation’, as 
opposed to ‘federation’.102 In characterising this point, we find a useful aid in the theoretical 
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commentary of Johannes Althusius who, writing in the early-17th century, distinguished 
between complete and partial confederation103 as means of state configuration.  
Indicative of the Althusian distinction was its reliance on the absolute and binary separation of 
sovereignty as either the possession of the central government (complete confederation104) – 
what we may today term the ‘unitary state’ – or remaining in the possession of the provinces 
(partial confederation105) – what we today may distinguish as a ‘confederation’. Interestingly, 
we find no distinction in Althusius’ work to the idea of sovereignty as divided within the state, 
or of federal union as a ‘middle ground’ between the two absolute constructions of the unitary 
state and confederation – a principle that is commonly regarded to have only truly gained 
institutional form in the United States at the end of the 18th century.106 
Indeed, at the time of the Anglo-Scottish deliberations on the Union, the Swiss Confederation 
exercised a form of government that amounted to little more than a defensive alliance, with no 
easily definable system of central government, and a diverse mix of governmental styles 
employed in its respective Cantons, each of which remained sovereign in absolute terms.107 In 
the example of the United Provinces, we find a more developed system of central government, 
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facilitated through the operation of the Staten Generaal, however, its scope was – at least in 
theoretical terms – limited by the retention of sovereignty in the Provinces.108  
Thus, for the deliberations on the Anglo-Scottish Union, there existed little or no theoretical or 
practical distinction of ‘federal union’ – at least in its modern form – from which to base an 
argument for a form of non-incorporating Union of any notable separation from the Union of 
the Crowns. Yet, while lacking in structural distinctiveness, we find the arguments for ‘federal 
union’ as more significant in highlighting the underlying political anxiety in Scotland of 
subordination to, as opposed to equality with, England. Indeed, to a large extent, these 
arguments have altered little in the more than three centuries of Union after 1707, and continue 
to inform the position of nationalists in Scotland to this day109 – as will be demonstrated in 
Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. 
Yet, despite an organised opposition, and to some extent an open hostility towards 
incorporating union in Scotland,110 the strength of English argument, and the positive reception 
of the compromises made during the deliberations, led to an inevitable consensus in favour of 
incorporating union. On the 16th January 1707, the Scottish Parliament ratified the Act of Union 
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by 110 votes to 67, an action which, when taken together with the earlier ratification of the Act 
of Union in England in 1706, completed the Union process. Taking place on the 1st May 1707, 
the two nations formally ceased to exist and the new state of Great Britain emerged.  
From a legal perspective, the Anglo-Scottish Union created a unitary state, with the source of 
legal authority coming from the supremacy of the Crown and Parliament – this construction 
has been the subject of much contemporary debate in regards to Scottish nationalism.111 In 
political terms, however, the Union was only partial in its practical application upon 
Scotland.112 Under the provisions of the Treaty, Scotland retained a number of its 
administrative structures: the continued existence and independence of the Scottish Kirk, 
education and legal systems, and local administrative system of burghs.113   
For Tom Devine, this reality was well demonstrated in the initial decades after the Union, up 
to the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, whereby the administration of Scottish affairs fell primarily 
to the Secretary of Scotland,114 Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, rather than the Prime 
Minister Warpole; ‘Westminster was sovereign in law, but in practical terms Scotland was 
Argyll’s domain.’115 Moreover, in the Highlands, up until its abolition after the 1745 rebellion, 
the system of local administration continued as a primarily clan-based system, with little 
                                                          
111 Two conceptions of the ‘Union’. Under the Scottish construction, 1707 marked the Union of two sovereign 
states to form a new state – thus, the independence of one of those states would mean the end of the Union and 
by result the end of the State of ‘Great Britain’. Under the English construction, Scotland was absorbed into 
England, which was then redefined to form ‘Great Britain’. Thus, from an English perspective, upon Scottish 
independence nothing would fundamentally change in Westminster – the parliament would continue, albeit with 
jurisdiction over a smaller territorial area, but fundamentally Scottish independence would just be the ‘secession 
of a smaller state’. MacCormick, N., ‘Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?’, Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. 53, (2000), pp. 721-736 
112 Paterson, L., ‘Scottish home rule: Radical break or pragmatic adjustment?’, Regional and Federal Studies, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, (1998), pp. 53-67 at 54 
113 Keating, M., ‘Reforging the Union: Devolution and Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom’, Publius, 
Vol. 28, No. 1, (Winter, 1998), pp. 217-234 at 219 
114 The office of Secretary of Scotland was abolished following the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion.  
115 Devine, T., Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present, (London: Penguin, 2017), p. 51 
56 
 
relationship to central government – or indeed the rest of lowland Scotland – other than a formal 
oath of allegiance to the Crown.116 
Indeed, while the Union prescribed legal incorporation upon Scotland, it initially made little 
effort to extend this incorporation into the administrative or cultural realm of Scotland, and left 
many of the concerns of ‘low politics’ and domestic affairs in the hands of Scots themselves.117 
To some extent, this was merely a practical application of the constitutional mind, transferring 
over the control of ‘high politics’ in Scotland to the new Parliament of Great Britain, but 
leaving ‘low politics’ relatively undisturbed from its pre-union configuration – so long as Scots 
refrained from challenging the sovereignty of the new British Parliament.118  
More significantly, however, was the reality that the Anglo-Scottish Union was not in itself 
designed to build a new British nation, but to safeguard the geopolitical security system of 
Great Britain from outside influence: it was a ‘marriage of convenience’ for both nations, as 
opposed to a coming together of companionable brethren.119 Indeed, it appears that the aims of 
the architects of the Union had little concern with the design of any social or cultural nation, 
and pursued a pragmatic approach that would have a significant effect on allowing for a unique 
Scottish political identity to endure:  
‘… the men who drafted the Treaty of Union carefully left every institution in England 
and every institution in Scotland untouched by the Act, provided that the existence of 
such institutions was consistent with the main objects of the Act. Hence the 
extraordinary success of the Act. It destroyed everything which kept the Scottish and 
the English people apart; it destroyed nothing which did not threaten the essential unity 
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of the whole people; and hence, lastly, the supreme glory of the Act, that while creating 
the political unity it kept alive the nationalism both of England and of Scotland.’120 
Therefore, while uniting Scotland in a formal legal union with England, and creating the new 
state of Great Britain, we find that the Anglo-Scottish Union was, from a political perspective, 
only a partial union. Indeed, while 1707 proved to be the ‘end of an auld song’ for the Scottish 
Parliament, it had little effect on the everyday lives of Scots who, aside from the reforms 
attached to the Jacobite Rebellions in 1715 and 1745, continued to maintain a strong degree of 
administrative freedom in the regulation of their civil society.   
 
1.3.3. Anglo-Irish Union 
In Part One of this chapter, we saw how the experience of pre-empire in Ireland had, by the 
15th century, developed into a clear system of colonial government. Carrying forth into the 
period of informal empire, after 1610, Ireland maintained its position as separated from and 
subordinate to England, both as a whole, through Poynings Law, and through the particular 
segregation of Irish Catholics, who were disenfranchised and excluded from public office. The 
essence of such division was further enhanced in 1690, following the victory of the Williamite 
forces over the Jacobites at the Battle of the Boyne, an event that Ignatieff describes as instilling 
‘the founding myth of ethnic superiority’ of Protestant community in Ireland.121 
However, despite this long historical past, from 1750 onwards there is evidence of concessions 
being granted to Irish Catholics, beginning with their admission into the military, the right to 
hold property and, in 1793, the beginnings of Catholic enfranchisement amongst the nobility. 
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Moreover, following the passage of the 1782 constitution, the restrictions of Poynings Law 
were lifted, allowing the Irish Parliament considerable legislative freedoms.122  
Yet, despite the success of Irish Parliamentarians such as Henry Grattan in securing such 
reforms, the system of governance in Ireland continued to maintain the Protestant ascendency 
and to restrict Catholic membership from the Irish Parliament. As a direct reflection of this 
fact, a growing movement developed within the Catholic community in opposition to the 
system of governance employed in Ireland. The essence of such resentment crystallised in 1791 
through the formation of the Society of United Irishmen, a unique collection of Catholic 
Irishmen and a minority of Protestant landowners, each with the agenda of freeing Ireland from 
the perceived oppression of British rule. From an early stage, the actions of the Society were 
militant and, in 1798, mobilised in force across Ireland in protest against British Rule.  
For the historian Roy Foster, the 1798 rebellion marked one of the most concentrated periods 
of violence in Irish history, resulting in an estimated death toll on both sides of more than 
30,000.123 Its result, when taken in context with the Napoleonic Wars with France, 
demonstrated to the British Government that Ireland could no longer be relied upon to govern 
itself. Fearing French intervention, and the possibility of Ireland being used as a staging post 
for an invasion of Great Britain, the Whig Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, hastily 
introduced legislation for an Anglo-Irish Union.124 
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In this regard, we find little divergence between the motivations for Anglo-Irish Union than 
had been experienced in Scotland a little under a century before. Similarly, the English 
response of political union in Ireland was a reply to a short period of political instability and 
insubordination. The Union in 1801 was, as in 1707, a flagrant exercise of the English ‘official 
mind’ in securing its strategic interests through the application of its political superiority: it 
was the result of strategic foreign and military policy, designed for the control, as opposed to 
the integration of Ireland.125 
Yet, alongside the sterile pragmatism of this argument, we also find a high degree of evidence 
that the Union was, at least from a Catholic perspective, conducive to the aspirations of many 
of the Irish themselves. Indeed, evidence shows that opposition towards the Union in Ireland 
was greater, as a percentage, within the Protestant as opposed to the Catholic community – the 
latter of which found recompense in the promises of Catholic emancipation and economic 
prosperity attached to the Union.126  Conversely, for the Protestant minority in Ireland, such 
promises raised anxieties as to the ability to protect the Protestant ascendency from an 
empowered Catholic majority.127 Despite such protests from the Anglo-Irish elite, however, 
the Union with Ireland was driven forward with haste – largely as a result of the persuasive 
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politics applied by Lord Castlereagh128 – coming into effect on the 1st January 1801, less than 
three years after the 1798 rebellion.  
Under the terms of the Union itself, while transferring control over the high politics of war, 
trade and foreign affairs to the new Parliament of ‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland’ at Westminster, the everyday administration of Ireland continued to be conducted in 
Ireland. Similar to arrangements in Scotland after 1707, the terms agreed in 1801 left the 
majority of domestic affairs in Ireland under the control of a Lord Lieutenant and Chief 
Secretary, overseeing a system of Irish departments and boards based at Dublin Castle.129  
Yet, despite maintaining a system of Irish administrative independence, the architects of the 
Union failed to deliver upon several of the promises made in the run up to the Union. After 
1801, the majority of Catholics remained unfranchised and excluded from participating in the 
governance of Ireland – the repercussions of which helped maintain a cultural barrier restricting 
the full integration of the Irish catholic community into mainstream British society.130 
Moreover, a distinct economic disparity also continued after 1801 between the industrialised 
Protestant areas of Ulster and Dublin, and the largely agrarian Catholic hinterland of the rest 
of Ireland.131 In an ironic twist of fortune, the community which was most optimistic about the 
Union in 1801 had come to suffer at the hand of an British acquiesce, and of an indifference 
towards Ireland after the security of Union had been guaranteed. 
Such indifference, as well as the continued lack of rights for the Irish Catholic majority, meant 
that resentment towards the Union did not take long to emerge. Indeed, to some extent, we may 
see the Union as ultimately sowing the seeds of its own destruction in isolating such a large 
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portion of the population from the political process. The effects of this rising resentment will 
be considered in Part Three of this chapter.  
 
1.3.4. Summary 
In summary, the arguments developed in this section of the chapter have provided us with three 
themes which prove central in reflecting upon the processes of Union that took place between 
England and the periphery.  
First, as a point of overarching critical observation on each of the three Unions, we are able to 
locate a consensus that the motivation for full political union in each instance was a matter 
dominated and controlled by England. However, in agreement with Bulpitt, we find that in 
events surrounding each of the three Unions, there existed little evidence to suggest that their 
conclusion was a pre-ordained or inevitable process.132  Rather, an overarching conclusion as 
to the motivation for Union must be seen as relating to the wider geo-political context of each 
of the Unions, and reflecting the needs for security and control in English foreign and domestic 
policy, as opposed to the culmination of a deeper desire for integration between England and 
the periphery.133   
Second, in each of the above Unions, we find their conclusion as making immediate provision 
for the absolute and unchallengeable construction of sovereignty vested in the Crown in 
Parliament. To a significant extent, this legal doctrine reflects the above-mentioned practical 
realities in English foreign policy in guaranteeing control and authority over the periphery, 
with each Union abolishing the peripheral governance structures and creating a formal unitary 
construction of authority.134 Thus, as a result of each of the three Unions, the formal 
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constitutional construction that emerged was that of a unitary state, whereby the single, 
absolute and supreme source of legal authority became enshrined in the symbolism of the 
Crown in Parliament.135 
Third, while concentrating legal authority in a single unitary centre, we must also recognise the 
political reality that each of the Unions provided – to varying degrees – for the administrative 
autonomy for the periphery. While unifying certain key aspects of functional and symbolic 
importance, most notably the emphasis on a common Protestantism – though never widely 
received in Ireland – and the facilitation of economic integration, each of the three Unions left 
intact varying degree of peripheral autonomy. 
For political scholars studying the construction of such constitutional systems, the lack of 
complete administrative congruency across the territory of formal unitary states has given rise 
to the theoretical category of the ‘Union State’136 – or, as is more reflective of the constitutional 
realities of the UK, the ‘State of Unions’.137 In explaining this category, we find its fundamental 
construction as located in the understanding that ‘while administrative standardization prevails 
over most of the territory, the union structure entails the survival in some areas of variations 
based upon pre-union rights and infrastructures.’138 
In this regard, we find a notable distinction between the legal and political arrangement of 
authority and power within the state. Relating back to the work of Bulpitt, we find perhaps the 
most readily available translation of the realities of the Union State as demonstratable through 
the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. The former of which, relating to matters such 
as defence, foreign affairs and high finance, are indivisibly constructed in the unitary centre, 
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whereas matters concerning the latter, summarised broadly under the heading of ‘domestic 
affairs’, may be exercisable through administratively devolved, regional entities.139 The 
effective application and continuation of the latter is, however, at all times subject to its respect 
of the overarching authority of the unitary centre – a matter which, if breached, may result in 
the repeal of peripheral autonomy, as seen in part in the case of Scotland following the Jacobite 
Rebellion of 1745-46.  
In addition to the continuing existence of pre-union rights and infrastructures in each of the 
three Unions discussed above, we also find the absence of an enforced sense of cultural unity 
from the newly cast central government. Indeed, with perhaps the exception of Catholic Ireland 
which experienced a policy of colonial government, neither the Scottish or Welsh examples of 
Union, aside from certain linguistic standards in administration and a common set of legal 
norms, contained the rigid promotion of a new national culture attached to the State. 
On this basis, the tentative conclusion is proposed that the incomplete sense of UK-wide 
cohesion created by the Unions, resulted in the development of a national society built on weak 
foundations – a factor which it is argued proved influential in the eventual rise of sub-state 
nationalism in each of the peripheral nations of the State of Unions.140 The next part of this 
chapter will now begin to examine this trend. 
 
1.4. The Rise of Nationalism 
The final theme to be considered in this chapter relates to the beginnings of dis-union within 
the United Kingdom. The debate in this part of the chapter will take place under two headings. 
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The first will discuss the rise of nationalism in Ireland, charting the growth of opposition to the 
Union of 1801 and the rise of the Home Rule movement, and finishing with the independence 
of the Irish Free State in 1922. The second section will discuss the rise of nationalism in 
Scotland and Wales and their relationship to events in Ireland, concluding with a summary of 
the political and constitution position of these two parts of the UK at the time of Irish 
independence.  
The decision to close the debate of this chapter at 1922 is largely due to the fact that it provides 
us with two useful summary points – first, it the contemporary configuration of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; second, is the fact that after 1922, we find the 
initial beginnings of devolution, both as a system of constitutional reality in Northern Ireland, 
and as an increasingly advocated for constitutional objective in Scotland and Wales.  
  
1.4.1. Ireland 
As was established Part Two of this chapter, the legacy of the Anglo-Irish Union in 1801 saw 
the continuation of notable division within Ireland, centred primarily around the continued 
suppression of the rights of Irish Catholics. Thus, following the beginnings of Catholic 
emancipation in 1829, and the further widening of the franchise in 1867 and 1884, it is 
hypothesised that this had a significant effect upon the political landscape in both Ireland and 
the UK as a whole.  
After the franchise reforms, for the first time, the Irish Catholic majority, a significant 
proportion of which were sympathetic to Irish nationalism, entered into the mainstay of British 
politics. The initial effects of this transition can be seen through the growth of autonomy 
seeking groups such as the Repeal Movement. Led by the veteran Irish nationalist, Daniel 
O’Connell, the constitutional aims of the Movement related to the repeal of the Act of Union 
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– although the extent of the literal application of the term ‘repeal’ remained ambiguous, and 
included ambitions for home rule, federation and the secession of Ireland as a republic.141 
In 1842, the radical arm of the Movement, the Young Irelanders, inspired by events in 
continental Europe, attempted to stage a ‘Revolution’ for Irish independence in South 
Tipperrary. The actions of the groups were quickly shut down by local law enforcement 
officials, but the overarching message of the attempted revolution went a long way in 
demonstrating the continued existence of underlying radicalism in Ireland.142 Indeed, 
compounded against the effects of the Great Famine, the period after the 1840s proved to be a 
turning point in convincing an increasing proportion of the Irish population that Ireland’s best 
interests would be served by autonomy from the United Kingdom.143 
Following the widening of the franchise to include all Irish males – both Catholic and Protestant 
– by 1884, this underlying current in Irish society became a politicised reality. At the 1885 
general election, out of the 103 Irish seats at Westminster, 85 returned MPs from one of the 
nationalist parties.144 For the first time, the threat of Irish nationalism had landed as a 
coordinated block on the doorstep at Westminster.  
Confronted with such a clear demonstration of dissatisfaction with the Union in Ireland, 
together with the increasing activity of the Fenians in instigating political unrest and militant 
activity in England, the response of the UK Government was driven into once again confronting 
the issue of Ireland. To a large extent, what we will now come to see as the UK Government’s 
response can be seen as a reflection of the continuing anxiety within England as to the ability 
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to control Ireland – a factor which this chapter has traced back to the 13th century. However, 
in a deviation from the previous trend by the UK Government of treating instability in Ireland 
with the emphasis of greater political control, the response in the mid-19th century was to cater 
to the opposite extreme. 
In 1886, the Liberal Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, laid forth before Parliament a 
Bill advocating for Home Rule for Ireland, beginning what would become a more than thirty-
year struggle at Westminster for an answer to the Irish Question.145 While the undeniable logic 
of the Bill was to deal with the Irish Question by way of offering the concession of self-
government to the Irish – offering an autonomous Home Rule Parliament for Ireland, with 
competence over all matters apart from defence, foreign relations and indirect taxation, 
although removing Irish representation at Westminster146 – the reality of its implementation 
proved wildly controversial, both at Westminster and in Ireland.  
On the one hand, the nationalists, treated the 1886 proposals with suspicion on the basis that 
by not offering full independence, and expressly maintaining the legislative supremacy of the 
UK Parliament over Ireland, the solution of Home Rule would continue to restrict the ability 
of the Irish Parliament to defend Irish interests. On the other hand, many unionists in both 
Ireland and the rest of the UK, saw the terms offered by Gladstone as conducive to the 
possibility of embarking Ireland upon an uncontrollable road to secession, and the ultimate 
defeat of the Union.147  
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To some extent, the nature of this debate, which pre-dated the 1886 Bill, was to create a 
stalemate between the two groups of opinion on Ireland. For Liberal Irishmen such as Isaac 
Butt, a logical solution to this stalemate that would answer the Irish Question while also 
guaranteeing the stability of the UK as a whole, was to be found through a federal solution:  
‘England, Scotland and Ireland, united as they are under one sovereign should have a 
common executive and a common national council for all purposes necessary to 
constitute them, to other nations, as one state, which each of them should have its own 
domestic administration and its own domestic Parliament for its own internal affairs.’148 
Indeed, Butt was not alone in his proposal and throughout the 1880s several prominent 
members of the UK Parliament – both liberal and conservative – from Joseph Chamberlain to 
Benjamin Disreli, declared their preference for a UK-wide federal solution to the Irish 
Question.149 Interestingly, the logic of a federal solution, as well as its positive reception by 
many Unionists, appears to have been motivated by the anticipation that the devolution of 
power across the four parts of the UK would reduce the risk of a snowball effect emanating 
from Ireland, and divert the other parts of the UK away from any trajectory towards 
separatism.150 
However, on the not incorrect recognition that the demands made by Ireland could not be 
compared to those in the rest of the UK, Gladstone made clear his position that the primary 
concern of Home Rule was, above all else after 1886, an attempt to answer the Irish 
Question.151 Yet, despite highlighting the importance of seeking a solution to the Irish 
Question, the failure of the 1886 Bill to pass beyond the Commons, and of the further defeat 
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of the 1893 and 1914 Bills, only added to frustrations in Ireland, which was still governed by 
the Protestant dominated Dublin Castle regime.  
The culmination of this frustration erupted on the streets of Dublin in 1916. The Easter Rising, 
though short, amounted to the significant turning point in the crisis in Ireland, and is seen by 
many as the point of no return in Home Rule debate in Ireland. Unpossessed of the gift of 
hindsight, however, in 1920 the UK Government made what would be its final attempt in 
legislating for Home Rule in Ireland. In a dramatic turn of events, and in part as an 
acknowledgement of the dire need for a solution to the conflict in Ireland, the Bill passed.  
Under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the island of Ireland was to be 
separated into two parts – North and South – the former largely as a concession to Protestant 
opposition to Home Rule to the Catholic majority.152 In addition, the Act made provision for 
the establishment of bicameral Parliaments in Belfast and Dublin, each of which being 
comprised of a Senate and House of Commons.153 Overarching these institutions, it was 
intended that a Council of Ireland be created, headed by a Lord Lieutenant, and comprising 
ministers from both Northern and Southern Ireland154. The underlying aim of the Council was 
for the eventual merging of both parts of Ireland to form a single unified Parliament – the 
creation of which would be dependent upon the success of Acts agreed by absolute majority in 
each of the Houses of Commons in both Northern and Southern Ireland.155 
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The political realities that surrounded the Act, however, prevented it from ever becoming a 
reality in Southern Ireland. In 1922, following the inability of the two sides to reach a 
compromise to the Irish War of Independence, Southern Ireland seceded from the Union to 
form the Irish Free State – becoming an autonomous Dominion within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.156  
In its wake, Northern Ireland was left as the last remaining part of the United Kingdom on the 
island of Ireland. With the reality that the region had been under devolved government since 
1920, the system of Northern Irish devolution continued after 1922 – a fact that will be 
discussed in more depth in Chapter Four. Although, at this point, it is useful to highlight that 
the under the new configuration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the construction of legal authority remained concentrated, in indivisible terms, in the UK 
Parliament at Westminster. However, from 1922, Northern Ireland was a devolved part of the 
union, enjoying legislative competence over a range of domestic matters, and being largely left 
to its own devices.  
 
1.4.2. Scotland and Wales 
While it is important to understand the primacy of the Home Rule campaign in Ireland during 
the late-19th and early-20th century, attention must also be afforded to the effects of the Irish 
Question over this period on the other three component parts of the UK. As reflected upon by 
several commentators on the constitution, the efficacy of the Home Rule campaign in Ireland 
had a clear influence on motivating similar, though to some extent more restrained, movements 
in Scotland and Wales.157 From both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective, Home Rule for 
Scotland and Wales, as well as less frequent debate on a similar mechanism for England – 
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either as a whole or regionally – was a readily discussed topic for much of the period of the 
Irish Question.   
Broadly, this wider debate, while associated with the calls for federation, came to be known 
under the more unique banner of ‘Home Rule All Round’ – the logic of which was well 
captured in a speech made by William Ewart Gladstone in Dalkeith, Midlothian on the 26th 
November 1879: 
‘We have got an overweighted Parliament; and if Ireland or any other portion of the 
country is desirous and able to arrange its affairs, that by taking the local part or some 
local part of its transactions off the hands of Parliament, it can liberate the strengthen 
Parliament for Imperial concerns, I say I will not only accord reluctant assent, but I will 
give a zealous support to any such scheme.’158 
In unpacking this quote, we find Gladstone’s vision of Home Rule All Round as a practical 
exercise in alleviating strain on the UK Parliament; a call for administrative efficiency and the 
unburdening of the UK Parliament at a time of particular external stress and intense foreign 
policy.159 For other prominent figures in the Liberal Party such as Joseph Chamberlain, the 
merits of Home Rule All Round were similarly practical, though informed by a greater 
understanding of the possibility of negative reaction and competition between the four 
component parts of the UK, should Home Rule be employed only in part, or on an asymmetrical 
basis.  
In addition to the periods of Liberal support for Home Rule All Round, it must nevertheless be 
noted that such proposals were, at all levels, unfettering in their clarification that Home Rule 
would not amount to the division of sovereignty within the UK.160 Indeed, while sometimes 
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compared with federalism, there is little evidence to suggest that Home Rule All Round was, 
from a bottom-up or a top-down perspective, ever widely advocated as a means of dividing the 
sovereign competence of the UK Parliament. 
Instead, its general application was constructed in conformity with the ‘official mind’ – the 
alleviation of domestic concerns from the UK Parliament for the efficiency of external affairs, 
while maintaining the overarching unitary state idea of the unconditional sovereign supremacy 
of Parliament over the periphery. By the 1890s, however, Gladstone, along with a majority in 
the Liberal Party, had come to abandon the idea of Home Rule All Round, due in large part to 
the perceived unworkability of England within any scheme. Instead, the primary focus of Home 
Rule was narrowed to the particular issue of the Irish Question.  
The eclipse of the national Liberal Party’s commitment to Home Rule All Round, however, 
did not signal the demise of its campaigning in Scotland and Wales. Instead, a number of groups 
associated with the Liberal Party in both nations came to maintain a continued, and to a large 
extent enhanced, vision of Home Rule. Motivated from a bottom-up perspective, these new 
groups came to produce tailored visions of Home Rule for both nations as isolated entities, 
moving away from the idea of Home Rule as a UK-wide experience. While appearing as a 
relatively minor point, this shift was, to some extent, the signal of the beginning of the designs 
of Home Rule as a nation specific instrument, and a point of departure from any meaningful 
vision of devolution as a UK-wide policy.  
In Scotland, the primary vessel for this new vision of Home Rule became associated with the 
actions of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA). From its formation in 1880, the SHRA 
came to form the totem for an individual Scottish campaign for Home Rule, associated with 
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the Liberal Party.161 Unlike in Ireland, however, the rhetoric employed by the SHRA 
maintained a consistent commitment to equality with England within the existing borders of 
the UK, and refrained to venture into a position of seeking independence from the UK. Indeed, 
the SHRA held little commitment to ever seeking divided sovereignty from the UK 
Parliament.162 
In total, between the groups Liberal dominated phase from 1880-1918, the SHRA proposed a 
total of thirteen separate resolutions in the UK Parliament for Scottish Home Rule; each of 
which, while ultimately unsuccessful, served as a symbolic affirmation of the continuing voice 
in favour of Home Rule in Scotland.163  
Yet, despite serving a clear symbolic purpose of underlining the will of the Scottish Liberal 
Party, the actions of the SHRA remained inevitably linked to the wider fortunes of the national 
Liberal Party and to events unfolding in Ireland. As a result, following the uncontrollable final 
act of the Irish Question in 1918-1920, and the subsequent decline of the Liberal Party and of 
the accompanying salience of Home Rule in British political discourse, the fortunes of the 
SHRA entered a phase of relative decline after about 1910.   
In 1918, the SHRA was reformed by the Scottish Labour MP, Ronald Muirhead, as a group 
aligned to, though not expressly affiliated with, the Labour Party in Scotland. As noted by 
Keating, the initial fortunes of the reformed SHRA looked promising, particular following the 
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election of Ramsay MacDonald’s minority Labour Government in 1924. Yet, frustrations over 
the groups failure to make an effective impact at Westminster, coupled with the increasing 
opposition within the Labour Party towards accommodating the interests of Home Rule, led to 
its eventual foundering and fragmentation. In response, in 1928, Muirhead broke away to form 
the National Party of Scotland, the first independent political party expressly inclined to the 
goal of Scottish self-government, and the antecedent to the Scottish National Party.164  
Where the elements of early-Scottish nationalism where more successful over this period came 
in the realm of administrative devolution within central government. In 1884, as a response to 
the open dissatisfaction with the Scottish Education Act 1872 – creating a Scottish Education 
Board in London as opposed to Edinburgh165 – the UK Conservative Government under Lord 
Salisbury revived the office of Secretary for Scotland, accompanied by a Scottish Office based 
at Whitehall. The continued attachment of the latter to the perceived view of Scotland as ruled 
from Westminster resulted in its base eventually being transferred to Edinburgh. 
Similar to events in Scotland, the embryonic growth of nationalism in Wales over the 19th 
century and into the 20th century achieved the majority of its initial political expression through 
its association with the Liberal Party.166 Although, unlike in Scotland, the lack of a distinct 
political or institutionalised identity in Wales meant that early Welsh nationalism developed 
more in line with the defence and recognition of cultural and linguistic identity as opposed to 
a distinct brand of political nationalism.  
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Indeed, for Kenneth O. Morgan, the early objectives of Welsh nationalism could be 
summarised as seeking administrative reforms against the ‘unholy trinity’ of the bishop, the 
brewer and the squire, as opposed to any perceived opposition to Westminster.167 Illustrative 
of this fact was the reality that in 1881, the first piece of UK Parliamentary legislation for over 
a century168 to deal with Wales as separate from England concerned the Sunday closing of 
public houses – a strong symbol of the Welsh Methodist movement.169 Moreover, for the 
remainder of the Liberal dominated period of Welsh nationalism into the early 20th century, the 
issue of primary political salience and representation of grievance in Wales related not to any 
demands for legislative autonomy, but related to the desire for the disestablishment of the 
Church of England in Wales.170 
While on the whole the Welsh population remained relatively unreceptive towards Home Rule 
for much of the 19th century, the development of events in Ireland had a particular influence on 
the growing educated class emerging from Wales’ first University at Aberystwyth. Finding 
inspiration from the writings of Irish figures such as Parnell, as well as the wider continental 
examples of young radicalism, these figures went on to form the bedrock of many of the early 
Welsh nationalist movements during this period.  
Most prominent of these early groups was the movement within the Liberal Party known as 
Cymru Fydd (Young Wales).171 While the origins of the group first emerged in the expatriate 
Welsh population in England, with branches forming in London and Liverpool from 1886, the 
movement quickly came to establish itself in Wales and by 1891 had branches across Wales. 
Headed by the charismatic figure of the North Walian solicitor, and future Liberal Prime 
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Minister, David Lloyd George, the group quickly became known for its enthusiasm and 
political ambition.  
Progressing along similar lines as the SHRA, Cymru Fydd quickly showed signs of a clear 
‘unionist-nationalism’ in its constitutional ambitions, and as early as 1890 maintained a 
consistent advocacy in favour of Home Rule in Wales. The most notable of these proposals 
came in 1891, when the Liberal MP for East Glamorgan, Alfred Thomas, introduced the 
National Institutions (Wales) Bill into the House of Commons. The Bill itself failed to progress 
beyond first reading, however, its corpus was nonetheless significant in demonstrating the 
embryonic advancement of arguments for Welsh devolution.  
Amongst its advocacy for the administrative representation of Wales at Westminster through 
the creation of a Welsh Education Board, University of Wales and an office of Secretary of 
State for Wales, the Bill noted the ambitious aim for a ‘Council for Wales’172 to be based at 
Aberystwyth and which, as noted by Rawlings, had all the hallmarks of an early form of 
‘national executive devolution’.173  
Yet, as meteoric as had been its rise from 1886, the fortunes of Cymru Fydd were short lived. 
After the failure of Lloyd George to convince the South Wales Liberal Federation to 
amalgamate with its Northern counterpart in 1891, the group swiftly lost much of its political 
capital and was, by the end of the century, effectively obsolete.174 While Home Rule did, to a 
lesser extent, continue as a salient issue in Wales into the 20th century, the overarching 
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arrangement of Welsh nationalism after 1891 largely returned to its traditional roots of cultural 
and linguistic defence, moving away from any active constitutional strategy.  
Yet, this is not to see the brief golden age of Welsh nationalism during the late 19th century as 
failing to produce a lasting impact on Welsh politics. As a result of the Cymru Fydd period, 
significant concessions were made that advanced Welsh civil society, creating a Welsh system 
of School boards in 1889, as well significant land reforms and the inauguration of the 
University of Wales in 1893.175 Indeed, by the turn of the 20th century, Wales had made 
significant strides in its re-emergence as a polity separated from England.  
For some, such as J. C. Banks, the concessions made by the Liberals to the enhancement of 
civil society in Scotland and Wales amounted to a feat of political strategy that, while delivering 
little in the way of substantive reform, allowed the Liberals to remain as the symbolic party of 
the periphery. Indeed, Banks went as far as to claim that the success of the Liberal strategy of 
piecemeal reform during this period ‘stultified the national movements for a generation’.176  
However, when viewed retrospectively, the success of the Liberal strategy in keeping Scottish 
and Welsh nationalisms relatively well subdued in their constitutional objectives, the actions 
of the Liberal Party would come to affect a number of more significant effects in the later 
emergence of well mobilised political nationalisms in both nations.  
Certainly, in Wales, the Liberal concessions to the representation of Welsh civil society had 
the notable effect of transforming Wales into a distinct political and territorialised entity; 
reversing, as it were, the shadow of the Wales and Berwick Act, and the idea of Wales as 
merely a part of England. Indeed, by the turn of the 20th century, it is correct to observe that 
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Wales had matured into a ‘distinct entity within the British polity’.177 Additionally, in Scotland, 
the Liberal concessions to Scottish civil society, as well as notable representation in central 
government, created a scenario whereby Scotland was well placed to seek additional 
concessions during the next ‘episode’ of sub-state nationalist resurgence in the 1930s.  
Where perhaps agreement can be made with Banks, however, is that the Liberal concessions 
were effective in curtailing the emergence of a well-established, or at least a long-reaching, 
sense of Scottish or Welsh nationalism that pursued a concrete constitutional strategy. Rather, 
it would take much broader changes, emerging during the aftermath of the First World War, to 
truly drive this shift in the nationalist psyche in Scotland and Wales towards a set of conditions 
favourable to the division of sovereignty. These changes may be summarised by two broad and 
equally significant sets of events: 
First, the traditional reliance on the Liberal Party as the voice of the periphery at central 
government entered a spiral of unreversed decline during the 1920s. To a large extent, this was 
due to the Party having extinguished its own political salience; disestablishment had been 
successful in Wales by 1919, both Scotland and Wales had received a significant bolstering of 
their civil societies and, more significantly, the independence of the Irish Free State in 1922 
had removed one of the central vestiges of Liberal Party from UK domestic affairs.  
As a result of the decline in the Liberal Party, the traditional totem of peripheral representation 
became undefined and only partially succeeded to the emerging successor of the Liberals in 
the periphery, the Labour Party.178 Correspondingly, the identification of an effective political 
                                                          
177 Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State, (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 95 
178 By the 1922 general election, the Party secured 142 seats in the House of Commons, replacing the Liberals as 
the largest party in both Scotland and Wales – a shift which was to a large extent motivated by the translation of 
the growing support for the trade union movements in the industrial heartlands of Scotland and Wales, a factor 
catalysed by the global economic misfortunes of the inter-war period. 
78 
 
voice for peripheral concerns, and in particular an outlet for the discussion of Scottish or Welsh 
self-government became, to a large extent, removed from the theatre of UK politics. 
While a selection of prominent members of the early Labour Party, such as Keir Hardie, Ronald 
Muirhead and Ramsay MacDonald,179 were sympathetic to Home Rulers in Scotland and Wales 
and indeed the early ambitions of the Party were favourable to Home Rule, a notable majority 
in the Party remained committed to an ‘internationalist’ position. Inevitably, the latter would 
win forth as the dominant position, placing socio-economic cohesion and a centralised UK state 
above the interests of nationalist groups for self-government.180 Thus, similarly to the effects 
of the declining position of the Liberal Party after 1922, the early Labour Party’s opposition to 
Home Rule by the 1930s had the significant influence of further restricting the political voice 
of nationalism in Scotland and Wales.  
Second, in accompaniment to the negative effects of the shifting political representation of the 
periphery, events within the international sphere during this period also transpired to influence 
the reorganisation of nationalism in Scotland and Wales. The most notable of these events 
concerned the effects of the global financial crash during the inter-war period. Viewed from 
the perspective of hindsight, we find the impact of the crash as having two effects:  
First, its wide-reaching effects on the prosperity of the individual citizen as a result of the global 
crash served as a symbolic affirmation of the weakness of the British Empire to withstand the 
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effects of the economic depression; challenging the illusion of the nation-state as the 
unquestionable vessel for guaranteeing the prosperity and political allegiance of its citizens.  
Second, the response of increased centralisation and government control in alleviating the 
effects of the economic depression served to compound the spectre of the under-representation 
of Scotland and Wales within the governmental process and to increase desires for 
representative self-government.  
While the essence of this third element served as part of a much broader and far-reaching 
process of political economic transformation – the corpus of which will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three – it is nonetheless significant to note that by the 1920s, the ideological 
bond of the citizen to the state had begun to be seriously questioned in parts of Scotland and 
Wales.181  
Read collectively, the mix of a reduced political voice following the decline of the Liberal 
Party, the removal of Home Rule as a salient political issue at Westminster after 1922, and the 
beginnings of the weakening of the British Imperial project, created a significant vacuum for 
new nationalist groups to form; this vacuum was filled with relative haste in the aftermath of 
the independence of the Irish Free State.  
In 1925, a collection of Welsh academic and clerical figures united to form Plaid Cymru (the 
Party of Wales). Almost a decade later, in 1934, the union of the Scottish Home Rule 
Association and the National Party in Scotland led to the creation of the Scottish National Party. 
The aims of these groups will be considered at length in Chapter Three, however, at this stage, 
it is of value to mention that within both groups, a set of constitutional objectives emerged that 
differed significantly from the earlier operation of Scottish or Welsh groups within the Liberal 
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Party; nationalism had now begun to move from a ‘unionist-nationalist’182 to a ‘pure 
nationalist’ persuasion, whereby self-government and not administrative independence were 
the new salient political issues.  
  
1.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to capture the constitutional and political processes that 
influenced the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. By way 
of a summary of the argument presented in this chapter, we may distinguish its corpus as 
consisting of three main points that will serve as a useful guide for the later discussions in this 
thesis.  
First, we may conclude from the above analysis that the formation of the UK took place as a 
practical response to critical junctures in English political history, as opposed to being the result 
of an inevitable process. Moreover, it has been noted that the essence of this process emerged 
from a longer historical past than was advocated by Bulpitt, and was at all points conditioned 
by the English desire for overlordship over the periphery. Indeed, we find that the eventual 
arrival of ‘formal empire’ was the conclusion of a gradual thickening of the various Anglo-
peripheral relationships in response to wider geopolitical circumstances, as opposed to a 
holistic process of inevitable Union.   
Second, we find that the constitutional unit that emerged from these Unions was not a classic 
unitary state, but a distinctly qualified construction. In legal terms, we find that all power was 
vested in a single central source of authority – initially the Crown and, from the 17th century, 
Parliament. However, in political terms, we find that the extent of the Unions was not to provide 
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a similar construction of political authority. Rather, in each of the three ‘Unions’ – and in 
particular in Scotland – there remained a distinct package of continuing peripheral autonomy, 
characterised by the retention of certain pre-Union rights and infrastructures. As argued above, 
this was in essence a direct reflection of the logic of the Union itself; desiring supremacy and 
control over the periphery, but acquiescing as to the need for a single source of administrative 
action – a ‘State of Unions’, conditioned by the opinion of the English ‘official mind’ in 
drawing distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics.   
Third, in reflection of the idea of the UK as a ‘State of Unions’, we find that as well as providing 
for a pluralised construction of political power, there was also a distinct lack of a single source 
of cultural identity. Rather, in each of the respective peripheral units, a sense of national identity 
continued after their respective Unions. In part, this was facilitated by the continuing 
administrative independence of the periphery – as seen in Scotland – however, it is argued that 
it was also the reflection of the broader acquiesce of central government in failing to enforce a 
sense of nation building – allowing for peripheral allegiances to continue, so long as their 
manifestation did not threaten the fundamental foundation of the state.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the United Kingdom as a ‘State of Unions’. It has been 
concluded that the terms of those Unions were far from inevitable, but instead emerged as 
pragmatic responses to particular political conditions. Moreover, this chapter has established 
that the ‘State of Unions’ did not create a single culturally homogeneous unit, but a multi-
national state. The next chapter of the thesis will explore issue of political identity further, 
focussing specifically on the idea of Britishness as a state-based identity, and its influence upon 
the political dynamics in the territorial constitution.   
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Chapter 2 
Identity and the State: Locating Britishness 
 
The previous chapter of this thesis focussed on the formation of the United Kingdom as a unit 
of constitutional definition. This chapter now moves to investigate the factors that came to 
influence the individual placing their primary political identity in the institutional vessel of the 
state. This chapter is about locating Britishness; its tenets, salience, and historical influence 
upon the dynamics of the territorial constitution.  
 
2.1. Introduction  
For the majority of the modern age, the nation-state has served as the ‘alpha and omega’ of 
personal identity.183 For states, the idea of the nation-state has been crucial in securing the 
allegiance of its citizens.184 For nationalists, the idea of congruence between nation and state 
has been a crusading ambition.185 Yet, explaining the logic or construction of this hyphenated 
term has, for more than a century, baffled historians, political theorists, sociologists and, 
increasingly, constitutional theorists.  
What forces constitute the fusion of two such apposing concepts as nation and state, into the 
formation of a system of identity which has led millions to, voluntarily, bear arms and fight for 
the cause? Moreover, in multi-national states such as the United Kingdom, what reasons have 
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existed for the individual to place their primary allegiance in the state, over and above other 
forms of cultural identity?  
Recognising the importance of these questions for understanding the political dynamics of the 
territorial constitution, this chapter anticipates the later debates on the rise of sub-state 
nationalism, by focussing on understanding what factors have historically influenced the 
individual to place their primary political identity in the state. This chapter is about 
understanding Britishness, and in particular the significance that this state-based identity has 
held in influencing the political dynamics of the territorial constitution. In pursuing this line of 
enquiry, this chapter seeks to contribute to answering the central research question of this thesis 
by providing a valuable lens on understanding the wider factors – namely political identity – 
which influence the dynamics of constitutional systems. By understanding what factors 
originally influenced the individual to place their primary political loyalty in the UK state, it is 
seen that we will gain a greater base for analysis as to why, over the last century, this has begun 
to change. In achieving this aim, this chapter will be divided into three parts.  
In Parts One and Two, emphasis will be placed on the theoretical dissection of the idea of the 
nation-state. Part One will discuss the concept of the state; considering how the state emerged 
as the primary political unit in the modern age, and as to how its construction laid the 
groundwork for a system of state-based identity to emerge. Part Two will then discuss the 
concept of the nation; defining its form, and forming a theoretical opinion as to why the nation 
became associated with the design of the state. Part Three will then apply the theoretical 
analysis of the preceding two parts of the chapter to the case study of the United Kingdom, 
seeking to identify the essence and tenets of ‘Britishness’, and their relationship to the wider 
political dynamics of the territorial constitution.   
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2.2. The State 
For some, such as Joseph Strayer, the development of a system of European sovereign states – 
at least in the external sense – had become an almost inevitable trajectory from as early as the 
13th century.186 More broadly, we find a consensus within the academic literature that by the 
17th century, the state had risen to become the primary vessel for political mobilisation.187 In 
this part of the chapter, we will explore the themes and processes that led to this transition, 
charting the ascendency of the state.   
In beginning this investigation, we find the majority of historical accounts as accrediting the 
rise of the state, from around the 16th century, to a mix of military and economic changes within 
the wider geopolitical sphere. For Charles Tilly, these changes were primary military in nature, 
leading to the famed adage of ‘war made the state, and the state made war.’188 Others, such as 
Alberto Alesina, chart the rise of the state as equally reflective of changes within the economic 
sphere, and the wider pressures of economic performance in instigating the rise of statal 
blocks.189 The essence of these two accounts may be charted as follows: 
Under what we may term the ‘military’ or ‘political’ reading of the rise of the state, we find 
the locus of explanation as framed by the identification that statal units emerged as a response 
to the rising costs of military conflict during the early-modern period. During this period, it is 
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argued that a number of significant advancements in military technology, most notably the first 
widespread use of gunpowder units, significantly increased the cost of waging war.190  
Indeed, as evidenced by Michael Mann, the estimated cost of warfare during this transitionary 
phase rose significantly, from around 3-5% of state GNP in the pre-17th century, to up to 30% 
by the late-18th century.191 As confirmed by Norman Davies, the trend in states over this period 
was to develop professionalised military forces; retain standing armies; and install complex 
administrative systems to administer them – leading to a significant strain being placed on the 
still largely feudal construction of the European political system.192 
Economic historians also note that through the increased size, scale and longevity of military 
conflicts, the arrangement of resources – both physical and financial – began to be viewed as 
increasingly finite.193 As a response, it is argued that states emerged as crystallised territorial 
blocks, framing their borders as distinct economic markets – or national economies – and 
creating a global system whereby the construction of power was increasingly constructed 
within the territorial boundaries of the state.  
In response to these two factors, namely the sharp rise in military expenditure and the increased 
competition for economic resources, it is argued that a systematic and interdependent trend 
emerged whereby states needed ‘tax revenues to support an army, and an army to guarantee a 
flow of revenues’.194 As noted by North and Thomas, the results of this dynamic would be over 
two centuries of almost continual military conflict and social transformation, in which states 
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sought to carve out their individual spheres of influence.195 In retrospect, this can be seen as 
influencing three processes in the construction of states in Western Europe: 
First, we find actions whereby states sought to increase their economic position through the 
increase of revenues. Initially, we find that this primarily took the shape of internalised reform 
through the raising of taxes and rents, and the development of large-scale bureaucracies196 – 
monopolising the systems available to the state.  
Second, from the 16th century, this was transferred to the external sphere after several western 
European states, most notably England and the United Provinces, began to pass mercantilist 
laws designed to monopolise trade with their emerging overseas Empires; framing them within 
protected, national economies of scale:197 
‘As wars became more expensive, the sheer cost of warfare on the scale established by 
their large rivals overruled the financial resources of all but the most commercialised 
states.’198 
Correspondingly, the once light and flexible economies of free-trading city-states such as 
Venice, Genoa or the Hansa, became subsumed within the jaws of the emerging Leviathans, as 
free-trade was replaced by state-based closed-market mercantilism.199 For contemporary 
Marxist thinkers such as Hobsbawm or Frank, this process led to what may be observed as a 
‘threshold principle’ on statehood, whereby it was assumed that only large states could 
effectively guarantee the security and prosperity of their citizens.200  
                                                          
195 North, D. C., and Thomas, R. P., The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 80 
196 Ertman, T., Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Remines in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 157; North, D. C., and Thomas, R. P., The Rise of the 
Western World: A New Economic History, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 81 
197 See: Chapter One (Section 1.3) 
198 Tilly, C., (ed.) Coercion, Capital and European States, (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 83 
199 Ibid., p. 83 
200 Franck, T. M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 
142; Hobsbawm, E., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 
31 
87 
 
To a significant extent, we find this as also being linked to the wider ideological shift in the 
imagining of size and scale as the embodiment of power and success, affected by the wider 
geopolitical landscape of statehood. Indeed, for Steinberg, while this period also saw the 
emergence of the doctrine of the de jure mutual exclusivity of state sovereignty, a distinct 
political dynamic – or reality – also emerged, whereby the de facto strength of state sovereignty 
was measured against the size and scale of the state, and its behavioural capacity to exercise 
those sovereign rights.201 In this regard, we find the emphasis during this period was on the 
territorial expansion of the state, evidencable in three ways: 
First, we find state sponsored expansion through the use of coercive means – being the invasion 
and conquest of neighbouring territories. This factor was particularly well versed in the 
territorial empires of Eastern Europe, but also in the initial expansion of Western European 
states such as France.202  
Second, we find that as a result of the rising need for size and scale, certain political units also 
moved to form closer bonds of association with their neighbours through – voluntary203 – acts 
of political union. The logic underpinning these political unions – increasingly defined as 
‘federal unions’ after the 17th century – was generally for the provision of defence against 
foreign threats, and the taking advantage of increased economies of scale in a world of trade 
restrictions.204 Indeed, under the Rikerian understanding of ‘coming together’205 federalism, 
the instigation of the ‘federal bargain’ emerged in response to external threats, and the need for 
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collective defence against those threats.206 Further explanation of the general dynamics of the 
processes and logic of political union is cogently provided by the Australian jurist, K. C. 
Wheare:  
‘The need for common defence, the desire to be independent, geographical contiguity, 
and the hope of economic advantage all helped to produce a desire for union which was 
a force in leading England and Scotland to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
in 1707; the Italian states to form the Kingdom of Italy in the years from 1856 to 1864; 
the German states to form, first the North German Confederation of 1867, and then the 
German Empire of 1871; and the South African Colonies – Transvaal, Orange River, 
the Cape and Natal – to form the Union of South Africa in 1909.’207 
Reflecting upon this quote, we find that the third element of state expansion came through the 
accompanying projection of state power in an international context, corresponding to the 
growth of global empires. In this regard, it must be noted that this process developed along two 
avenues, with Western European states developing salt-water Empires overseas in the 
Americas, Africa and Asia, while their Central and Eastern European counterparts expanded 
east to form the land-based Empires such as Russia, Austria or Prussia.  
At all points, however, the core of the process of imperial expansion lay in the reality of 
colonial possessions ‘conceived not as ends in themselves but as assets to be deployed in 
defence of the European balance of power’.208 Indeed, the arrangement of global Empires was 
a crucial tactic in the ‘breakdown of the international economy into regional trading blocs’ 
during times of economic competition between the European powers.209 It is argued that 
Empires, therefore, were external support systems for the state, conditioned by the functional 
reality of a hostile geopolitical environment.  
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In this regard, we find the growth of the state as demonstrating a distinct transactional quality, 
whereby events in one territory motivated a response in another. We find a useful 
demonstration of this provided through Hobsbawm’s quoting of a conversation between the 
French and British ambassadors in 1897:  
‘If you were not such persistent protectionists’, the British premier told the French 
ambassador, ‘you would not find us so keen to annex territories.’210 
In essence, the externally motivated and transactional nature of the growth of the state led to 
what many have attributed to a relatively inorganic, and impractical system whereby the state 
ballooned into a Leviathan of unprecedented size and scale. Indeed, in a contemporary account 
of the 18th century, the Scottish economist, Adam Smith noted how the expenditure of the 
British Empire, both in war and peace, placed an overburdening strain on the resources of Great 
Britain, and should be cut loose if not profitable.211 Writing later in the 20th century, Norman 
Angell framed the presumed prosperity of Empire as a ‘Great Illusion’, and offered 
considerable qualitative evidence of the negative economic effects of the Imperial sphere.212 
Reflective of these facts, as well as the wider discussion in this section of the chapter, we may 
conclude that the formation of the state was far from an inevitable process. Indeed, in the above 
constructed arguments, we have seen how the crystallisation of political units to form units of 
unprecedented political and economic size and scale was, to a significant extent, a process 
driven equally by external as well as internal factors.  
                                                          
210 Hobsbawm, E., The Age of Empire 1875-1914, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p. 67 
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In reflection of the above arguments, we find that through the long transition into modernity, 
the significance of the state grew to such an effect that it became the primary political actor 
within the global sphere. This section of the chapter has argued that this transition took place 
primarily as a result of functionalist shifts within the international – and in particular the 
European – political economic sphere. As the costs of military expenditure rose, accompanied 
by the rise in economic tariff barriers, the formally lightweight political units of the medieval 
period were required to crystallise and expand, seeking revenue streams; from this, a society 
of states was born.  
 
2.3. The Idea of the Nation-State 
In Part One of this chapter, we have seen the argument presented that the state grew, both 
administratively and territorially, as a response to the politico-economic conditions which 
emerged during the early-modern period. In this part of the chapter, we will investigate as to 
how the state, as an institutional entity, came to secure the allegiance of those within its 
territory, a process which subsequently gave rise to the idea of the ‘nation-state’.  
In achieving this end, this part of the chapter will be divided into two sections. Section One 
will consider the theoretical positions associated with the identity of the nation by considering 
the existing schools of thought relating to the definition of nations and nationalism. Section 
Two will conclude by analysing the work of two political thinkers who gave much 
consideration as to the construction of identity as connected to the state – Giuseppe Mazzini 
and Carl Schmitt. 
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2.3.1. Current Theories on Nations and Nationalism 
The debate in this section will consider the main schools of thought on nations and nationalism; 
its construction will be defined through a mixture of consultation of specific thinkers, as well 
as broader schools of theoretical thought.  
 
A. The Continuity Arguments 
The first school of thought on nations and nationalism relates to what John Breuilly defined as 
the ‘continuity arguments’,213 relating to the idea of the nation as tied to pre-modern and 
primordial forms of identity. In defining this school of thought, we find its construction as 
comprising of two distinct strands. The first strand relates to the group of thinkers known as 
the primordialists, the second, the perennialist.  
From the perspective of the primordialist school of nationalism theory, containing thinkers 
such as Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, the identity of the ‘nation’ is constructed through a 
system of pre-modern indicators of allegiance. For both thinkers, the idea of the nation was 
constructed through the ineffable significance214 placed upon the nexus of ‘assumed givens’215 
which constitute the nation.  
Such givens refer to what Geertz described as the natural elements of the human construction 
of identity – attachment to a particular kinship group, religious community, common language 
                                                          
213 John Breuilly defines both primordialism and perennialism as ‘continuity arguments’, on the basis that their 
essential argument is in the location of the nation within a time immemorial history. See; Breuilly, J., ‘Dating 
the nation: how old is an old nation?’, in Ichijo, A., and Uzelac, G., (eds.) When is the Nation? Towards an 
understanding of theories of nationalism, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 15-39 at 23 
214 Shils, E., ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 8, No. 2, 
(1957), pp. 130-145, at 142 
215 Geertz, C., The Interpretation of Cultures, (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 259 
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or dialect, or set of social practices216 – which in turn exude an overpowering coerciveness upon 
the construction of identity within a given community: 
‘for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem 
to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from 
social interaction.’217 
While Geertz acknowledged that the emergence of this specific strand of nation formation was 
most prevalent within weak civil polities, with low welfare provision, 218 the overarching 
essence of the primordialist argument maintains a connection that the roots of the nation 
emerged through a long historical process, being bottom-up constructions, devoid of state-
sponsored nationalism. 
The second strand of the continuity argument relates to what Anthony Smith defined as 
‘perennialism’, relating to the identification of the nation as a time immemorial concept – 
perennial – but divergent from primordial accounts in its rejection of the nation as part of the 
‘natural order’.219 Indeed, we largely find the perennialist account of the nation as located in 
the historiography of writers such as Adrian Hastings, who justify the longevity of nations such 
as England and France, through the endurance of national symbols and terms, as well as 
vernacular languages. Using Hastings as a guide, let us now locate the main kernels of the 
perennialist approach to nations and nationalism. 
                                                          
216 For thinkers such as Van den Berghe, the natural indicators identified by Shilz and Geertz can be summarised 
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(Oxford: Elsevier, 1981), p. 18 
217 Geertz, C., The Interpretation of Cultures, (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 259-260 
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In his main contribution, ‘The Construction of Nationhood’, Hastings pronounced the 
emergence of the nation as grounded in the transformation of ethnic groups into viable 
vernacular communities.220 In this transformation, Hastings made particular reference to the 
role of religion, or rather the translation of religious texts, in facilitating the fostering of national 
cultures. He defined; ‘once an ethnicity’s vernacular becomes a language with an extensive 
living literature of its own, the Rubicon on the road to nationhood appears to have been 
crossed.’221  
Moreover, Hastings also located the longevity of national terms or labels as essential on the 
fostering of collective identity. Taking the example of England, Hastings argued that the 
longevity of national labels – “England” or “English” – provided the markers for identity 
needed for common association: prescriptively applying the identification of an English nation 
to the time of the venerable Bede in the 8th century.222  
However, in making such an account, we find that Hastings received considerable criticism on 
the limitations of his approach, both from historians and sociologists. Indeed, for Breuilly, 
Hastings’ reliance on the pervasion of certain political titles or labels was unrepresentative of 
the wider historical nature of these labels as having a distinctly different salience within 
different historical periods.223 This view was largely confirmed by Strayer:  
‘Though the ruler often took an ethnic title (rex Anglorum, ref Francorum, and so on), 
most of the regna were not ethnic units. The usual pattern was a dominant warrior 
group, drawn from several Germanic peoples, ruling a subject population which was 
Latin, Celtic, or Slav.’224 
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Moreover, Strayer drew reference to the wider historical inaccuracy of Hasting’s approach in 
defining the composition of medieval kingdoms as being uniform social structures, able to 
facilitate a single source of identity. Rather, for Strayer, the essence of the medieval kingdom 
was impervious to a fixed territorial definition, being a relatively autonomous field outside of 
its central core.225 Thus, the idea of the nation as emerging within a specific regnum was a 
distinctly hard to prove historical concept – at least before the birth of the modern state. Indeed, 
since the second half of the 20th century, the essence of the continuity argument has met with 
considerable challenge within the academic literature, perhaps none more so than under the 
criticism of Ernest Gellner.  
 
B. Ernest Gellner and the Modernist Turn 
For Gellner, nations were not natural, but rather a contingency, forged in response to precise 
political conditions – and in direct relationship to the emergence of the state.226 In this regard, 
Gellner identified three stages in the evolution of the state as a condition of human organisation: 
the hunter-gather stage, where the state was not an option for organisation; the agrarian period, 
where the state was an emerging – though still optional – condition; the industrial stage, within 
which the state became a necessary condition for the facilitation of central sanctions and 
controls on large societies.227  
In translating these historical periods into a theoretical design on the nation, Gellner saw the 
crucial element of the formation of nations and nationalism as taking place in the transition 
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from agrarian to industrial society – explainable in sociological terms through the definition of 
high and low cultures.  
In the agrarian age, Gellner argued that the existence of high cultures was a phenomenon 
confined to, and maintained by, the clergy and the elite.228 Gellner explained this on the grounds 
that in agrarian society, there existed a notable ‘distance’ in the arrangement of job 
specialisations – for example the division between the monk and the farmer was a considerable 
distinction, both financially and in terms of individual education and national consciousness.229 
Moreover, during the agrarian period, labour remained relatively static, with many of those in 
the low culture remaining in a fixed location for the majority of their lives. Gellner identified 
that following the existence of industrial society, the labour market became transformed, 
requiring a mobile and literate populace: 
‘Let us recapitulate the general and central features of industrial society. Universal 
literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication are among 
its functional prerequisites. Its members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from 
one activity to another, and must possess that generic training which enables them to 
follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation… They must also 
be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-
may-concern type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared 
and linguistic medium and script.’230 
In order to achieve a standardized means of communication, Gellner identified that this was 
only possible through a developed education system, a phenomenon which he understood as 
not being able to have existed without the infrastructure, administration and finance of the state. 
Thus, Gellner saw the nation as a condition which emerged from the societal shift from an 
agrarian to an industrial society – connecting the construction of the nation to the modern 
period:  
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‘It is not the case that the “age of nationalism” is a mere summation of the awakening 
and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather, when general social 
conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, 
pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which 
well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the 
only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify.’231 
Under Gellner’s definition, we find at its core is the idea of the nation as formed at the point at 
which the high culture becomes universal, and is experienced by the majority of the population 
of the state, outside of the social elite.232  
In earlier works, Gellner made it clear that the territorial stability and longevity of the ‘nation-
state’ was made possible by the ability of state-based education systems to overwrite the ethnic 
chasms contained within the state; ‘the natural limit of the political unit… is the limit of the 
validity of its educational certificates.’233 Thus, in identifying the nation as a primarily political 
unit of identity, attached to the age of industrial society, we find that Gellner saw the possibility 
for the nation to be ‘constructed’, to an extent. However, Gellner also saw instances upon which 
the state fails to coincide with the boundaries of a single high culture, and where there continues 
to exist one or more wild cultures within its territorial boundaries.234  
In this regard, Gellner explained the existence of nationalist movements due to the fact that the 
industrial age inherited the political boundaries of the previous age, as well as its high and low 
cultures. In instances where the state fails to overwrite the ethnic chasms which exist within 
the various high cultures within a political unit – the state – nationalist movements are 
mobilised, which by result fight it out for the available state space.235 
This argument, which Gellner summarises as ‘one nation, one state’, was constructed on the 
belief that in order to sustain the construction of the high culture in the industrial age, ‘every 
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high culture now wants a state, and preferably its own.’236 Thus, under the Gellnerian reading 
of nations and nationalism, the nation is a modern construct, emerging from the societal 
transition from the agrarian to the industrial age, and constructed as a response to the functional 
necessity of the state unit.  
 
C. Anthony Smith and the addition of ethno-symbolism 
In approaching the work of Anthony Smith, we find an initial base of similarity between Smith 
and Gellner. Originally a student of Gellner, Smith broadly agreed with Gellner’s interpretation 
of the nation, and nationalism, as having both emerged as products of the modern age. 
However, Smith qualified his agreement by referring to the fact that the essence of the nation 
that emerged within this period was sustained by the memory of a deeper historical past: 
‘striking the right balance between the obvious modernity of nationalism and the often 
premodern historical dimensions of ethnicity.’237 
Indeed, under Smith’s reworked account of nations and nationalism, while the nation achieved 
a state of consciousness only during the modern era, its origins lie in the deep historical past, 
framed by the boundaries of ‘pre-modern ethnic communities.’238 In this regard, we find 
Smith’s theory on nations and nationalism as a distinct nuance of the pre-existing approaches 
of the primordialists and the Gellnerian modernists.  
 
D. Hobsbawm and ‘Invented Traditions’ 
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An initial engagement with the work of Eric Hobsbawm conjures up several themes of 
similarity with the writings of Gellner. In unison with Gellner, Hobsbawm saw the nation as a 
functionalist construction of modern state-based education systems.239 Moreover, Hobsbawm 
also agreed with Gellner’s description of the nation as an artificial construct, vertically 
constructed by a literal elite during the great transition from agrarian to industrial society: 
‘nations so not make states and nationalism but the other way round.’240  
However, while in broad agreement with Gellner, we find that Hobsbawm also extended 
Gellner’s theory by placing an emphasis on the condition that the nation can only be truly 
imagined when it is received by the social mass. Indeed, on this point, Hobsbawm drew 
example to the construction of the Italian or Polish nations, which he argued were largely the 
constructs of top-down processes, and which at the time of ‘national independence’ lacked a 
distinctly nationally conscious population.241 Thus, for Hobsbawm, the essence of the nation – 
or rather, the nation’s reception by the mass – is a factor to be constructed by the state:   
‘“Invented Tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly 
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish 
continuity with a suitable historic past.’242 
In unpacking this quote, upon first glance we would not be mistaken to draw similarity with 
Smith’s concept of ethno-symbolism. However, unlike Smith, Hobsbawm saw the principle of 
‘invented traditions’ as being processes emerging from the rise of nationalism; and denying the 
position of an ethno-symbolically mobile past. Indeed, as Hobsbawm directs us to understand, 
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one of the central pillars in the strength of invented traditions is that of their vague and ill-
defined construction: 
‘The crucial element seems to have been the invention of emotionally and symbolically 
charged signs of club membership rather than the statutes and objects of the club. Their 
significance lay precisely in their undefined universality.’243 
Historically, therefore, Hobsbawm saw the principle of national continuity as largely invented. 
For example, the reliance on the symbols of resistance used in the romanticizing of certain 
Western European national identities; the symbolism of the ‘national’ figureheads who 
opposed Roman expansion; Boudicia, Vercangetarix, Arminius, rely on romanticism as 
opposed to historical fact, and the subsequent invention of national anthems, flags, and 
traditions, are largely invented constructs.244  
In this regard, and upon a similar seam of functionality to Gellner, Hobsbawm justified the 
emergence of the nation as indicative of certain requirements – political, technical, 
administrative, economic or other – and ranked ethnic markers of identity as only secondary 
conditions to the emergence of nationalism.245 Moreover, Hobsbawm also reconfigured the 
definition of the nation as requiring a certain size and scale in order to be viable in the historic 
past. He called these ‘threshold principles’ and, arguing on a largely political economic 
perspective, saw national independence as achievable only by large states.246  
Thus, in a similar strand of thought to Gellner, we find that Hobsbawm attached the 
significance of the nation, and of the formation of the nation, to a specific point in human 
history and, more importantly, to the wider idea of the size and mentality of the nation as 
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influenced and constructed by the wider geopolitical environment, and the functionalist 
requirements that it creates.  
 
E. Benedict Anderson and the ‘Imagined Political Community’ 
In consulting a final thinker on nations and nationalism, we now come to discuss the work of 
Benedict Anderson. In beginning this discussion, we find that Anderson moved away from the 
functionalist accounts of Gellner or Hobsbawm, but at the same time, also drew distinction 
from the ethno-symbolic or primordialism approaches of thinkers such as Smith or Geertz. 
Rather, Anderson’s account of the ‘imagined political community’ hinged on what Wimmer 
and Feinstein describe as ‘cultural modernization’.247  
In this regard, we find that the essence of Anderson’s argument was that, while nations and 
nationalism emerged within the modern sphere, their construction was far more holistic than is 
proposed under the theories advocated by Gellner and Hobsbawm. On this point, the essence 
of Anderson’s theory rested on the emergence of sense of imagined political community as 
associated with the arrival of the print revolution248 from the 15th century.249 From this moment, 
Anderson identified that the illiterate mass was able to develop a common vernacular, and to 
develop a largely holistic sense of nation-building.250 
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For Anderson, the linguistic revolution found its greatest momentum through religious texts, 
primarily the Bible, being the first books to be widely translated from Latin to respective 
national languages. Such a revolution found particular advancement through the events of the 
Reformation, taking root firstly in the newly Protestant nations of the Dutch Republic and 
England, and which resulted in what Anderson defines as ‘large new reading publics.’251 
However, while taking a largely poststructuralist approach to nation formation, we find a 
pervasive theme within Anderson’s writing which also attaches a distinct salience to the idea 
of the nation as being motivated by the state. Indeed, we find that Anderson made specific 
reference to the fact that the nation was a construct of the state – via the informalized elements 
of the literary culture, but which in itself was sponsored by the wider nation-building strategies 
of the state.252   
 
Summary 
At this point, it is important to take stock of the theoretical schools of thought on nations and 
nationalism so far discussed. In reflection, we find that following a discussion of the central 
schools and thinkers on the theories of nationalism, the overarching consensus, with the 
exception of the primordialists, is that the nation emerged during the modern period – 
associated with the rise of the state as the primary political unit within the global sphere, as 
articulated in Part One of this chapter.  
However, while articulating a broad consensus on the specific period within which the nation 
emerged, we find far less agreement within the literature as to the specific causes for the 
emergence of the nation. For ethno-symbolists such as Anthony Smith, the rise of the nation in 
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the modern period was based on the mobilisation of pre-modern ethnic markers of identity; a 
theory that differs from the continuity arguments of the primordialists, but which maintains a 
distinct connection between the modern nation, and the pre-modern ethnic past.  
Contrary to this view, we find the writings of functionalists such as Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm, the both of whom hold the position of the nation as being formed by the self-
induced nationalism of the state, framed broadly through the operation of state-based education 
systems. Within this theory, the essence of the nation is not conditioned by the consciousness 
of an ethnic past, but on the top-down mobilisation of a system of pervasive high cultures, 
historically maintained by the literary and clerical elite, and filtered down to the masses during 
the modern period – primarily as a response to the shift towards a system of industrial society. 
Bearing similarity to the modernist accounts of Gellner and Hobsbawm, we find that the work 
of Anthony Smith further extends the critique of the nation by articulating the view of the 
‘imagined political community’. This largely poststructuralist account of the nation, while 
broadly agreeing the historical scope of nation formation argued by Gellner and Hobsbawm, 
focussed on the direct mobilisation of a sense of national community as coming through the 
more holistic development of print cultures. Anderson argues that through the development of 
large literate populations after the print revolution in the 16th century, the gradual trend emerged 
of the holistic development of a sense of nationhood, attached to the abstract de-ethicised idea 
of the imagined political community.  
While agreeing with Anderson’s idea of the nation as an imagined political community, the 
argument in the next section of the chapter will seek to expand upon the formative account 
supplied by Anderson, and move to consider the factors that fundamentally helped to sustain 
the imagined political community from a symbolic perspective – in essence, the next section 
of the chapter will investigate the factors that led to the sustaining of identity mechanisms 
103 
 
attached to the state, and will seek to build a theoretical model with which to locate and analyse 
the tenets of Britishness.   
 
2.3.2. An Alternative Approach to the Imagined Political Community 
The aim of this section is not for formulate a new theory on nations and nationalism, nor is it 
to necessarily discount the theoretical approaches discussed above. Indeed, the aim of this 
section of the chapter is not to create a new understanding on the ‘foundation’ of the nation 
but, instead, to draw a theoretical conclusion on the factors that allowed for the continuing 
sense of national attachment connected to the state. Indeed, it is noted from our analysis of the 
above framed theorists that their emphasis of enquiry falls primarily on the birth of the nation. 
This section of the chapter seeks to investigate as to what sustained a sense of national feeling 
– or an imagined political community – attached to the vestiges of the state.  
In achieving this end, the corpus of this section of the chapter will be divided into three parts. 
The first two will consult the political theory of two influential thinkers on the role of the nation 
and the state – Giuseppe Mazzini and Carl Schmitt. The third part will then seek to frame a 
synthesis between these two thinkers, and develop a single theoretical approach for an analysis 
of the frame of Britishness, taking place in Part Three of this chapter.  
 
Mazzini and the Nation-State of Common Goals 
Beginning with Giuseppe Mazzini, we find that Mazzini is often placed by a number of political 
commentators within the intellectual tradition of liberal idealism. In this frame of analysis, the 
main aspects of Mazzini’s work to receive notable critique relate primarily to his writings on 
Italian nationalism and his role in that movement. Indeed, even within Mazzini’s wider writings 
on the state, we find a clear demonstration of his underlying ideology as a proponent for the 
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creation of an Italian state, as well as his opposition to the culturally heterogeneous Empires of 
Austria and the Ottomans – the former of which he often decreed as being a fundamental barrier 
to the formation of a unified Italy.253 
Yet, as an aside to the main emphasis of Mazzini’s writing, we also find a rich vein of political 
theory in Mazzini’s writing based on an analysis of the role of the state, and the relationship 
between the state and the identity of the citizen. In this regard, we find an argument presenting 
a primarily functionalist account of the role of the nation, comparable to the later work of 
Gellner, and frequently relied upon by Marxist theorists such as Hobsbawm.254 
The main lines of Mazzini’s theory on the nation and the state can be fruitfully approached 
through analysis of a series of essays published in 1871 – namely Nationalism and Nationality 
and Principles of International Politics. In consulting their corpus, we find that the primary 
basis of Mazzini’s political view of the nation was maintained by an understanding of the 
constructed essence of the nation as being able to be forged by the unity of similar peoples – a 
critique in itself holding considerable comparison to the later functionalist accounts of the 
nation formulated by Gellner: 
‘give this man a Country… and establish a link of solidarity between his individual 
efforts and the efforts of all subsequent generations; place him in association with the 
labors of 25 to 30 million men who speak the same language, have similar habits and 
beliefs, profess faith in the same goal, and have developed specific tools for their work 
as required by the general conditions of their land, and… his strengths will be greatly 
multiplied, allowing him to feel up to the task. The national tradition and his own 
intellect, revitalized by a communal bond with the intellects of millions, reveal to him 
a special goal, placed along the way towards the general goal.’255 
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The general goal256 to which Mazzini referred, equated to the transition of European states 
from a condition of despotism to democracy, leading eventually to a United States of Europe.257 
In this regard, we find Mazzini as having held a distinctly idealist view of the nation, 
constructed from a largely Hegelian position of the progress of modernity as commuting 
towards a specific end goal.258 In achieving this end, Mazzini identified each state (and nation) 
within the European sphere as being conditioned to pursue a special goal, which would 
eventually equate to a condition of European unity.259 Mazzini defined this position as follows: 
‘The Nation is not simply a territory that ought to be strengthened by enlarging its size. 
Nor is it just a collection of men who speak the same language and follow the initiative 
of a single leader. It is instead an organic whole held together by a unity of common 
goals and efforts.’260 
In unpacking this quote, we find that Mazzini saw shared conditions such as language, territory 
or race as ‘indications of nationality’, but viewed their capacity to form stable political units as 
dependent upon the identification of a common goal with which to bind the national 
community.261 Through his identification of common goals, Mazzini saw the nation as a 
political construct designed to achieve the necessary conditions for a transition to a United 
States of Europe. Thus, for Mazzini, the nation was in essence a transitionary mechanism to a 
society of European unity: ‘Humanity constitutes the end and the nation the means.’262  
                                                          
256 In his accompanying work of 1871, Mazzini framed the general goal as the third mission of the Italian people 
– the first being the political unity provided by the Roman Empire, and the second the moral unity provided by 
the Papacy – and framed the Italian people as the only truly homogenous nation in Europe capable of leading the 
defence of humanity; See, Mazzini, G., ‘Principles of International Politics’, in Recchia, S., and Urbinati, N., 
(eds.) A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Guizeppe Mazzini’s Writings On Democracy, Nation Building and 
International Relations, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 224-240 
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However, in framing this idealist account of the aims of the nation, we also find that Mazzini 
maintained an understanding of the wider geopolitical factors influencing the construction of 
the nation and, in particular, the basis of this construction in relation to the state.263 
Perhaps the best demonstration of this underlying functionality in Mazzini’s political thought 
on nations and nationalism came through his predictions on the geopolitical map of Europe. 
For Mazzini, the number of states in Europe during the 19th century was, due to reasons of 
political economy, not capable of exceeding thirteen or fourteen, whereas the number of 
potential national units in Europe over the same period numbered fifty or more.264  
In this regard, we may deduce a significant similarity with the later writing of Gellner who, as 
already mentioned, identified that the number of nations far exceeded that of formable states.265 
In answering this seeming imbalance between the number of nations and states, Mazzini saw 
the need for the fusion of cultural groups sharing common goals, under the umbrella of a state 
hierarchy. For example, in regards to the United Kingdom, Mazzini identified the following; 
‘the fusion of its three races, Scandinavian, Germanic and Celtic, as yet imperfect, is only a 
matter of slow, internal administrative progress’.266  
In reflection, therefore, we find that while holding an overarching position of liberal idealism, 
Mazzini’s writing on the nation also exhibited a distinct vein of functionalist critique. In 
essence, Mazzini’s view was broadly comparable to the later writings of Gellner and 
Hobsbawm, seeing the nation as a relatively unnatural and functionalist construct, conditioned 
by the wider political economic necessity of the global sphere – but also to be symbolically 
mobilised through the pursuit of common goals.  
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Carl Schmitt and the Distinction Between Friend and Enemy 
We now move to consider the political theory of Carl Schmitt. In contrast to Mazzini, we find 
that Schmitt’s political philosophy was primarily motivated from a conservative perspective of 
the state and its relationship as conditioned by a state of conflict.  
For Schmitt, the necessary condition of the state rested upon the identification of the political; 
‘The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.’267 In defining the political, 
we find that Schmitt distinguished its construction as based upon the necessary fear of 
hostilities between two groups. Schmitt defined this through the paradigm distinction between 
‘friend and enemy.’268 In interpreting this distinction, we find the enemy as not necessarily a 
hostile foe but, rather, a political group which holds the potential for hostile conflict: 
‘The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear 
as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in 
business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient 
for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and 
alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.’269 
Perhaps the key identifier to Schmitt’s distinction of the political is the notion of conflict as a 
possible condition; this alludes to the fact that conflict may not be a necessary condition for the 
definition of the political group but, rather, must stand as a possible scenario arising in the 
future. In this regard, Schmitt defined his construction of identity as connected in response to 
the definition of a public enemy. Through the definition of the public enemy – being the enemy 
of the political group – Schmitt concluded that it is not a necessary condition whereby the 
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individual feels threatened by the public enemy, but that the group as a whole identifies the 
public enemy as one which holds the potential to be a hostile foe in the future: 
‘The enemy is not merely any competitor or just a partner of a conflict in general. He 
is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least 
potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The 
enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a 
collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a 
relationship.’270 
The identification of the public enemy was, therefore, the primary condition upon which 
Schmitt based his definition of the political. However, as already identified, we find that the 
boundaries of this idea were essentially constructed by the outlining of the political as any 
group which enters the political sphere. For example, in order for a specific group – be it 
religious, moral, economic, ethical or other – to form a political group, it must be conditioned 
by the existence of conflict between that group and a defined enemy; a religious group 
declaring war upon another religious group ceases to be a solely religious group, and instead 
transfers to becoming a political group through the distinction between friend and enemy.271  
Thus, in translating this definition to the nation, or the political group best associated with the 
definition of a nation, we find its corpus as becoming a defined political group when the 
possibility of conflict exists with another political group, thus enforcing the distinction between 
friend and enemy. In this regard, we find the following useful definition of Schmitt’s concept 
of the political nation as provided by Ulrich Preuss: 
‘“The political” delineates the character of a social conflict in that it refers to its 
potentially highest intensity an escalation to the existential antagonism of “friend” and 
“enemy”. The paradigmatic constellation is a group’s contention of its “sameness” 
based on race, ethnicity, common history, culture or language, which for Schmitt forges 
the members of the group into the “oneness” of a “people” – that constitutes the political 
quality of a group. As a consequence, the notion of “the political” antecedes the notion 
of the state, because the common feeling of a group’s oneness is the determining state-
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building social energy; the state – the institutional order of the political quality of a 
people – rests on “the political” as its preceding condition.’272 
Thus, for Schmitt, the construction of a sense of ‘oneness’ or ‘belonging’ was the condition 
that formed the foundation for the constitution of the political group; a condition which he 
argued was strengthened internally through the identification of the possibility of conflict with 
a hostile other.  
In this regard, we find Schmitt’s definition of the political nation as referring to the idea of a 
sense of collective identity. As argued by Balakrishnan, the theory at the heart of this aspect of 
Schmitt’s design of the political stemmed from Schmitt’s primordial understanding of the 
foundation of the political group; a group which for Schmitt gained an ordered structure 
through the development of the state.273 Upon the point at which the possibility of war is 
diminished, Schmitt concluded that the distinction between friend and enemy comes to an end, 
as does the existence of politics as a frame for identity.274 
However, through Schmitt’s identification of the political group as the precondition for the 
existence of the state, we may rightly presume that Schmitt saw the state as a static construct, 
conditioned by the boundaries of the political group. It is upon this issue, however, that we find 
the second tenet of Schmitt’s concept of the state; the recognition of geopolitical factors in the 
construction and reconfiguration of the state and its boundaries: 
‘The development of military techniques appears to move in a direction which will 
perhaps permit only a few states to survive, i.e., those whose industrial potential would 
allow them to wage a promising war. Should smaller and weaker states be unable to 
maintain their independence by virtue of an appropriate alliance, they may then be 
forced, voluntarily or by necessity, to abdicate the jus belli.’275 
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Following this account, we find that Schmitt recognised the definition of the state as evolving 
in correlation with wider shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Thus, if we consider that Schmitt 
found the existence of the political as a precondition for the existence of the state, we may 
presume that the changes in statal boundaries are in themselves a recognition of the shifting 
boundaries of the political group. Under this construction, we find two conceptions of the role 
of the state in the formation of the political group. First, Schmitt identified the role of the state 
in safeguarding the condition of total peace within its territorial boundaries: 
‘The endeavour of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the 
state and its territory. To create tranquillity, security, and order and thereby establish 
the normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid.’276 
Therefore, in instances where the political group coincides with the boundaries of the state, we 
find that the role of the state is reduced to maintaining the tranquillity of the political group, 
and in defending its interests in relation to the external enemy. However, we find that Schmitt 
also identified a second condition whereby, in instances where the internal conditions of the 
state are lacking in peaceful settlement, the role of the state is to rectify such conditions through 
the identification of an internal domestic enemy: 
‘As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it 
in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.’277 
In this regard, we see Schmitt’s definition of the state as, on the one hand, the vessel for the 
identity of the political group, which exists prior to the creation of the total political state. On 
the other hand, we find that Schmitt also saw the state as dictating the boundaries of the political 
group by defining the internal membership of that group through the identification of an 
internal enemy.  
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In this regard, we may conclude that Schmitt saw the creation of identity, attached to the state, 
as a condition arising both from the external definition of a defined Other, as well as the internal 
condition of a defined domestic enemy. While relying on a primordial foundation in the 
definition of the political group, Schmitt left open the interpretation of the fact that the political 
boundaries of the state are open to shift and change in regards to the territorial boundaries of 
the state; this was a primarily functionalist account of the nation, but conditioned by an 
overarching sense of wider political economic competition.  
 
Summary and Synthesis  
Through this account of Schmitt’s philosophy on the state, we find a number of parallels to the 
previously considered position of Mazzini. Initially, we see that both thinkers saw the role of 
the state as conditioned, first, by the need to safeguard the rights of its internal populace, and 
second, as defining its boundaries against the geopolitical conditions of the time. Thus, both 
thinkers seem to have displayed a vision of the state as a token of power, conditioned against 
the backdrop of geopolitical thresholds of size and scale.  
Yet, in making these initial connections, we also find that the two thinkers differ considerably 
in their vision of the construction of identity within the state. Whilst both Schmitt and Mazzini 
saw markers of identity such as language, religion or ethnicity as necessary conditions to the 
foundation of the national community, they differ in the means of the final construction of the 
national group. For Mazzini, as has been explained, the nation formed through the 
identification of a common goal which served to bind the collective interests of the national 
group, and to provide it with a mission. Thus, Mazzini’s idea may be summarised as the 
construction of the nation against the domestically constructed mission of the state.  
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Schmitt, however, differed by constructing the identity of the nation – as connected to the state 
– against the primordial requirement of the formation of a collective group within an 
environment of hostile Others. Thus, Schmitt saw the construction of the nation as conditioned 
by the fear of conflict with an external enemy, a fear which transforms the national group into 
a political group, whose best means of protection is through the creation of the state. Schmitt’s 
idea may be summarised, then, as the construction of the nation against a common external 
enemy.  
In reflecting upon these arguments, let us now cast a useful synthesis between these two 
theoretical approaches, and form a theoretical approach with which to define the existence of 
a sense of ‘Britishness’ as attached to the state. In achieving this task, we may raise the 
provision that the definition of the nation-state, or rather the ‘state-nation’, is constructed via 
the dualism of a need for collective defence against an identifiable political Other – a factor 
that is easily framed through the boundaries of the state.  
However, in recognising this element, this thesis also argues that certain internal factors of 
cohesive mobilisation are required, in order to confer a distinct character and purpose upon the 
national group. In this regard, this thesis relies upon Mazzini’s idea of the nation-state of 
common goals, arguing that through the prosecution of common projects, a degree of national 
cohesion emerges which, if congruent to the boundaries of the political community, instils a 
sense of national cohesion.  
 
2.4. Locating Britishness 
So far, this thesis has provided us with two themes that are useful in considering the facilitation 
of a sense of ‘Britishness’ in the United Kingdom, and its relationship to the dynamics of the 
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territorial constitution.278 The first, as recognised in Chapter One, relates to the relatively 
inorganic processes which incorporated Wales, Scotland and Ireland into political union with 
a predominantly English-led centre.279 In 1536, 1707 and 1801, we find Unions that were not 
the conclusion of an inevitable process, but rather the reaction to critical junctures in English 
politics.280 Moreover, each of the Unions, while concentrating the locus of sovereignty at 
Westminster, failed to create a unitary state in the broader political sense of the term; instead 
forming a ‘State of Unions’ which allowed for certain peripheral institutions to continue, 
largely unaltered.281 As a result, there is considerable argument that there never emerged a 
single definition for the political structure of the UK, and the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution continued to be influenced by the realisation of the UK as a State of Unions.  
The second theme draws reference to the absence of a single source of identity emerging after 
each of the three unions. In contrast to the relatively mono-cultural, state-sponsored brands of 
civic nationalism employed in states such as France, we find that the UK (and its various 
precursory forms) maintained a distinctly multi-national character after the incorporation of 
each of its peripheral parts. Indeed, as noted by Nairn, the development of a sense of 
‘Britishness’ attached to the UK-state emerged via a system of complex layered loyalties, 
whereby Britishness was ‘superimposed’ on top of – as opposed to unilaterally replacing – the 
older peripheral loyalties in each of its four component parts.282  
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As a result, it is argued that the construction of individual identities in the UK assumed a 
distinctly pluralised character, with individuals maintaining a distinction in being, for example, 
Scottish and British. More broadly, David McCrone comments on how the layering of identity 
within the UK followed a pattern of concentric circles, ranging from local and peripheral forms 
of identity, whereby the individual recognised themselves as being from a particular town, shire 
or nation, through to the broader state-based and imperial context of Britishness.283  
Perhaps as a result of this multi-national construction, the ability to reach a scientific definition 
of what constitutes ‘Britishness’ has proven relatively unachievable. Instead, we find that 
abstract symbols such as the monarchy, liberal democracy and the rule of law, have historically 
been used to define a sense of Britishness,284 while also recognising its relatively undefinable 
character. Perhaps framed most cogently by George Orwell, Britishness is ‘a species of instinct, 
really a code of conduct which is understood by almost everyone, though never formulated.’285  
In recent years, a number of commentators have come to recognise this abstract and flexible 
character as constitutive of one of the relative strengths of Britishness – and of the dynamics 
of the territorial constitution. Indeed, for Keating, the greatest weakness of contemporary 
British ‘unionism’, in response to the rise of sub-state nationalism, has been its attempts to try 
and reach a coherent definition on what constitutes ‘Britishness’.286  
However, despite what appears to be a relative consensus against any scientific definition, this 
thesis argues that from an historical perspective, certain factors, events and conducive forces 
are able to be located, which influence individuals to place their primary political identity in 
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the UK state. This section of the chapter seeks to understand the tenets of Britishness as a state-
based identity, as well as understanding its wider unionist dynamics, and its effects upon the 
territorial constitution. In developing this approach, the following argument will be separated 
into four frames of analysis, each of which draws on a particular tenet in the conducive form 
of political identity in the UK. 
 
Warfare 
Perhaps the first, and by far most long sustaining understanding of the primacy of Britishness 
is conceived through the idea of identity as defined against an identifiable Other. As already 
noted in this thesis, the threat – and reality – of conflict with France held a distinctive 
symbolism in the mobilisation of unionising forces within the British Isles. Indeed, as was 
concluded in Chapter One, the Unions which came to form the UK had a foundation and 
motivation in the threat of military conflict, and the possible emergence of a hostile player 
within the British Isles – a largely English-led anxiety.287  
In this section of the chapter, it is argued that this functional process also played a defining role 
in the symbolism of embodying a sense of identity and attachment to the state. In Part One of 
this chapter, the argument was presented that states largely emerged as the result of changes in 
the wider political economic environment; condensing the previous mosaic of small-scale 
political units into weighted Leviathans of unprecedented size and scale. Moreover, as noted 
in Part Two of this chapter, the functionalist arguments of Gellner and Hobsbawm, as well as 
the reflections of Mazzini and Schmitt, all demonstrate the idea of the nation and state as 
becoming yoked together as a response to wider alterations in the geopolitical landscape. 
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In the UK, we find the definition of the boundaries of the political community were well 
provided by the natural boundaries of the British Isles; invoking a distinct sense of unity and 
defiance, as well as a natural barrier against the definition of the hostile Other.288 Indeed, it was 
the pre-made geographical boundaries of the British Isles that held such significance for 
Mazzini when he defined it as a natural theatre, requiring a unity of those peoples within its 
borders.289 
Moreover, we find that the existence of – or threat of – conflict played a significant role in the 
construction of identity. From the early-modern conflicts with Spain and the United Provinces, 
through to the wars with France, Germany and the looming threat of war with the Soviet Union, 
a condition emerged which placed a premium on the importance of British national cohesion 
and action.290 As noted by Colley: 
‘Time and time again, war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from 
Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other, and 
encouraged them to define themselves against it.’291 
Indeed, as noted by Mann, the significance of conflict during the Napoleonic Wars was such 
that it not only presented an obviously hostile Other against which to frame the need for British 
cohesion, but also had the practical effect of directly impacting the life of the individual; Mann 
estimates the Napoleonic Wars consumed between 31-43% of GNP, as well as recruiting more 
than 5% of the population into direct military service.292 The significance of the Other, 
therefore, was not only psycho-symbolic, but also significant in the everyday lives of the 
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individual, which we may presume had a significant effect in influencing the individuals 
construction of identity and allegiance in connection to the state. 
Thus, as our first theme, we may conclude that the essence of Britishness was constructed 
against the weight of a common enemy, characterised by the distinction between ‘friend and 
enemy’ – and generally directed towards the hostile statal Others of continental Europe. Yet, 
while significant, we also find the essence of this point as distinctly lacking in substance in 
facilitation of a common goal with which to unite the national populace outside of times of 
conflict. In this regard, we may now turn to the additional characterisation of the political group 
through the identification of a common Protestantism.   
 
Protestantism 
It is argued that the second tenet of Britishness relates to the personalisation of the Other 
through the boundaries of religious communion. Essentially, this thesis casts this web of 
identity through reference to a sense of common Protestantism, arguing that throughout the 
modern history of ‘Britain’ – from the 17th century onwards – a sense of common Protestantism 
came to form a defining characteristic of identity.  
Indeed, at the time of the Anglo-Scottish Union, we find that the focus of a sense of common 
Protestantism was a key factor that influenced many Scots, and in particularly the Presbyterian 
Church in Scotland, to support political union.293 As argued by Bowie, a central element to this 
process was the ability to define a sense of common Protestantism against an obviously hostile 
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French (and Spanish) Catholic Other294 – thus creating, in Schmittian terms, a clearly 
identifiable political community.  
However, while it is important to recognise the force of Protestantism as a unionising 
mechanism, defined against an external threat, it is also useful to see the boundaries of this 
political community as being influential in creating an internal enemy or Other, within the 
territorial boundaries of the state. This thesis argues that no more so was this the case than in 
Ireland, whereby the disenfranchised Catholic majority became a distinct Other following the 
Reformation. 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter One, we find that the effects of the Protestant Reformation in 
Ireland had a significant effect in alienating the Catholic majority, and in creating a sense of 
distinctive ‘Otherness’ between the British and the Irish – a factor which Ignatieff argues 
assumed a condition of ‘ethnic superiority’ following the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.295 
In this regard, it may be argued that the strength of a common Protestantism held a distinct 
dualism in its effecting of the individual’s loyalty to the state. On the one hand, we find the 
idea of a common Protestantism as a unionising mechanism, defined against a common Other, 
and fostering a sense of collective identity against the potentially hostile Catholic Others of 
continental Europe (and Ireland). On the other hand, we find the wider sense of a common goal 
attached to the image of Protestantism, and broadly associated with the imagined ‘superiority’ 
of Protestant liberal democracy – particularly when framed in comparison with the perceived 
illiberalism of continental Catholic absolutism.296  
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Thus, it may be argued that through the emergence of a common Protestantism, the relatively 
sterile political boundaries of Britishness, as defined against the actions of warfare, became 
embodied with a distinct national cause – characterising a national project, as opposed to a 
simple means of collective defence.  
 
Empire 
The third tenet of Britishness is to be found in the Empire. As has been touched upon in earlier 
sections of this thesis, the English – and later British – Empire emerged onto the world stage 
during the 16th century. In regards to the translatability of the Empire into fostering a system 
of identity attached to the state, we find its significance as falling under two headings – the 
functional and psychological influence of Empire on the minds of the individual in the UK, 
these will now be discussed below: 
 
Functional Advantage of Empire 
As we have already seen illustrated at several points in this thesis, the significance of Empire 
was a primary factor in securing the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707. Following the failings of 
the Darien expedition, and the subsequent mercantile politics employed by both sides, the 
economic consequences required a new form of politics. For many Scots, the subsequent Union 
with England was seen as a ‘marriage of convenience’, having as its raison d’etre the benefit 
of access to English markets at home and abroad, while also guaranteeing the continued 
administrative independence of Scotland297 – an argument that similarly influenced many in 
Ireland to be receptive to the idea of Anglo-Irish Union in 1801. 
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As argued by Tom Nairn, the urban centres of Wales, Scotland and Ulster all assumed roles as 
‘sub-centres of the Victorian capitalist economy.’298 Indeed, the ports of Glasgow, Belfast and 
Cardiff, amassed an equal share of Imperial trade than did the English cities of Liverpool, 
Bristol or London. However, while this created a weighted sense of allegiance to the state in 
these areas, the comparison with rural areas, dominated by a largely agrarian economy, as was 
particularly the case in Ireland, was such that a sense of Britishness failed to develop the same 
attachment to the common goal.  
Moreover, as already noted, the failure of the Reformation to take hold in Ireland also created 
a situation whereby the majority Catholic population where unable to take their place under the 
umbrella of Britishness on account of both cultural incompatibility and state-based hostility.299 
These two issues may broadly be framed as the ‘industrial-agrarian divide’, itself largely 
following a pattern of religious distinction, with the Protestant areas of Ulster and around the 
Pale developing prosperous industrial areas, whereas the remainder of Ireland – being majority 
Catholic – remaining underdeveloped and agrarian.300  
As argued by Keating, this created the condition whereby a significant proportion of the 
population of Ireland, outside of Ulster and the Pale, were forced to emigrate, either inside the 
United Kingdom, or more commonly overseas. However, despite the failure of industry to take 
hold in Ireland, and the subsequent weakness in a sense of Britishness being received, the 
                                                          
298 ‘important sub-centres of the Victorian capitalist economy, and around their great urban centres – Belfast, 
Cardiff and Glasgow – had evolved middle and working classes who, consciously and indisputably, gave their 
primary political allegiance to the imperial state.’; Nairn, T., The Break-up of Britain: Crisis in Neo 
Nationalism, (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 12 
299 Nairn, T., The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis in Neo Nationalism, (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 11 
300 ‘In Ireland, industry was largely concentrated in the north-east, which was also the area of greatest Protestant 
settlement, giving the dominant groups within Ulster and a section of the working class a material interest in the 
British link. The effect was to increase the division within Ireland while not, however, reducing the political 
impact of religious differences within the north.’; Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial 
Politics and the European State, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 64 
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effects of industry in the remainder of the periphery had an equally significant effect in helping 
to foster a sense of identity attached to a system of common goals.  
More importantly, we find that the effects of Empire, and the existence of a distinct common 
goal between the component parts of the United Kingdom – Ireland of course being the 
exception – had a significant effect on allaying the rise of peripheral nationalism. As Paterson 
directs us to understand in relation to Scotland:  
‘autonomy in domestic matters, and access through free trade and migration to the 
biggest empire the world had ever seen. For an economy based on trade, and for a 
middle class that had developed an excellent system of meritocratic education, these 
opportunities could hardly be rivalled by any alternative constitutional 
arrangements.’301 
Thus, from a broad perspective, it is possible to frame the functional advantages of Empire as 
instilling a sense of national cohesion, based on the direct benefits it conferred to the individual. 
Under the second tenet of Empire, we will also see how the broad functional advantage of 
Empire was also conditioned by a perceived set of psychological benefits in the minds of the 
individual, linked to the wider conditioning of the global sphere.   
 
Psychological and Symbolic Significance of Empire 
The second aspect of Empire in the facilitation of a sense of Britishness, relates to the 
psychological and symbolic significance of Empire. It is argued that through the size, scale and 
opportunity provided by the Empire, the individual was induced, in a relatively holistic manner, 
to place their primary political allegiance in the UK-state. In arguing this position, we may 
separate the psychological significance of Empire into two parts.  
                                                          
301 Paterson, L., ‘Scottish home rule: Radical break or pragmatic adjustment?’, Regional and Federal Studies, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, (1998), pp. 53-67 at 55 
122 
 
First, we find the definition of the territorial limits, as well as the geopolitical strength, of 
Empire as influencing its construction as a distinctive political community within the minds of 
the individual. Fundamental to this principle, it is argued that the territorial limits, and clearly 
defined borders of the Empire helped to define its internal ordering as a defined political 
community, embodying a distinct distinction between ‘friend and enemy’ on a geopolitical 
scale.302  
Indeed, as already acknowledged in Part One of this chapter, the pursuit of overseas Empires 
by European states was primarily an act of geopolitical high politics, designed to ensure the 
strength and success of the parent state; a measure of geopolitical significant that it is argued 
instilled a distinct cultural affinity to the vessels of Empire within the minds of the individual.  
Second, we find that the system of Empire also offered a web of psychological possibilities for 
the individual in framing a sense of identity through its common goals. Fundamental to this 
understanding is the reading of Empire as a positive endeavour, as well as an outlet valve on 
the essence of Britishness as a purely state-based identity. Indeed, as already mentioned, the 
essence of Empire helped to transform Britishness into an international – or rather, Imperial – 
context, being a further layer of identity above the state, but synonymous to the fundamental 
principles of the state.  
 ‘More generally, imperialism encouraged the masses, and especially the potentially 
disconnected, to identify themselves with the imperial state and nation, and thus 
unconsciously to endow the social and political system represented by the state with 
justification and legitimacy.’303 
Within the context of Britishness, we find this view as conditioned, on the one hand, by the 
pursuit of common liberal projects, for example in the British missionary efforts in Africa from 
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the mid-19th century.304 On the other hand, however, we also see the wider significance of 
Empire as a geopolitical mechanism as embodying a sense of ‘patriotic flag waving’ within the 
national community – furthering the sense of collective identity and common pursuit of the 
imagined community.305 
Fundamental to this aspect of Empire, we find that the strength of Britishness in this context 
was inherently connected to the strength of the Imperial sphere. On the one hand, when faced 
with a hostile Other, we find a notable increase in the identification of Britishness – defined by 
an allegiance to the state as the vessel best suited for collective defence against a hostile Other.   
On the other hand, however, several historians account for the fact that the essence of 
Britishness was also connected to the strength of its economic markets. In explaining this 
account of the strength – or weakness – of Britishness, we find considerable evidence of the 
fact that, during periods of international peace, but of relative slow economic growth within 
the Imperial sphere, the salience of Britishness began to, at least marginally, decline. Indeed, 
as noted by Tom Devine, the salience of a sense of collective identity tied to the benefits of 
Imperialism began to decline in Scotland during the economic instability of the inter-war years; 
over a decade before the British Empire reached the height of its territorial size.306  
 
Welfare 
It is now argued that the fourth tenet of Britishness relates to the emergence of the ‘Welfare 
State’ after 1945. As noted by McCrone, the essence of this tenet had a particular salience in 
the periphery, whereby the continuing economic underperformance in comparison to England 
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meant that membership of the Union and of the Welfare State were viewed as ‘common sense’ 
rather than a cumbersome ‘commitment’.307  
More significantly, however, is the fact of the Welfare State emerging in tandem with the 
decline of the British Empire; replacing the existing system of common goals, albeit reframed 
within a newly internalised perspective.308 In this regard, as has already been framed in the 
identification of the other tenets of Britishness, the role of Welfare was not to facilitate a direct 
nation-building strategy but, rather, to condition an indirect source or benefit between the state 
and the prosperity of the individual.309 It was, in essence, to give the individual a common goal, 
and the perceived understanding of that goal as facilitated by the institutional architecture of 
the state.  
Moreover, we find any rush in the decline of Britishness after the 1960s as being mitigated by 
the continuing memory of Britain’s imperial past, as well as its place as the victorious power 
in the Second World War.310 Moreover, the common goals of the Welfare State, as well as the 
relative weakness of economic performance, meant that from a sense of collective identity, 
Britishness continued to be seen as the most salient form of national allegiance, well into the 
second half of the 20th century. In the modern era, however, the ability for such symbols to 
endure is distinctly in doubt – the essence of this debate will be carried form in Chapter Three.  
 
Summary 
                                                          
307 McCrone, D., ‘Scotland Out of the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda’, The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1, (January-March 2012), pp. 69-76 at 73 
308 Williams, F., Social Policy, A Critical Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 162 
309 McEwen, N., ‘State Welfare Nationalism: The Territorial Impact of Welfare State Development in Scotland’, 
Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2002), pp. 66-90 at 86 
310 Nairn, T., The Break-up of Britain: Crisis in Neo Nationalism, (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 13 
125 
 
Reflecting upon the above arguments, we find that Britishness emerged not as a constructed 
identity, grounded on the belief of an historical past, but rather as a constitutional or state-based 
identity, embodying a system of values which related directly to the actions and ideals of the 
state. To some extent, it is argued that this has been both its blessing and its curse. On the one 
hand, we find that the flexibility and relatively abstract frames of Britishness have allowed it 
to rest on top of the culturally defined identities of the peripheral parts of the UK – as well as 
the wider multiculturalism of the Empire.  
On the other hand, however, its lack of concrete definition has also served as its biggest 
weakness, for in the contemporary age of struggles over identity, Britishness, and its 
predominant reliance on state-based frames of identity, has fallen fowl to the decline in the 
significance of the state - subsequently being matched, and to a significant extent exceeded, by 
the national identity mechanisms of the periphery.311 These changes will be explored in more 
depth in Chapter Three, however, at this point, it is useful to translate the argument that 
Britishness was, and is, a system of identity and imagined communion linked inextricably to 
the power and common goals of the state.  
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we find that the argument in this chapter has laid forth a functionalist account 
of the modern state and its relationship with the political identity of its citizens. In Part One of 
the chapter, it was argued that the state emerged as a result of wider changes in the global 
political sphere which, in turn, necessitated the increase in the size and scale of the state as a 
means of political organisation. Part Two of the chapter extended the debate to consider as to 
how the political unit of the state became associated with the essence of identity of the 
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individual. In this part of the chapter, a debate was undertaken on the current theories on nations 
and nationalism, and a synthesis drawn in favour of the nation as an imagined political 
community, albeit reconditioned in the British context through reference to the system of 
Othering and common goals, as identified in the theoretical ideas of Carl Schmitt and Giuseppe 
Mazzini.  
More importantly, however, this chapter has demonstrated that the fundamental tenets of 
Britishness, being the essence of identity associated with the political unit of the United 
Kingdom, has been sustained through a complex system of Others and common goals, 
unreservedly tied to the fortunes of the state. Moreover, this chapter has also shown how the 
tenets of Britishness have had a significant impact upon the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution; helping to foster a sense of unionism and shared belonging between the 
component parts of the UK.  
 
Carrying this debate forward, the next two chapters of this thesis will deal with the effects of 
the recent decline of Britishness as a form of state-based identity. Chapter Three will frame 
this through reference to the declining salience of the state within the new world order – 
highlighting how when framed against the new multi-level challenge to the authority of the 
state, the essence of Britishness has lost a degree of salience within the minds of the citizens 
of the UK. Chapter Four will then reframe this debate into an analysis of the effects of this rise 
in peripheral nationalism upon the territorial constitution itself; analysing the devolution 
process.  
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Chapter 3 
The New World Order and Challenges to the State 
 
The previous chapter of this thesis argued that the facilitation of a sense of ‘Britishness’ took 
place within a distinct geopolitical environment, in which the state was conditioned as the 
primary vessel for the identity and allegiance of its citizens. The debate in this chapter will 
reframe this analysis, drawing consideration to the recent shift in the global order, framed under 
the abstract rubric of ‘globalisation’. In undertaking this analysis, the debate in this chapter will 
focus on the substantive constitutional challenges the new world order poses to the state. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, the argument was posed that since the 16th century, the state has 
been ‘the alpha and omega of personal identity’.312 As was demonstrated, the essence of this 
argument was framed against the wider geopolitical realities of the time, specifically the need 
for size and scale in defining the political unit in a world of closed market economics and global 
competition. The argument in this chapter seeks to unpick this tradition of state-based identity 
by drawing on the recent changes in the global sphere, and the rise of new sites of authority 
above and below the state. It will be argued that, as a result of these challenges, the state’s 
ability to continuously frame itself as the principle vessel for the political identity of its citizens 
has been significantly reduced.  
By pursuing this line of enquiry, this chapter contributes to the central research question of this 
thesis by examining the wider themes that influence the devolution process in the UK. In this 
                                                          
312 Franck, T. M., ‘Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice’, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 90, No. 3, (July, 1996), pp. 359-383 at 360 
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regard, the analysis in this chapter will fall primarily upon outlining the normative changes 
taking place within the global sphere, and the challenges they pose to the traditional structure 
of the nation-state. Important for the central research question of this thesis, this chapter will 
also consider the direct impact of these challenges in the UK; how they have influenced the 
political demands of sub-state nationalist groups; and the challenges these demands pose to the 
structure and dynamics of the territorial constitution. In achieving these aims, this chapter will 
be divided into three parts.  
In Part One, the essence of the debate will seek to clarify what is meant by the all-encompassing 
rubric of ‘globalisation’ and, more specifically, how its associated forces have come to impede 
upon the traditional hegemony of the state-based global order. Part Two will build upon this 
theme by identifying the specific constitutional challenges associated with the rising arc of 
globalisation; specifically, the substantive, theoretical and normative challenges to the state. In 
this part of the chapter, a particular premium will be placed on understanding the essence of 
the sub-state challenge, and its reliance on the processes and institutions associated with 
‘globalisation’ in the formation of its constitutional objectives. Part Three of this chapter will 
then conclude with an analysis of the constitutional aims of sub-state nationalist groups in the 
UK and, in particular, how they have come to rely upon the structure and opportunities 
presented by the new world order in framing their constitutional objectives.  
 
3.2. Globalisation and the New World Order  
Globalisation has become a danger word for the nation-state. Through its abstract framing, 
many commentators attribute the contemporary challenges to the authority of the nation-state, 
both functional and normative, to its processional march in the years after 1945.313 Yet, while 
                                                          
313 Habermas, J., ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization’, New Left Review, No. 235, 
(May/June 1999), pp. 46-59 at 48 
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continually relying on its all-encompassing rubric in framing certain of the contemporary 
challenges to the state, few writers in the area of constitutional enquiry afford much ink to 
considering what globalisation amounts to, or indeed how ‘globalisation’ came to challenge 
the once monopolistic authority of the nation-state. Therefore, in this first part of the chapter 
we will pause to ask two questions. First, what is globalisation? And second, how has it 
assumed a normative personality which has come to challenge the operative authority of the 
nation-state? 
Beginning with the first question, we find an initial definition of globalisation as provided by 
Holm and Sorensen; ‘the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations 
across borders.’314 Through consultation of the wider literature, we find the corpus of this 
definition as reflective of the general idea of globalisation as a descriptive term, relating to a 
distinct change in the ordering of the global sphere.315 Framed another way, we find 
globalisation to be a term describing not an isolated event, but rather a process of distinct events 
spanning an extended chronology.  
For Keohane and Nye, this understanding of globalisation as a process was able to be explained 
through the ‘thickening’ of the various strands – economic, political, cultural, etc. – of 
globalism.316 Under this reading, the multi-speed intensification of globalism is one whereby 
its influence comes to gradually spread across the operative and normative strands of global 
society; both vertically and horizontally. Yet, in order to apply this understanding to the 
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concept of the state, and the challenges it faces in the new global sphere, this thesis argues that 
we must include a distinction of globalisation as operating in two parts:  
First, we must see globalisation as a functional process, being the transfer of the operative 
capacity for effective action away from the state, and its relocation to a new global sphere of 
operation. Initially, we find this demonstrated in the development of certain functionalist 
strands within a new global sphere. For example, the first mercantile expeditions of the 
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch or the British in the 16th century, and the opening up of global sea-
based trade routes created a transitional and interconnected quality of globalism, whereby the 
actions of state geopolitics were expanded onto a global canvas.317  
At this early stage, it is recognised that the control of globalism rested primarily with the state; 
driven within the confines of state-based Imperial expansion, as opposed to multi-lateral 
globalism that transcends political borders. Indeed, it is only at the point whereby this latter 
process occurs, and the functional element of globalism comes to evolve from the national 
market to the global market, that we find the functional aspect of globalisation as posing a 
distinct challenge to the capacity of the state to act with unfettered flexibility.318 
Briefly summarised, it is argued that the initial casting of the global strands occurred within 
the nexus of the expansion of national economies and Imperial markets, which then gradually 
thickened to assume a cross-border relational quality, exporting its operation to outside of the 
national economy and onto the global sphere. Under this transition, the ability of the state to 
control the development of each of globalism’s strands was reduced, transcending the dynamics 
of globalisation into an extraterritorial and international sphere.319   
                                                          
317 Ferguson, N., Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 17 
318 Horsman, M., and Marshall, A., After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder, 
(London: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 23 
319 Habermas, J., ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization’, New Left Review, No. 235, 
(May/June 1999), pp. 46-59 at 48 
131 
 
The second aspect of globalisation is institutional, and concerns the reconfiguration of 
functional globalisation into new sites of normative authority – designed primarily for the 
regulation or administration of the various strands of globalism.320 It is argued that these new 
sites of authority can take two forms. The first are bilateral or multilateral agreements between 
states to set up regulatory organs, or agree certain regulatory practices concerning one or more 
globalised strand. Under this construction, states retain the ability to dictate the reach of 
administrative capacity through a series of agreements. Although, the conferring of power to 
new sites of authority holds the possibility of – albeit voluntarily – diminishing the functional 
capacity of the state.321  
The second, are the creation of supranational organisations to administer strands of previously 
state-based action, through the creation of new institutional sites of regulation, which have the 
ability to regulate the actions of the state – at times without the necessary consent of the state 
itself. Fundamentally, it is this challenge which will form the basis of the later discussion in 
this chapter. However, before we begin an investigation into the normative changes these 
challenges pose to the nation-state, we must first chart a brief chronology of the emergence of 
functional and institutional globalisation and its relationship to the state.  
Beginning in 1815, we will chart how the ‘thickening’ of the above discussed modes of 
globalisation have come to interact – and interfere – with traditionally state-based practices. 
This part of the chapter will be composed of three chronological sub-divisions. The first, charts 
the emergence of bilateral forms of institutional globalisation during the 19th century. The 
second, looks at the expansive forms of state-based administration during ‘inter-war years’ 
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from 1918 to 1939. The third, then focusses on the rapid thickening of institutional 
globalisation in the post-war era, after 1945. The essential aim of this analysis is to provide the 
contextual bedrock for the later theoretical discussions which will consider the changes in the 
normative construction of the state in response to globalisation.  
 
3.2.1. The Concert of Europe 
By the time of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the world was on the cusp of a new age 
of globalisation. The international spread of European Empires had brought economic, 
political, cultural and indeed military interactions into a new global sphere of relations. State 
actors now interacted on a global canvas, from Curacao to Calcutta; New Orleans to Nagasaki; 
Boston to Bloemfontein. Moreover, at the deliberations to the Congress of Vienna, Europe’s 
leaders began crafting, in its embryonic form, a new world order to govern in the wake of the 
Napoleonic conflict.  
The resulting system, commonly known as the ‘Concert of Europe’, came to establish a system 
of state-based mediation, designed to counter the threats of future conflict. As already 
indicated, this new system was based largely on the operative authority of European nation-
state, with the composition of the Concert system being comprised, first and foremost, of the 
so called ‘Great Powers’,322 whose collective action was designed to reduce the threat of 
conflict; replacing the language of war with that of diplomacy.323  
For the majority of the 19th century, this new system delivered on its aims. Both Europe and 
the wider world entered a new age of rapid expansion in the progress of functional 
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globalisation. Free trade – at least in part324 – replaced state centred protectionism, and the 
threats of another major conflict were largely averted by the collective interests of the Great 
Powers to retain a ‘balanced equilibrium’ in the ordering of Europe.325 Yet, despite the rapid 
thickening of functional globalisation during this period through the expansion of global capital 
flows, we find little progress was made in the configuring of a distinctive strand of institutional 
globalisation; at least in a supranational context.326 
Rather, as noted by Droz, the composition of the global sphere of international relations, while 
questioned by some from a moral or theoretical327 perspective, remained relatively unaffected 
in its framing of state sovereignty as its central condition.328 However, in framing this view, 
this is not to suggest that the period of the Concert of Europe did not play a role in providing a 
context for the later emergence of institutional globalisation. Indeed, in the period after the 
Congress of Vienna, we find that the nation-states of Europe began to enter into what we may 
refer to as early-institutionalisation.  
In 1815, a Central Commission was established to administer the free navigation of the Rhine, 
and another followed for the Danube in 1856. The International Telegraph Convention of 1865 
established common regulations for the operation of a system of international communication, 
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and the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty began a process of tariff reductions on the operation of 
trade between states.  
Indeed, throughout this period, we find a number of emerging regional and international 
regulatory mechanisms, designed to transfer the traditional capacity of state-based regulation 
to a new regional or transnational theatre of functional regulation. Yet, as already noted, the 
efficacy of this shift was essentially still tied to the political reality of the state as the primary 
actor within the global sphere. Thus, the ultimate success of the Concert system rested upon 
the reactional space between states, and the need for this space to remain committed to the 
ideology of democratic relations – a factor that distinctly began to decline in the second half of 
the 19th century.  
Indeed, by the time of the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, the 
balance of power in Europe had already assumed a path towards a future major conflict; the 
end point of which would be the First World War. In this regard, we find that the essential 
success or failure of this system was still very much in the hands of the nation-states of Europe. 
Ultimately, as the course of history shows us, this led to the demise of the Concert of Europe. 
With the formation of the German Empire in 1871, the Great Powers began to react with 
increasing economic protectionism and rearmament. Geo-political rivalries remerged, as grand 
military alliances came to fragment the possibilities of transnational state cooperation, as states 
pulled up their drawbridges and took shelter being the parapets of sovereignty and tariff 
barriers.  
Whilst the age of the Concert of Europe may have shown rapid expansion in the facilitation of 
functional globalisation, the continuing practice of state-based political economy meant that 
the chances of functional globalisation transferring to a new global sphere of institutional 
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regulation was restricted.329 Yet, we must not necessarily look at this age as purely negative, 
for a number of the institutional organs its delivered – such as the Commissions on the 
Navigation of the Rhine and Danube – still exist to this day. However, any further 
advancements in institutional globalisation had to wait for the aftermath of the First World War 
in order to be achieved.   
 
3.2.2. Inter-War Globalisation  
The events of the First World War shocked states into an era of transition. With the creation of 
the League of Nations in 1920, the operation of global diplomacy attained a distinct 
institutional personality. While still largely dictated by the politics of the Great Powers – a 
legacy itself inherited from the Concert of Europe330 – it is argued that the League of Nations 
marked a new phase in the ‘thickening’ of institutional globalisation.  
Indeed, the early years of the League had a number of success stories, from the creation of the 
League sponsored free territories of Danzig and the Saarland, to the settlement of the territorial 
ownership of the Aaland Islands between Sweden and Finland. However, the legacy of state-
based political economy continued through into this period, and when this began to translate 
into a renewed era of economic protectionism following the Great Depression of the 1930’s, 
the League began to founder.  
The introduction of the American Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930 charted the way for a renewed 
round of economic protectionism. Moreover, the rise of reactionary nationalism in the 
mobilisation of fascist dictatorships in Italy and Germany, meant that the problems facing the 
                                                          
329 It could be argued that this new system provided an early example of institutional globalization – albeit 
limited to the capacity of the Great Powers and the scope of their extra-territorial projection of power.  
330 Armstrong, D., Farrell, T., Lambert, H., International Law and International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 62 
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League began to stack up.331 Indicatively, the Italian refusal to withdraw from Abyssinia in 
1933, as well as the Japanese ignoring of League of Nations policy in relation to Manchuria, 
meant that the operative authority of the League was left at the mercy of its members. Perhaps 
the most useful understanding of the failure of the League was delivered by Winston Churchill: 
‘The League did not fail because of its principles or conceptions. It failed because those 
principles were deserted by those states which brought it into being, because the 
governments of those states feared to face the facts and act while time remained.’332 
Ultimately, its decline was sealed by the events of the Second World War. However, the legacy 
of the League of Nations was essentially a product of the times. Under intense economic and 
political conditions, the chance of success of the League of Nations was always a limited 
possibility. Though, more importantly, the failure of the League, and the triumph of the state-
based system, and in particular the modernist interpretation of nation-state congruence and 
state sovereignty, shows that at this point, as was the case in the Concert era, the march of 
globalisation was still an option, ruled over and dictated by the state.  
The enduring legacy of inter-war globalisation, therefore, was not necessarily its recasting of 
the global sphere, or the emergence of new sites of authority to challenge the previously 
monopolistic position of the state, but to lay the groundwork for its eventual emergence after 
the Second World War. While the legacy of the League of Nations is a fragile one, its success 
was one of charting untrialled waters in the facilitation of institutional globalisation.  
 
3.2.3. Post-War Globalisation and the New World Order 
The end of the Second World War in 1945 marked a turning point in the operation of 
institutional globalisation. For the first time, new regulatory mechanisms emerged which 
                                                          
331 See: Alter, P., Nationalism, (London: Edward Arnold, 1989) 
332 Winston Churchill, ‘Something to astonish you!’, Speech delivered in Zurich, 19 September 1946, 
<http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> (Accessed: 27/10/2016) 
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actively sought to bind states and, more importantly, had significant repercussions for states 
acting contrary to the new rules-based system. The so-called Bretton Woods era in economic 
integration saw the creation of a World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Global 
diplomacy was enshrined in the United Nations, the matured predecessor of the League of 
Nations. In military matters, new international alliances and transnational security systems 
emerged, guaranteeing collective action for the defence of its members, and sustained under a 
new geopolitical reality of global hyperpowers.333  
In Europe, the effects of two major World Wars also inspired a new era of integrative 
imaginings. In a speech delivered at in Zurich in 1946, Winston Churchill famously resurrected 
the liberal idealism of the previous century, declaring his support for the idea of a ‘United 
States of Europe’, in order to combat the effects of states acting on their own self-interests.334 
The establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 was seen as the first step on the road 
towards European integration. Two years later, six European states established the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in an attempt to collectively pool their resources in order 
to reduce the salience of nationalism motivated by political-economic ends.335 By the 1960s, 
the fledgling economic agreement of the ECSC has matured into the European Community – 
the antecedent of the European Union.  
Moreover, in the international sphere, the traditional hegemony of the European Empires began 
to rapidly defragment, leading to the emergence of new nation-states in Africa, Asia and the 
                                                          
333 The term ‘hyperpowers’ is used to describe the reality that, from the late-1940s, the ordering of the global 
sphere transferred from a system of ‘Great Powers’, comprising several European nation-states and their 
overseas empires, to a new system of ‘Hyperpowers’; reduced in number, the hyperpowers during this era are 
generally agreed as being the two main protagonists in the Cold War, the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union. See: Keating, M., and Harvey, M., ‘The Political Economy of Small European States: And 
Lessons For Scotland’, National Institute Economic Review, No. 227, (February 2014), pp. 54-66 at 55 
334 Winston Churchill, ‘Something to astonish you!’, Speech delivered in Zurich, 19 September 1946, 
<http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> (Accessed: 27/10/2016) 
335 Effectively, the logic underpinning the European Coal and Steal Community was to create a mechanism for 
reducing the significance of economic markets associated with national units; in essence, this was an attempt to 
divert from the original salience of political-economic factors in the formation of the state – as was identified in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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Caribbean. Accompanied by the development of functional globalisation in the mobilisation of 
transnational economic markets and global communications media, the once hegemonic ideals 
of state sovereignty, at least in the European context, came to be significantly reduced; both 
practically and symbolically.336 Globalisation had now arrived as a significant element in 
workings of the state system – it was no longer an option, but a reality.  
 
In conclusion, the argument presented in this first part of the chapter has been to frame 
globalisation as a process. As the above arguments have shown, the essence of this process was 
to take place over a long chronology, characterised by a gradual ‘thickening’ of the strands of 
globalism, but interspaced by episodes of intense global conflict. The conclusion of this 
argument has been to show that the current ‘stage’ of globalisation is characterised by the 
emergence of new sites of authority and regulation above the state. In the next part of the 
chapter, we will discuss the effects of these new sites of authority on the state.  
 
3.3. Challenges to the Authority of the Nation-State 
The first part of this chapter argued that the once largely functional challenge of globalisation 
has, in the post-war era, been joined by a new institutional challenge to the operative authority 
of the nation-state. Through the growth of economic, legal and political spaces at the 
supranational and international levels, it was argued that a number of new institutional actors 
and regulatory regimes have emerged which place limits on, and challenge, the operative range 
and capacity of the state’s functional and normative authority.  
                                                          
336 Walker, N., ‘Independence in an Interdependent World’, in Hassan, G., and Mitchell, J., (eds.) After 
Independence, (Edinburgh: Luarth Press, 2013), pp. 21-34 at 23; Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E., The Size of 
Nations, (London: MIT Press, 2003), p. 201 
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The second part of this chapter will now focus on further identifying these challenges. In 
achieving this end, the debate in this part of the chapter will be divided into three sections, each 
of which relating to a specific ‘challenge’. Section One will analyse the effects of the new 
multi-level ordering of the global sphere through the creation of new sites of normative and 
regulatory authority above the state. Section Two, in building upon the substantive factors 
raised in Section One, will analyse the new theoretical understandings of the construction of 
sovereignty that have emerged in association with the multi-level challenge. Section Three will 
conclude this analysis by focussing on the effects of those challenges highlighted in the first 
two sections, and how they have come to affect the constitutional objectives pursued by sub-
state nationalist groups, reframing the traditional modernist construction of nationalism into a 
decidedly more nuanced and globalised context.  
 
3.3.1. Multi-Level  
The first challenge to the state comes by way of the structural reconfiguration of the global 
sphere, and the emergence of new sites of power and authority above the state. In unpacking 
this observation, we find that the academic literature relating to the reconfiguration of the 
global sphere points to three new ‘levels’ of institutionalised action which have come to 
challenge both the functional capacity and normative authority of the state.337 These levels may 
be summarised as follows: 
First, it is argued that the growth of supranational organisations above the state, has come to 
place significant restrictions on the state’s position as the primary actor within the legal and 
political sphere. While posing significant functional challenges to the ability of the state to act 
                                                          
337 Keating, M., Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, 
(London: Routledge, 2001), p. 45-46; Tierney, S., Constitutional Law and National Pluralism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 83 
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independent of external interference, the central tenet of the supranational challenge must be 
seen as relating to its legal restructuring of the regional sphere by creating new sites of 
normative legal authority above the state.  
In the context of this thesis, the essence of this challenge is perhaps best referenced in the 
example of the European Union which, through an increasingly voluminous catalogue of 
conferred member-state authority, has come to challenge the normative position of the state as 
the final and undisputable source of legal authority. In the UK, we find useful evidence of this 
fact through the principled case of Factortame, as well as the wider obligations ratified in the 
Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties – each of which reconfirmed the supremacy of ‘European 
Union Law’ in areas of transferred competence.338 Perhaps the best illustration of the general 
nature of this challenge comes through the text of the landmark European Court of Justice case 
of Costa v ENEL:  
‘By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or 
a transfer of powers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nations 
and themselves.’339  
In unpacking this quote, we may conclude the essence of the challenge placed by supranational 
regimes as significant for two reasons. First, are the direct normative repercussions of the 
transfer of legal authority to the supranational level; challenging the traditional Westphalian 
construction of sovereignty as a mutually exclusive and indivisible doctrine, exercisable 
between states. Second, and perhaps more significantly, is the fact that this transfer of 
competences to the supranational level has taken place – at least initially – as a voluntary action, 
                                                          
338 Craig, P., ‘Britain in the European Union’, in Jowell, J., and Oliver, D., (eds.) The Changing Constitution, 7th 
Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 102-131 
339 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] Case 6/64, ECR 585 
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instigated by the state.340 Indeed, while we find that the thickening of functional globalisation 
has emerged as a largely involuntary – and relatively uncontrollable – action, the thickening of 
institutional globalisation, in particular at the supranational level, has been a voluntary action, 
whereby states transfer measures of previously exercisable legal competence to the new 
supranational level.  
Second, in addition to the new supranational level, we also find the emergence of new global 
regulatory regimes within a number of areas of previously state-based functionality. While it 
is recognised that this challenge does not necessarily pose the same legal restrictions on the 
state as acknowledged in the emergence of supranational regimes, it is argued that the new 
organisations operating within the transnational sphere have had an equally significant effect 
on the political capacity of the state.341  
Perhaps the most telling example of this phenomenon can be found in the globalisation of 
economic markets. As argued by Habermas, through the acceleration of world-wide capital 
flows and the increasingly interlinked nature of economic markets, the once monopolistic 
position of the state has been reserved; ‘Today, it is rather states which are embedded within 
markets than national economies which are embedded within the boundaries of states.’342 
On this point, we find the essence of this challenge as assuming an additional significance, for 
as well as challenging the functional capacity of the state, the globalisation of economic 
markets has also come to remove the state’s ability to frame itself as the most viable vessel for 
the facilitation and protection of ‘national’ economic interests.343  
                                                          
340 Grinin, L., ‘Toward a New World Order? New Foundations of International System or Why do States lose 
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Rather, in a world whereby the facilitation of economic markets and security systems is 
increasingly transferred – at least in part – to new international organisations such as the World 
Trade Organisation, NATO, or the United Nations, we find that the viable344 size of the state 
has subsequently decreased.345 When read in connection with the supranational challenge, we 
now find that the previous economic, military or political barriers to the independence of many 
stateless nations346 has been removed by a protective umbrella of size and scale offered by the 
new supranational and international organisations such as the EU, UN, WTO or NATO. 
Thomas Franck summarised this position as follows; 
‘New regional or global economies of scale, unlimited access to capital and consumer 
markets, and similar objectives have become attainable through modern international 
systematic innovations… By-passing states, these deliver the blessings of scale, and 
thereby inadvertently make it far less risky for Quebec to secede from Canada, or 
Scotland from Britain. Similarly, the benefits of military scale in many places now are 
seen as conferred quite adequately by the Security Council or NATO, making a 
continued reliance on the nineteenth-century state unnecessary.’347  
In reflecting upon Franck’s statement, we are now led to consider the third element of the multi-
level challenge to the state – the sub-state. Fundamentally, this challenge is one motivated by 
the rise of peripheral nationalisms in a number of Western multi-national states.348 The central 
principle of this challenge can essentially be seen as residing in the groundwork of 
globalisation. Through the declining salience of the state, the reduced importance of national 
                                                          
344 As argued in Chapter Two, the essence of the imagined ‘viability’ of the size of the state relates more to the 
external geopolitical environment in which the state finds itself, as opposed to the functional realty that size and 
scale has a necessary positive impact upon the economic prosperity of the state. Thus, the current trend in the 
declining emphasis of size and scale in dictating the ‘viability’ of smaller states is essentially motivated by a 
change in the geopolitical environment, as opposed to a sudden realisation of a system of Kleinstaaterei as 
suddenly being a positive condition. This emphasises the distinct reactional element with the wider geopolitical 
community in dictating the size of the state.  
345 Keating, M., and Harvey, M., ‘The Political Economy of Small European States: And Lessons For Scotland’ 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 227, (February 2014), pp. 54-66 at 55 
346 David McCrone uses this title to describe politically conscious national communities within multi-national 
states seeking autonomy or independence from the parent state. McCrone, D., The Sociology of Nationalism, 
(London: Routledge, 1998) 
347 Franck, T. M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p.143 (Italicisation added)  
348 The term ‘multi-national state’ is used to describe traditional nation-states such as the UK or Spain, whereby 
the construction of identity is divided between a single ‘state-based’ identity, and two or more sub-state 
‘national’ identities (e.g. Scottish, Welsh, Basque, Catalan).  
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borders, the increasing diffusion of national economic markets, and the creation of military 
protection systems above the state, the ability of the state to command the political allegiance 
of its citizens has declined. 
Benedict Anderson described this process as the impeding ‘crisis of the hyphen’, whereby the 
traditional modernist understanding of nationalism, as a method seeking congruency between 
nation and state, has been reworked by the emergence of portable identifies framed against the 
continuously evolving tapestry of globalisation.349  Explanatively, this new convex on 
nationalism may be viewed as a systematic response to the new multi-level configuration of 
the global sphere of authority and action. Through what Michael Lynch has termed the 
‘external support systems’350 offered by the new supranational and translational regimes, sub-
state nationalist groups have been remobilised to think of independence beneath the umbrella 
of multi-level institutional protection systems.351  
Yet, pausing to reflect upon this argument, we find that this identification of the opportunistic 
nature of sub-state nationalism as relying on external support systems is not a new 
phenomenon. Indeed, as shown in Chapter One, during the early-20th century, sub-state 
nationalist groups in Scotland, Wales and Ireland each held aspirations for independence and 
autonomy under the politico-economic umbrella of the British Empire.352  
In this regard, the correct identification of this new challenge must be understood not on the 
basis of ‘external support systems’ per se, but on basis that the new locus of authority in 
contemporary external support systems is detached from the traditional authority of the state – 
inhabiting the new ‘third layer’ in the multi-level order, as provided by the new supranational 
                                                          
349 Anderson, B., ‘Introduction’, in Balakrishnan, G., (ed.) Mapping the Nation, (London: Verso, 2012), p. 8-9 
350 Lynch, M., Minority Nationalism and European Integration, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), p. 
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351 Keating, M., and McGarry, J., (eds.) Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, (Oxford: 
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352 This will be discussed in more detail in the final part of this chapter.  
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and transnational regimes. Reflectively, we may attribute the essence of this multi-level 
challenge as having two distinct effects upon the state: 
First, under the distinct transactional and interconnected construction of the multi-level 
challenge, the state is now sandwiched between new sites of normative authority, both above 
and below its traditional position. While David McCrone reminds us that it is facile to associate 
this phenomenon with the relative death of the state,353 it is necessary to see the position of the 
state as having at least been reworked. Indeed, under the multi-level challenge, we find that 
many states have lost the ability to monopolise power within a distinctive unitary territorial 
frame354 – playing now only a part as opposed to a leading role in the lives of its citizens.355   
Second, we find that through the essence of this sandwiching of the state between new levels 
of functional and normative authority, its traditional ability to frame itself as the vessel best 
suited to catch the political identity of its citizens has declined.356 Rather, under the new multi-
level ordering, the state is now seen as ‘first amongst equals’, and is no longer automatically 
assumed as the primary vessel for the political allegiance of its citizens.357    
Correspondingly, in reference back to the argument presented in Chapter Two, we find that 
under this new umbrella of transnational security organisations, and free-trading economic 
markets, the traditional symbols of Othering and common goals that sustained state-based 
identities have declined. Indeed, taking Britishness as our example, we find that under the 
reconfigured composition of the European sphere, as well as the institutional reality of 
                                                          
353 McCrone, D., ‘Neo-Nationalism in Stateless Nations’, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 1, (2001), pp. 3-13 at 11  
354 Wright, A., Who Governs Scotland?, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 131 
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devolution within the UK, the traditional symbols of Britishness, embodied through systems of 
common goals, have been diluted – leaving a distinct ‘hole’ in the psyche of Britishness.358 
In this regard, we find that under the rubric of globalisation, it is no longer the case that the 
ordering of authority and identity are held as conterminous with the boundaries of the state, but 
are now increasingly spread across new horizontal and vertical axis of reconfigured power and 
authority. Reflective of this, the next section of this chapter will now consult the theoretical 
and normative effects that this change has had on the locus of sovereignty, and its connection 
with the state.  
 
3.3.2. New Theoretical Understandings of Sovereignty 
The second challenge to the state relates to the theoretical reinterpretations of the construction 
of sovereignty. The Westphalian idea of sovereignty assumes the unitary, absolute, supreme 
and indivisible concentration of power within the state.359 From the writings of Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century, the construction of this doctrine became associated with 
the idea of a common power, able to exercise authority on behalf of the nation as a whole; being 
the undisputed and final source of authority within the territorial structure of the state.360  
As outlined in Chapter One, in the context of the UK, the reality of this doctrine had by the 
late-18th century, become vested in the idea of the legislative supremacy of the Crown in 
Parliament, having: ‘[the] right to make or unmake any law’, with ‘no person or body… having 
                                                          
358 Gamble, A., ‘The Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom’, Publius, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2006), pp. 19-
35 at 26 
359 Hoffman, J., Sovereignty, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p. 32; Bellamy, R., ‘Sovereignty, 
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360 See; Hobbes, T., Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 90, 112; Bodin, J., On Sovereignty, 
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a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.’361 Moreover, while considerable 
administrative independence continued in certain parts of the UK, it was conditioned by the 
overarching legal interpretation of the UK as a unitary state – with the UK Parliament as the 
final and indivisible source of legislative authority.  
The endurance of this doctrine remained relatively unchallenged into the first half of the 20th 
century. However, following the broad changes within the international system after the 
Second World War, as documented above, and in particular as a result of the distinct normative 
challenges posed by new sites of legal authority above the traditional level of the state, a 
number of reappraisals began to emerge, challenging the traditional concept of the state as the 
single and indivisible source of power and authority. Primarily, such reappraisals were the 
pursuit of political scientists,362 although after the realities of the Factortame case, and the 
UK’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a similar branch of theoretical legal enquiry 
emerged, challenging the traditional Westphalian relationship between sovereignty and the 
state.363 
Significant in these new appraisals is their identification of sovereignty as both a political and 
legal concept; respectively framed by a distinction between the functional capacity to act, and 
the competent authority to demand obedience.364 To some extent, this new approach is 
reflective of the realities of constitutional theory as inhabiting an interdisciplinary nexus 
between law and political science. Although, more significantly, it may also be explained by 
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the increased understanding of sovereignty as having a distinct relational quality; illustrative 
of a balance between practical reality and normative theory.365  
In documenting the essence of these new challenges to the theoretical understanding of 
sovereignty, we find a fruitful vein of discussion through the contributions made by two writers 
in the field of constitutional theory; Neil MacCormick and Neil Walker. 
 
Post-Sovereignty 
The first theoretical reappraisal of sovereignty came by way of Neil MacCormick’s design of 
‘post-sovereignty’. Before beginning our analysis of this theory, it is beneficial to first outline 
two points of contextual information. First, is the political undertone of MacCormick’s 
theoretical reappraisal of sovereignty; motivated both by MacCormick’s own politics, being a 
former member and MEP for the Scottish National Party, but also a wider recognition of the 
arguments in Scottish constitutional history that reject a purely unitary interpretation of 
sovereignty.366 Second, and perhaps as a reflection of the first point, is the character of 
MacCormick’s theory as a proposed direction, as opposed to a theoretical reflection of a 
constitutional reality.367  
                                                          
365 Interestingly, while a legal interpretation of devolution sees normative authority remain at Westminster, 
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Indeed, we find the essence of MacCormick’s approach, while recognising the distinct 
challenges posed by the multi-level system, as also pursuing the political agenda of illustrating 
a path towards Scottish independence, disassociated from the traditional modernist 
identification of independence as conterminous with the attainment of sovereignty.368  
In constructing this view, MacCormick began by recognising sovereignty as being at a 
crossroads within the new multi-level order of the European sphere. Initially, MacCormick 
addressed this by analysing the possibilities of sovereignty as transitioning within its existing 
bonds, as a unitary and indivisible source of legal authority:  ‘Either we are fated to go forward 
to a situation in which there is a massively centralised European Community which takes over 
the dominant place in legal imagination.’369 Or ‘[we] go back to a European order of fully 
sovereign states, with no links stronger than those of treaties which bind only rebus sic 
stantibus.’370  
Through his recognition of the nature of sovereignty as being at a crossroads, we find that 
MacCormick had already greeted the fact that the global order had moved ‘beyond the 
sovereign state.’371 Indeed, writing in 1999, MacCormick declared his perspective on the status 
of the sovereign state within the European Community to be as follows:  
‘… it is clear that absolute or unitary sovereign is entirely absent from the legal and 
political setting of the European Community. Neither politically nor legally is any 
member state in possession of ultimate power over its own internal affairs. Politically, 
the Community affects vital interests, and hence exercises political power on some 
matters over member states. Legally, Community legislation binds member states and 
overrides internal state-law within the respective criteria of validity. So the states are 
no longer fully sovereign states externally, nor can any of their internal organs be 
considered to enjoy present internal sovereignty under law; nor have they any 
unimpaired political sovereignty.’372 
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In unpacking this critique, we find that MacCormick acknowledged the new multi-level nature 
of the globalising world – witnessed particularly in Europe – as having created a new space for 
political thought and action, based on the rhetoric of ‘divided sovereignty’.373  On this basis, 
the essence of MacCormick’s political argument advocated for the theoretical proposition of a 
departure from the vertical framing of sovereignty, advocating instead for a move towards a 
new horizontal or lateral frame:  
‘So what about a sideways move? Can we think of a world in which our normative 
existence and our practical life are anchored in, or related to, a variety of institutional 
systems, each of which has validity or operation in relation to some range of concerns, 
none of which is absolute over all the others, and all of which for most purposes, can 
operate without serious mutual conflict in areas of overlap?’374 
In explaining MacCormick’s approach to advocating for a final move beyond the sovereign 
state, we can identify two points of contextual clarification. First, was MacCormick’s political 
position, that in order to be effective Scottish nationalism must pursue a constitutional path 
associated more with a pluralised design of independence within the broader European sphere, 
and relying upon the external support systems offered by the supranational level. 
Second, was the practical reality of the events taking place within the sphere of the European 
Community. Most notably, this was associated with the doctrine of subsidiarity which emerged 
following the Maastricht Treaty, and which gained considerable traction in the 1990’s through 
the creation of the European Committee of the Regions – the idea of a transformative Europe 
of the Regions, based on a move beyond state-based intergovernmentalism – a scenario that 
was, for a time, distinctly welcomed by the Scottish National Party.375 MacCormick framed 
what he saw as the benefits of this approach as follows: 
                                                          
373 Ibid., p. 133; For a broader discussion on this topic, see: Keating, M., ‘Plurinational Democracy in a Post-
Sovereign Order’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4, (2002), pp. 351-365 
374 MacCormick, N., ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, Modern Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, (January 1993), pp. 1-
18 at 17 
375 See Part Three of this chapter for move detail on the substance of the SNP’s constitutional objectives.  
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‘The doctrine of subsidiarity requires decision-making to be distributed to the most 
appropriate level. In that context, the best democracy – and the best interpretation of 
popular sovereignty is one that insists on levels of democracy appropriate to levels of 
decision-making. And the tendency to over-centralize at the level of member states is 
as much to be countered as is any over-centralization towards Brussels. The demise of 
sovereignty in its classical sense truly opens opportunities for subsidiarity and 
democracy as essential mutual complements. It suggests a radical hostility to any 
merely monolithic democracy.’376 
Thus, in summarising MacCormick’s argument for post-sovereignty, we see its operation as 
advocating not for the destruction of sovereignty as a principle, but rather, the reinterpretation 
of sovereignty as reconfigured from the traditional understanding of absolute, unitary and 
supreme authority. MacCormick saw the possibilities for a new institutionalised dynamic to 
emerge in which authority – and sovereignty – was divided between a collection of mutually 
exclusive actors, framed on a horizontal axis, and upon which the exercise of power is dictated 
not by allegiance to a single ultimate authority but, rather, by the overlapping and 
interconnected dynamic of shared competence.  
As already noted, MacCormick’s theory was essentially a reflection of political ambition as 
opposed to a practical reality. However, the overarching essence of MacCormick’s approach, 
and its ability to rely upon the active mechanisms of the European Community, was nonetheless 
indicative of the reality of the influence of the new multi-level system on the design of 
sovereignty.  
 
Late Sovereignty 
                                                          
376 MacCormick, N., Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 135 
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A counter prefixal interpretation for the recalibrated framing of sovereignty is provided by 
MacCormick’s successor as Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations 
at Edinburgh, Neil Walker.377  
For Walker, the processes of globalisation and constitutional pluralism have led to a transition 
into what he terms a ‘post-Westphalian’ age.378 However, unlike MacCormick, Walker stops 
short of any proposals for a move beyond sovereignty as a doctrine of ultimate and final 
authority but, rather, focusses his theory on the continuing transformative nature of debates 
surrounding sovereignty. In this regard, Walker uses the term late-sovereignty to both 
recognise the new multi-level political order, as well as the continued validity of sovereignty 
in the language of constitutional action.379  
On this point, Walker identified three fundamental tenets of late-sovereignty. First, there is the 
continuity of sovereignty within the language of European integration.380 Through the creation 
of a new European legal order, a system of norms continue which rely on the operation of 
‘sovereignty’ as a doctrine of ultimate authority.381 Second, Walker defined the distinctive 
phase of sovereignty within the European Union.382 Essentially, this acknowledges the new 
multi-level framing of the term, and its nature as being transferred to a number of new sites of 
authority. Third, Walker goes against MacCormick’s understanding of the possibility for a 
reversion back to the polycentric sovereign state by suggesting the irreversibility of the current 
                                                          
377 A notable similarity to Walker’s approach can be found in the work of Michael Keating – although, rather 
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phase of transition in the operative application of the term383 – essentially, this was a reference 
to the acknowledgement of globalisation as an expansive phenomenon, and the presumption of 
its continued ‘thickening’ within the global sphere.  
On this point, Walker identified that under the contemporary forces of globalisation, there is 
little scope for a return to the world of ‘early-sovereignty’, associated with the construction of 
Westphalian absolutism: 
‘The dynamic of globalisation, and of the response to globalisation through the 
formation of non-state polities, continues inexorably to unfold. The challenge of 
multinational capital, of global communications and of free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital is beyond the regulatory grasp of the state, and the grant 
of regulatory authority to non-state polities cannot, except through the most obtusely 
state-reassertive perspective, be seen as a holding measure until states reassert their 
hegemony, but rather as a process of reallocation of regulatory authority which 
guarantees that states will never re-establish their hegemony.’384 
Such an approach coincides with the work of Leonid Grinin, who outlines that the presumptive 
effects of the ‘new world order’, marked under the rubric of ‘globalisation’, has the implied 
effect of breaking the traditional world order, and with it the association of sovereignty as 
vested within a purely unitary and indivisible form.385 Translating this effect into a theoretical 
equation with regards to sovereignty, we may say that in response to the increasing 
interconnectedness of globalisation, states are no longer either required to be – or are capable 
of being – the sole masters of their sovereign destiny; in at least political if not strict legal 
terms.  
Illustrative of this account, we find that the process of the United Kingdom’s departure from 
the European Union shows that even in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’, the UK would continue to 
dictate its international trading policies in line with those dictated by the World Trade 
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384 Ibid., at 24 
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their sovereignty in the age of globalization?’, Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, (May 2012), pp. 
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Organisation, as well as implementing the majority of European legislation into UK law in 
order to facilitate continued relations with the supranational bloc.386 Thus, we find that the road 
back to the Westphalian construction of sovereignty is – despite the political rhetoric387 – highly 
unlikely, at least in a practical sense of the term as separate from the theoretical construction 
of final authority.  
Indeed, in refocussing the debate back to Walker’s late-sovereignty, we find that as a fourth 
point, Walker marks the transformative potential of sovereignty as it enters its final stage.388 
For Walker, the transformative potential is at present, still inconclusive as to the future 
direction of sovereignty. As observed by Jaklic, Walker bases his theory on the continued 
understanding of foundational sovereignty – essentially the construction of epistemic pluralism 
through procedural concessions which, in theory, are able to be repealed by states.389 Thus, 
Walker sees the continued validity of sovereignty as a construction of final authority within a 
field of identifiable legal norms. Explanatively, the claims to ‘sovereignty’ made by the 
European Union have the transformative effect of creating a new legal order which is bound 
by its own legal norms – separate from those made by the member states.  
Yet, we must understand this as a bilateral system of norms. On the one hand, the new European 
legal system has the capacity to claim authority over its member states, and to create a new 
system of legal norms, constituting a new legal order. On the other hand, however, the 
territorial remit of the legal order is dependent upon the pooled sovereignty of its member 
                                                          
386 This reality has been framed by some commentators as a ‘Hotel California’ scenario; whereby you can 
necessarily formally ‘check-out’ of membership of the supranational order, but you can never fully ‘leave’ from 
the perspective of functional interdependence. Princeton Alumni Weekly, ‘Brexit: Welcome, Britain, to the 
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states, and so is capable of varying in size and scope should a member state leave the European 
Union – as is likely to be the case under the UKs withdrawal from the EU.   
Thus, Walker’s claim is essentially one of defining the new supranational legal systems as 
having received actionable sovereignty from their member states, but which hold such authority 
on trust, remaining dependent upon the foundational sovereignty of its member states. 
Speculatively, therefore, it may be presumed that Walker could foresee a return to the 
Westphalian system of ultimate authority, but only under the practical reality of the new 
globalised system – or rather the reversal of globalisation – the chances of which are highly 
unlikely.  
Therefore, we find late-sovereignty as claiming sovereignty as being reworked into a partially 
divided context, although its theoretical basis remains anchored in the overarching claim to 
state-based foundational sovereignty. In this regard, we find sound deviation from the 
possibility of post-sovereignty in which the state would no longer be the sole possessor of 
foundational sovereignty, but would rather be one of several units on a new horizontal 
construction of divided authority.  
Thus, in conclusion on this debate, we find that despite the fundamental division in the reach 
of the transformative potential of sovereignty, MacCormick and Walker both agree that 
sovereignty – at least in its aspect of functional capacity – has moved beyond the solely unitary 
construction of the nation-state. However, they disagree on the basis of its future development; 
Walker holds that sovereignty is likely to remain on an – albeit reworked – vertical 
construction, whereas MacCormick saw the possibility for sovereignty to move to a new 
horizontal ordering of divided ultimate authority.  
This thesis tends to agree with the former view, arguing that while the new world order has 
distinctly called sovereignty into question the locus of sovereignty as a unitary, supreme and 
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indivisible concept, there remains little evidence to suggest that it has moved beyond its 
construction as a doctrine of ultimate authority. Indeed, while reduced in salience, we find that 
the concept of the sovereign state still forms the benchmark, both of political allegiance, but 
also political and legal action. 
 
3.3.3. The Challenge of Neo-Nationalism 
The third challenge to the state relates to the reconfigured constitutional objectives of sub-state 
nationalism groups. Framed by some as ‘neo-nationalism’,390 the essence of this challenge 
relates to the junctures of contemporary sub-state nationalism in rejecting the traditional 
modernist ambition of nationalism as seeking congruency between nation and state. Rather, 
under the refurbished brand of neo-nationalism, we find the constitutional ambitions of sub-
state nationalist groups as being distinctly more nuanced and, as highlighted previously in this 
chapter, influenced by the new multi-level construction of the global sphere.  
Central to this reconfigured character, we find the new understandings of sovereignty, and in 
particular the ideas that under the reduced salience of the state within the multi-level sphere, 
the ability – or need – to seek full sovereign independence is no longer required. Instead, we 
find sub-state nationalist groups as seeking distinct and qualified forms of autonomy within the 
state, or independence under the supranational level.  
Indeed, for Rokkan and Urwin, by translating the aims of sub-state nationalist groups onto a 
seven tier ‘pyramid of peripheral aims’ – only the upper most stratum pertains to the desire for 
the ‘full independence’ of the nationalist group.391 Moreover, when sub-state nationalist groups 
                                                          
390 Nairn, T., The Break-up of Britain: Crisis in Neo-Nationalism, (London: New Left Books, 1977); McCrone, 
D., The Sociology of Nationalism, (London: Routledge, 1998) 
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do in fact pursue policies of independence, an examination of their wider political manifesto 
highlights agendas which are often far from separatist – at least in the traditional Westphalian 
sense of the term.392  
With this in mind, many observers of contemporary sub-state nationalism have come to 
recognise and reframe its aims as interconnected to the wider shifts in the global order – as 
documented in the previous two challenges. Fundamental in this distinction have been two key 
elements in the reframed ambitions of sub-state nationalist groups:  
First, we find that sub-state nationalist groups place an increased reliance upon the new third 
level in the global sphere when framing demands for self-government. Termed by David 
McCrone as the ‘variable geometry of power’, we find the essential characteristics of such neo-
nationalist demands are connected to the new context of the global frame. Understandings of 
unitary sovereignty have been reinterpreted into new diverse conditions of independence ‘in’ 
the supra-state.393 On this note, David McCrone provides a range of characteristics of the neo-
nationalist sub-state group, three of which deserve direct quotation:  
•  ‘Multiple national identities are a feature of political identity, rather than a 
monocultural one. Hence, Scots are also British, Catalans are also Spanish, and 
Quebecois are also Canadian, when it suits them. This plurality is a political 
resource which can be played in appropriate circumstances rather than a fixed 
characteristic. 
• There is ambiguity about their aims. Are they seeking independence or autonomy? 
Ambivalent terms are used in political debate such as ‘Home Rule’, ‘Autonomisme’, 
‘Souverainete-Association’ or ‘Consociation’. 
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• The variable geometry of power: political debates take place within three 
dimensions not simply two dimensions: the nation, state and supra-state such as the  
European Union and NAFTA.’394 
In light of these characteristics, nationalism must now be read as reflecting a form of 
functionalism which disregards any necessity for a distinction between, for example, Scottish 
or British; Catalan or Spanish, but rather sees them both as compatible political loyalties set 
against the wider functionalist screen of globalisation.395 In this regard, sub-state nationalist 
groups in the context of the European Union can be found as playing the ‘European card’ in 
developing notions of self-government within the European polity which best fit their 
constructions of national identity.396 
The result of this effect is a smorgasbord of new constitutional aims which fit between the 
traditional understandings of sovereignty or separation; from ‘Home Rule’ to ‘Independence 
in Europe’; ‘Devolution-Max’ to ‘Dominion Status’. These so called ‘third way’ or ‘middle 
ground’ strategies often seek to reconfigure the traditional organisation of the state polity by 
seeking accommodation within the state.397  
Second, in instances where nationalist groups do seek to frame their demands within an 
understanding of ‘independence’, their aims are usually distinctly qualified and seek both to 
retain a number of key relationships with the parent state, as well as use the mechanics of 
supranational and international organisations as an important ‘external support system’.398 
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As Stephen Tierney points out, these new forms of qualified independence can sometimes be 
more burdensome to the parent state than would be the case under the simple Westphalian-
style secession of the sub-state group.399 Indeed, this is particular true when sub-state 
nationalist groups seek increased constitutional autonomy within the territory of the parent 
state; creating periods of prolonged constitutional unsettlement, as well as diminishing the 
operative capacity of the central government over their region. Moreover, in the external sense 
of pursued paths to independence, they create a new complex relationship of interconnected 
authority with the supra-state, which impedes both upon the operation of the newly independent 
sub-state, and the parent state. 
However, despite neo-nationalist groups’ continued reliance of the European Union as an 
‘external support system’, the realities of the situation are rather paradoxical, in that the 
attitudes of the EU have largely placed market integration over the protection or recognition of 
cultural diversity or national identity.400 If we consult the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum, or the more recent referendum on the independence of Catalonia, the EU has 
shown little support for the sub-state national groups. Indeed, in the former case, the then 
President of the European Commission in 2014, Jose Manuel Barroso, stated ‘any territory of 
a member state becoming independent would automatically leave the EU.’401  
In this regard, we find what is the veritable paradox of European integration, and indeed the 
reframed multi-level order as a whole; creating forces that limit the significance of national 
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borders, and foster the dynamics of political defragmentation, and the designs for independence 
of stateless nations, in certain areas.402   
Yet, the lack of support from the supranational level seems not to have deterred sub-state 
nationalisms groups in the UK or in other Western European liberal democracies. Indeed, in 
the wake of the recent Brexit referendum, sub-state nationalist demands have taken on a new 
vitality in their drive for constitutional autonomy within the European polity.403 With this in 
mind, the debate in the last part of this chapter will now focus on the history and varying 
constitutional aims of sub-state nationalist groups within the UK. 
 
3.4. The Constitutionalism of Sub-State Nationalist Groups in the United Kingdom 
So far, this chapter has argued that the reconfiguration of the global sphere has had a 
transformative effect on the wider environment of the state. It has been argued that through the 
diluted functional capacity and normative authority of the state within the new multi-level 
global sphere, the currency of statehood had lost some of its presumptive salience in securing 
the allegiance of its citizens.  
The resulting theoretical reinterpretations of sovereignty as a ‘pooled’ or ‘pluralised’ concept 
has meant that the traditional nationalist demands of congruency between nation and state have 
been reframed within the more nuanced concepts of ‘third way’ or ‘middle ground’ aims. The 
very ambiguity and the aims of neo-nationalist groups has meant that the traditional typology 
of statehood has become reframed within a new tapestry of constitutional pluralism.  
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In this final part of the chapter, we will explore the varying aims of sub-state nationalist groups 
in the United Kingdom, identifying their unique interpretations of sovereignty, autonomy and 
self-government, and outlining their visions for the future of the UK-state. In pursuing this 
approach, the debate in this section of the chapter will engage directly with the central research 
question of this thesis by examining the challenges that such demands have raised for the 
dynamics of the territorial constitution. In addition, this section of the chapter will also provide 
a useful footing for the discussions to be undertaken in Chapter Four, which consider the 
significance of these aims in influencing the introduction and evolution of devolution in the 
UK.  
 
3.4.1. Scotland 
Focussing on the mobilisation of sub-state nationalism in Scotland, we find our primary source 
of analysis linked to the Scottish National Party (SNP). Formed in 1934 out of a union between 
the Scottish Home Rule Association (pro-home rule) and the National Party in Scotland (pro-
independence), the initial constitutional aims of the party were conflicted in attaining a balance 
between its gradualist and fundamentalist wings.404  
In its early years, the desire for balance between these two ‘wings’ in the Party led to it pursuing 
the nuanced constitutional ambition of self-governing dominion status within the British 
Empire; a factor in itself partly influenced by events in Ireland, as well as the contemporary 
development of dominion status after 1931.405 Yet, by the 1940’s we find the triumph of the 
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fundamentalist wing of the Party, and the initial commitments to ‘independence’ as its main 
constitutional objective.  
By seeking independence, many observers attribute the SNP’s aims as inherently modernist in 
their construction, understanding independence as the desire for congruency between nation 
and state.406 The essential reasoning behind this position is one of political voice; the SNP held 
– and continues to hold – the position that Scotland needs a political voice of its own, a view 
of which it has attributed to the attainment of political sovereignty through independence. Yet, 
upon reflection, we find that while relying upon a modernist frame in justifying its advocacy 
in favour of independence, the fundamental constitutional aims of the SNP were not wholly 
reflective of the traditional Westphalian design of independence as congruent with the receipt 
of indivisible sovereignty.407  
In explaining this distinction, we are drawn to consider the recent objectives of the SNP in 
relation to the process of European integration. While the SNP, like many other sub-state 
nationalist groups, has a long history of advocating for varying degrees of independence,408 it 
is argued that this achieved a new salience in response to European integration. As an initial 
point of observation, it is interesting to note that the initial response of the SNP to the European 
Community (EC) in the 1960s was one of suspicion. This was motivated largely by the view 
of the EC as an elitist ‘rich man’s club’ of sovereign states, ruled by intergovernmentalism, and 
providing little space or opportunity for a distinctive Scottish voice or Scottish ‘sovereignty’ – 
a factor which, as already identified, forms a crucial aspect of the SNP’s demands.409  
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Indeed, it was not until the early 1980s that we find the SNP began to consider Europe as a 
viable environment against which to frame its desires for independence. In explaining the 
reasoning behind this change in policy, we may rely upon three factors of explanation: First, 
was the election of Winnie Ewing (SNP) as Member of the European Parliament in 1979, 
helping to convince many in Scotland that there existed avenues for projecting a political voice 
for Scotland in the European theatre.410 Second, was the move of the Scottish Labour leader 
Jim Sillars to the SNP in 1980, which brought with it Sillars’ earlier devised idea of 
‘independence in Europe’.411 Third, and perhaps the most persuasive, was the wider revolution 
taking hold in the European Community, led by Jacques Delors, and the idea of a ‘social 
Europe’ and a ‘Europe of the Regions’.412 
Under this new Europe, we find that the SNP mobilised its political goals to capitalise on the 
window of opportunity provided by the external support system of the EC.413 Consequently, in 
1988 the SNP officially adopted the constitutional objective of ‘independence in Europe’ – 
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interspaced by a brief period of consideration of Scotland in a new European Committee of the 
Regions414 – which has endured as its central commitment to this day.415  
Yet, whereas many in the SNP have now assumed the idea of Scottish independence within the 
wider umbrella of a supranational EU, how does this translate into constitutional terms? In 
answering this question, we will now consult the literature which has emerged around the 
recent 2014 referendum on Scottish independence.  
In the political rhetoric surrounding the referendum, the SNP’s idea of independence was 
distinctly qualified by a number of continuing horizontal relationships with the remainder of 
the United Kingdom. The then leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond, articulated the SNP’s 
demands for independence as the severing of one of the six unions Scotland has with the United 
Kingdom – the political union – with the retention of the other five.416   
Essentially, this wider frame of Scottish independence seems to have been one articulated by 
the design of independence as providing Scotland with the sovereignty to act independently 
and of its own accord.  But, then, immediately qualifying this independence through continued 
membership of the European Union and other international organisations, as well as retaining 
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a number of relationships with the United Kingdom – presumably through a form of confederal 
arrangement417 – in areas of substantial high politics, namely currency and defence.418  
It is argued that this heavily qualified frame of independence, defined by Keating as 
‘independence-lite’,419 is indicative of the nature of the new world order outlined above. 
Indeed, under the protective economic and security umbrellas of the new supra- and 
transnational regimes, as well as the reworked theories of sovereignty and subsidiarity, we find 
that sub-state groups have a myriad of new support systems within which to frame their 
constitutional demands.  
In this regard, we are able to conclude that the constitutional ambitions of the SNP are distinctly 
opportunistic and reactive in their construction. Having as their central ambition the idea of 
Scottish independence, but at all times relying on external frames within which to legitimise 
this cause – and to frame it as a viable objective. Indeed, to a significant extent, the essence of 
the constitutional ambitions of the SNP are as much a reflection of the shifts within the global 
sphere, as opposed to a reflection of a central defining will of the SNP; a nuanced argument, 
but one that aims to demonstrate the extent to which the shifts within nationalism theory are 
equally symbolic of a switch in the global world order. In considering this point, we find no 
better confirmation of its argument than in the next sub-state nationalist group to be considered, 
Plaid Cymru.  
 
                                                          
417 See, for example: MacCormick, N., Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 
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3.4.2. Wales 
While the case of sub-state nationalism in Scotland shows a clear example of independence as 
a readily relied upon totem, albeit qualified within a wider supranational frame, the case of sub-
state nationalism in Wales outlines a noticeable departure from the idea of independence as the 
central ambition of the nationalist group.  
In Wales, we find that the operation of the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru (The Party of 
Wales) as holding an historic aversion to the constitutional objective of ‘independence’. 
Indeed, unlike the SNP, the political rhetoric associated with Plaid Cymru has consistently 
come to frame its ambitions within the more ambiguous context of post-sovereignty, 
characterised by a preference for ‘freedom’ as opposed to outright ‘independence’.420 
In beginning to analyse these constitutional objectives, let us begin by focussing on the early 
years of Plaid Cymru, from its formation in 1925, at which point its goal was dominion status 
within the British Empire. Similar to the case of the SNP in Scotland, this early constitutional 
objective must to a large extent be seen as a child of its surroundings; both in recognition of 
the still powerful position of the British Empire as an ‘external support system’, as well as the 
precedent set by the Irish Free State and the other dominions in securing autonomy while still 
maintaining political and economic links with the UK.  
Comparatively, however, whereas the SNP’s objective for dominion status were largely 
designed on the functionalist argument of economic prosperity within the wider support system 
of the British Empire, we find that Plaid’s road to framing dominion status as its constitutional 
objective was decidedly more nuanced. To a large extent, this may be explained through the 
ideology of the then chairman of Plaid, Saunders Lewis.  
                                                          
420 Keating, M., ‘European Integration and the Nationalities Question’, Politics and Society, Vol. 32, No. 3, 
(September 2004), pp. 367-388 at 370 
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A dramatist and poet in the Welsh language, Lewis’ primary political ambition for Plaid was 
seeking the defence of the Welsh civilization through whatever means necessary, rather than 
pursuing a ready path towards a specific type of constitutional model: 
‘We must have self-government. Not independence. Not even unconditional freedom. 
But just as much freedom as may be necessary to establish and safeguard civilization 
in Wales.’421 
To some extent, Lewis’ aversion to advocating in favour of any particular type of constitutional 
design, particularly independence, was motivated by his wider philosophical and theological 
opinions on the detrimental effects of the doctrine of nationalism upon Welsh civilization. 
Himself a convert to Catholicism, Lewis believed that the essence of a Welsh civilization 
prospered best under the moral unity of the Catholic church during the medieval period; a 
period that Lewis attributed as having ended following the introduction of nationalism, and its 
association with a single unitary source of authority: 
‘In the sixteenth century, the age of Luther of Germany, Machiavelli in Italy and the 
Tudors in Britain, the moral unity of Christendom was destroyed, and instead of 
Christianity another principle came to rule, i.e. nationalism’422 
Yet, despite relating the practices of the unitary sovereign state – i.e. the UK state – to the 
demise of Welsh civilization,423 Lewis never advocated for Welsh independence as a means of 
reversing this trend. Indeed, as Hywel D. Davies reminds us, despite his strong sense of Welsh 
national identity, Lewis was a monarchist and supporter of the idea of Wales as retaining a 
constitutional position under the British crown and empire.424  
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167 
 
In this regard, we find that Lewis’ constitutional ambition for Wales was decidedly nuanced; 
advocating for just enough power to safeguard the Welsh civilization, but continually opposed 
to the terminology of ‘independence’. Instead, and perhaps as a reflection of Lewis’ primary 
objective as being the defence of Welsh culture, we find that his constitutional aims failed to 
crystallise beyond the philosophical idea of Welsh ‘freedom’, conditioned by the wider 
commitment to Wales within a post-sovereign European constellation; rejecting the modernist 
interpretation of nationalism, but being similarly vague in providing a definite alternative to 
the concept of the nation-state: 
‘let us not ask for independence for Wales. Not because it is impractical, but because it 
is not worth having: I have already shown that it is materialistic and cruel, leading to 
violence, oppression and ideas already proved to be bad. The age of empires is fast 
passing, and afterwards there will be no meaning or value in independence.’425    
Indeed, it was not until the former Labour Party member, D. J. Davies rose in the ranks of Plaid 
during the mid-1920s that the Party’s constitutional position became crystallised beyond 
Lewis’ abstract ambitions. For Davies, the constitutional argument for Plaid was split between 
the pursuit of two constitutional options; dominion status or devolution. Davies advocated for 
the former on the grounds that ‘nationalism, to be effective, must have sovereignty, that is, the 
active expression of the multiple will of a particular society.’426  
In effect, such a commitment was in part motivated by the recent conferral of Dominion Status 
upon the Irish Free State under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. Yet, similar to Lewis, Davies 
framed such aspirations within a more nuanced context; recommending for both dominion 
                                                          
425 Lewis, S., Principles of Nationalism, (Cardiff: Plaid Cymru, 1975), p. 9 
426 Davies, D. J., ‘The Economic Aspects of Welsh Self-Government’, in Davies D. J., Towards Welsh Freedom, 
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status within the British Commonwealth, but also under the ‘supreme sovereignty of the 
League of Nations.’427 This was met with further qualification in the expression of Wales 
retaining close economic ties with the remainder of the United Kingdom, as well as continuing 
to be part of the currency union and financial regulation of London428 – a move of departure 
away from Lewis’ ambitions for post-sovereignty, but remaining distinctly different from 
advocacy for single Westphalian independence.   
By the general election of October 1931, Plaid Cymru’s official constitutional position was for 
Wales as an ‘equal, free and self-governing member of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations’.429 However, owing to the changing nature of the global environment in the post-war 
years after 1945, and the decreasing salience of dominion status within the British 
Commonwealth during this period, we find that Plaid was, by the 1950s, once again forced to 
redesign its constitutional ambitions.  
The Party’s initial response, and indeed its long running commitment from the mid-1950s 
through to the 1980s, was for the idea of autonomy within a ‘Britannic confederation’.430 This 
was given character in 1971 by Gwynfor Evans, who declared Wales’ future as a 
‘commonwealth realm’,431 joining the Common Market and Travel Area of the British Isles; 
itself a further indication of the influence of the Irish example in influencing the Party’s 
constitutional policy.   
Over this period, we find that Plaid’s reference to Europe in its constitutional objectives 
maintained a balanced approach of opposition and ambiguity. At the 1975 referendum on 
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continued membership of the EC, Plaid campaigned under the banner ‘Europe: Yes, EEC: No’; 
an ambiguous aim, reflective both of the Party’s historic commitment to the idea of Wales in 
Europe but, similarly to the SNP, a rejection of the largely state-orientated and 
intergovernmental nature of the EEC during the 1970s.432  
However, in further similarity to the SNP, we find that Plaid’s attitude towards Europe shifted 
following the report of Delors Commission advocating for a Europe of the Regions.433 Indeed, 
it was no coincidence that at the 1988 Party conference, in the same year as the SNP adopted 
its commitment to ‘independence in Europe’, Plaid began to move towards a position 
advocating for self-government in Europe.434 Although, unlike the SNP, Plaid initially came to 
frame its demands not for ‘independence’ in Europe, but ‘full national status’ within a Europe 
of the Regions.  
In explaining Plaids position, we find its justification as a mixture of historic party attitudes 
and wider politico-economic influences. On the one hand, it was a direct reflection of the 
Party’s historical aversion to independence, and for its preference for post-sovereigntist 
strategies of self-government within the wider, and to a large extent ambiguous design of 
‘Europe’. On the other hand, however, it was also a reflection of the reality in Europe at the 
time, and of the distinctly pluralist doctrine of Delors’ Europe of the Regions435 – a 
constitutional design that held a far higher salience with Plaid’s wider post-sovereigntist 
ambitions.   
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However, it was the wedding of Plaid’s aims in response to the political nature of the European 
sphere that would eventually lead to it further reframing its constitutional objectives in 2001. 
In that year, and largely in response to the shift of the European Union away from a 
commitment to regionalism, we find that Plaid altered its position to ‘independence in 
Europe’.436 However, while this commitment brought Plaid’s constitutional objectives into 
terminological congruency with those of the SNP, we find a continuing commitment to a much 
broader interpretation of independence than that of the SNP. Most cogently, we find this 
position summarised by the recent remarks of the former Plaid Cymru Chairman, Lord Dafydd 
Wigley: 
‘Since the United Kingdom became a member of the European Community in 1973 and 
now – at least for the time being – of the European Union, I must admit that I had tended 
to look at Wales’s future in European terms more than in terms of the Commonwealth… 
That was not in any sense a separatist argument. If England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
and indeed, the Irish Republic, were also member states, we could co-operate within a 
new relationship covering Britain and Ireland. We would have our own presence in 
Europe. It was indeed the converse of a separatist approach. I regarded a pooling of 
sovereignty on a European level, subject to the principle of subsidiarity, where 
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the community on which they impact, as 
being most appropriate to the modern world, in which the physical barriers between 
nations should be regarded as a thing of the past.’437 
In this regard we may now draw two conclusions on the essence of Plaid Cymru’s constitutional 
ambitions. First, in comparison to the SNP, we find the history of Plaid Cymru as pursuing a 
far more post-sovereigntist agenda in the construction of its constitutional aims. Whereas we 
find that the SNP maintained a consistent, albeit nuanced, commitment to ‘independence’ from 
the 1950s, we find that Plaid’s usage of the title in the framing of its constitutional aims did not 
emerge until 2001, and even then, maintained a far more pluralist interpretation than that 
advocated by the SNP. 
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Second, in addition to the ambiguity of its aims, we also find a distinctly adaptive character in 
Plaid’s constitutional objectives, designed to suit its wider political surroundings. Indeed, more 
so than the SNP, we find a distinct chameleonic tendency in the construction of Plaid’s 
constitutional ambitions, maintaining a distinctly neo-nationalist agenda, and continuously 
adapting to the nature of the external support systems; whether that be the UK or the EU.  
In both points, we find Plaid’s aims as distinctly disjointed from the traditional Westphalian 
idea of independence, itself a recognition not only of the distinctly post-sovereigntist 
interpretations employed by sub-state nationalist groups, but also of the new normative 
understanding they bring in challenging the traditional modernist interpretation of nation-state 
congruency.  
 
3.4.3. Northern Ireland 
As has become apparent over the course of this thesis, the political status of Northern Ireland 
is distinctly detached from that of Scotland and Wales. Whereas in these two parts of the UK, 
the basis of the constitutional challenge has generally emerged from a single source of sub-
state nationalist aggravation, the political environment in Northern Ireland comprises a divide 
between two sectarian groups, Unionists and Nationalists, each of which can be subdivided 
into a number of different political manifestations.  
For ease of analysis, this thesis will broadly define this divide through reference to the four 
most popular political groups in Northern Ireland, two from each side of the sectarian divide; 
Unionist – Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Ulster Unionist Party (UUP); Nationalist – Sinn 
Fein, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). In each group, we find distinctly 
different attitudes towards the European Union, as well as to globalisation and the normative 
reinterpretations of the makeup of constitutional authority. However, before we begin to 
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analyse the substantive elements of each of these groups, it is first important to note an 
observation on the effects of the supranational sphere in Northern Ireland in general.  
Indeed, we find that the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union has assumed a 
unique significance in the context of Northern Irish politics. Under membership of the EU, the 
salience of the border with the Republic of Ireland has been significantly reduced – although 
has not disappeared.438 Moreover, through the supranational operation of the EU, a number of 
avenues for cross-border cooperation have emerged, which have significantly reduced the 
symbolism of the political divide between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.439  
Indeed, whereas the role of Europe – as well as the wider nature of the new ‘third level’ of the 
global sphere – has come to assume a role in facilitating arguments for autonomy in Scotland 
and Wales, its significance in Northern Ireland has been equally balanced in securing the 
security of the territory, and the relative decline in desires for independence (Irish 
reunification) within the territory.440 In explaining this point, let us now move to consider the 
politics of the respective groups within Northern Ireland. 
Beginning with the Nationalists, we find that attitudes within this group are largely divided in 
their reception of the European Union, and in the level of reliance they place upon the new 
multi-level order in framing their constitutional objectives. For Sinn Fein, while recognising 
the importance of EU membership in assisting in the peace process in Northern Ireland, the 
overarching view of the Party is largely anti-EU, and receptive only of a European Union based 
on loose intergovernmentalism rather than subsidiarity and post-sovereignty. To a significant 
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extent, this reflects Sinn Fein’s overarching commitment to a modernist view of nationalism, 
as well as the constitutional ambition of a reunified Ireland and of Irish membership of the EU 
as a single cohesive block – a goal which it sees as impeded by the horizontal transfer of 
Northern Ireland into the status of a European Region.441   
Conversely, whereas Sinn Fein continue to attach a significant degree of political salience to 
the ‘border’, the more moderate SDLP frame the EU as a way to transcend the border, and to 
frame the Northern Ireland issue within a wider international frame. Indeed, by the late-1990s, 
we find that the SDLP were, similar to the SNP and Plaid Cymru, promoting the idea of a 
Europe of the Regions. However, unlike in Scotland and Wales, the underlying salience of the 
regional dimension for the SDLP was not for ‘independence’, but was conditioned on the 
grounds of its ability to transform the Northern Irish issue into a distinctly international – or 
European – context.442 
To a significant extent, this was a direct reflection of the SDLP as the more gradualist element 
of the Nationalist group in Northern Ireland but, more importantly, was also a reflection of its 
largely post-sovereigntist vision of the future of the EU, and of Northern Ireland’s place within 
it – a perspective cogently framed in the following quote from the former leader of the SDLP, 
John Hume:  
‘Sovereignty and independence, the issues at the heart of the British-Irish quarrel, have 
changed their meaning. The basic needs of all countries have led to shared sovereignty 
and interdependence as we move inevitably towards the United States of Europe… 
Common membership in a new Europe moving toward unity has provided a new and 
positive context for the discussion and exercise of sovereignty in these islands.’443 
                                                          
441 Keating, M., Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 67 
442 Ibid., p. 67 
443 Hume, J., ‘A new Ireland in a new Europe’, in Keogh, D., and Haltzel, M. H., (eds.) Northern Ireland and 
the Politics of Reconciliation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 226-233 at 229 
174 
 
However, as was the case in the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the salience of the post-sovereigntist 
concept of a Europe of the Regions advocated by the SDLP, largely fell down after the EU’s 
turn back to a state-based system in the late-1990s. Correspondingly, as additional evidence of 
the relational and adaptive character of sub-state nationalism, the SDLP’s vision of Northern 
Ireland’s transition to the status of a European Region was similarly transformed back to the 
overall idea of a direct move to Irish reunification; however, we find that this commitment still 
recognising the distinct benefits of the EU in facilitating this transition, significantly more so 
than Sinn Fein.444 
Moving now to consult the attitudes of Unionist groups in Northern Ireland to the new multi-
level sphere, we find a similar catalogue of diverse objectives as was identified in regards to 
the Nationalist. While it is important to recognise that both Unionist groups recognise and 
support the EU’s role in the peace process, and are broadly committed to the maintenance of 
an open border on the island of Ireland, we find a pervasive rejection of the idea of any regional 
element in European integration.  
Inherently, the reasoning behind this idea relates to the construction of political identity within 
the Unionist groups and, in particular, the significance of the border as a mark of British 
identity, separating Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland. Most coherently, we see this 
argument framed in the recent Brexit process, whereby the DUP has maintained a consistent 
position of rejecting any settlement that differentiates Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. 
Indeed, while recognising the uses of the supranational theatre of the EU in providing for the 
stability in Northern Ireland, we find that Unionists also maintain that Northern Ireland will 
not be diluted into a post-sovereign polity, with a reduced sense of attachment to the UK.  
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Conclusively, therefore, we find that attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland are incapable 
of a single definition. Rather, the construction of attitudes towards the European sphere are a 
matter of political allegiance – over and above any theoretical debate on the status of Northern 
Ireland within a European polity.  
 
3.4.4. England 
As a final frame of analysis, we now move to discuss the position of England, and its reception 
of the new institutional and normative ordering of the global sphere. In undertaking this 
analysis, we immediately find the position of England as unique to that of the rest of the UK. 
Unlike Scotland or Wales, and decidedly different to Northern Ireland, England has failed to 
develop a significant sense of sub-state nationalism.  
Indeed, as noted by McCrone, rather than developing a distinctly national agenda of its own, 
the history of Englishness has largely developed in mutual exclusivity with the idea of 
Britishness.445 British institutions doubled up as English institutions, a factor which has, to a 
significant extent, been reflected by the tendency in the institutions of the UK constitution to 
show correlation with a uniquely English interpretation of the constitutional order.446 
To some extent, such synonymity between Englishness and Britishness is the product of the 
political reality of England’s dominant position within the UK-state; constituting 57 per cent 
of the UK’s total land area, as well as 86 per cent of its total population, and 81 per cent of 
those MPs sitting in the House of Commons – England has historically been the dominant force 
within the UK. Indeed, as argued by Anthony Smith, the lack of a ‘significant other’447 facing 
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England within the British Isles, meant that its sense of national identity became distinctly 
muted – or decidedly redundant within the British Isles448 – and, as noted by Michael Kenny, 
capable only of expression through ‘entities larger than itself.’449 
As outlined in Chapter Two, for much of the modern period, this sense of externalised 
expression was facilitated through the tenets of Britishness; most significantly Empire. 
Throughout this period, Englishness, or rather Britishness, developed through its pursuit of 
common goals within the external sphere, as well as defining itself against notable territorial 
and political Others – one of which being Europe. Indeed, whereas we find notable traditions 
in Scottish and Welsh nationalism in relying upon the idea of a European past, England’s 
historical development traditionally framed Europe as the Other and something to define itself 
against, as opposed to actively rely on.450  
Yet, to conclude the history of England’s political attitude towards Europe as being purely 
negative would be unrepresentative of the more recent shifts in political Englishness during the 
‘post-war’ period. Indeed, during the eclipse of the British Empire during the 1960s, and the 
distinct sense of loss that ensued in the exercise of a common goal, we find that attitudes in 
England significantly altered towards Europe – becoming distinctly receptive to the idea of 
Europe. As argued by Simms, this characterised itself most accurately in the movement in 
support of membership of the EEC during the 1960s; motivated by a desire for a reframed sense 
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of national pride, and an attempt to ‘regain the nation’s historic pivotal role in Europe by 
concentrating her main political and military attention there.’451  
Illustrative of this point in relation to England, we find that in the 1975 referendum on the UK’s 
continuing membership of the European Community (EC), England, as a region, delivered the 
highest percentage in favour of remaining in the EC at 68 per cent, a share of the vote that far 
exceeding that seen in the rest of the country; Wales (64 per cent), Scotland (58 per cent), 
Northern Ireland (52 per cent). To a significant extent, this higher level of support for the 
European project in England can be explained through comparison with the already analysed 
rejection of the EC during this same period by the SNP and Plaid Cymru.  
As evidenced above, in Scotland and Wales, the utility of the European theatre was only viewed 
as useful when demonstrating a heightened viability for independence from the UK-state. In 
England, however, it is argued that attitudes towards Europe were arranged as a contrary 
reality. Indeed, unlike the periphery, we find the central motivation in support for ‘Europe’ in 
England was in seeking to use the supra-state not as a means of achieving national 
independence, but of finding national expression within the external sphere; seeking hegemony 
over the processes of globalisation, rather than using them to facilitate the defragmentation of 
the UK-state.  
Indeed, at all points, we find the general commitment to the European project in England as 
more reflective of a desire for loose-intergovernmentalism between sovereign states, as 
opposed to a commitment to any post-sovereign restructuring of the European sphere; a move 
that would challenge one of the central tenets of the English ‘official mind’ – the indivisible 
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sovereignty of Parliament. Thus, following the shift in the politics of the EU towards closer 
integration in the 1990s, we find English attitudes towards Europe began to reverse.  
Moreover, when framed against the introduction of devolution in 1998, we find that the gradual 
contracting of the multi-level system around England created a system whereby England felt 
left behind.452 In a 2013 survey on the most salient constitutional issues in England, anxiety 
over the loss of sovereignty to the European Union came top, followed a close second by the 
sense of anxiety over the effects of devolution in reducing the English political voice within 
the United Kingdom.453  
Thus, unlike the periphery, we find that England initially hitched its political support on the 
new supranational level in an attempt to regain its national superiority Indeed, we find the 
‘external support system’ of the supranational level was, for England, designed more to replace 
the traditional common goal of Empire, rather than seeking a path towards independence. In 
this regard, we find that attitudes in England towards the new multi-level system run contrary 
to those in the periphery.   
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we find that the aim of this chapter has been to frame the constitutional 
challenges to the nation-state within a wider external context. In reflection, we find the 
concluding arguments of this chapter are able to be summarised under three headings: 
First, this chapter has argued that the boundaries of the international order, within which the 
state traditionally found itself, have been distinctly redrawn. Under the all-encompassing rubric 
of ‘globalisation’, it has been argued that the traditional unitary and absolute understandings 
                                                          
452 Kenny, M., ‘The Genesis of English Nationalism’, Political Insight, (September 2016), pp. 8-11 at 10 
453 Wyn Jones, R. et al., ‘England and its Two Unions: An Anatomy of a Nation and its Discontents’, Institute 
for Public Policy Research, (July 2013), p. 12 
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of state power and authority have been diluted within an ever-expanding system of 
transnational and supranational systems. While it has been recognised that this does not 
necessarily amount to the ‘death’ of the state as a political unit, it has been argued that under 
this new system, the state’s ability to continually frame itself as the primary vessel for political 
loyalty and competent authority has been significantly reduced.  
Second, in addition to directly challenging the functional capacity and legal competence of the 
state, we find that the nature of these challenges has increasingly stacked pressure on the state 
in its ability to continually frame itself as the primary vessel for the political identity and 
allegiance of its citizens. Indeed, in a converse interpretation to the arguments presented in 
Chapter Two, we find that under the new world order, the state is no longer able to rely upon 
the wider geopolitical environment in order to facilitate a sense of Otherness and common 
goals, as was possible during the ‘modern’ age. Rather, in an age of ‘late-sovereignty’, it has 
been argued that the state now has to complete with a number of new levels of functional 
organisation, and that in having to do so, has lost its premium on being the vessel best suited 
for the political allegiance of its citizens.  
Third, this chapter has demonstrated how, under the new multi-level construction of the global 
order, sub-state nationalist strategies have increasingly come to rely upon external, non-state 
organisations in the framing of their constitutional objectives. Moreover, it has been identified 
that in making claims for ‘independence’, many sub-state nationalist groups now rely on a 
distinctly different interpretation of independence than was traditionally framed under the 
modernist reading of nationalism. Indeed, we find that the constitutional objective of 
independence is no longer conterminous with the designs of separatism, but is far more nuanced 
in seeking increased self-government within the state, or a significant degree of continuing 
relationships as an independent political unit.  
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In conclusion, therefore, it is argued that the age within which the state now finds itself has 
been – and is still being – redrawn. The traditional modernist construction of the Westphalian 
state is, while not dying, significantly pale-faced, particularly in the theatre of Europe. 
Moreover, in the United Kingdom, we have seen that the ability for a system of state-based 
identity – Britishness – to endure has met with significant challenges, a factor which, when 
viewed more broadly, has significant consequences for the legitimisation of constitutional 
authority within the UK. In the next chapter, we will discuss the essence of this challenge to 
the constitutional authority of the UK state by consulting the logic, themes and challenges 
raised by the devolution process.   
 
The next chapter of this thesis will reframe this external analysis of the challenges to the 
authority of the state by focussing on the substantive strategy of constitutional accommodation 
of sub-state nationalist groups undertaken in the UK – the next chapter will consider the 
constitutional strategy of devolution. 
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Chapter 4 
Devolution in the United Kingdom 
 
Chapter Three of this thesis highlighted how the new world order has created several challenges 
for the state, both functional and normative, and has reduced the state’s ability to capture the 
primarily political loyalty of its citizens. Central to this theme was the rise of sub-state 
nationalism. This chapter will now deal with the substantive constitutional challenges posed 
by sub-state nationalism in the United Kingdom, as well as the constitutional strategies 
employed to counter the rise of sub-state nationalism. This chapter is about devolution, its 
logic, its themes and the challenges it raises for the dynamics of the territorial constitution.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
There is at times a tendency in academic literature to frame discussions on devolution in the 
UK within a distinctly Scottish and/or Welsh context. Indeed, devolution in Northern Ireland 
has often been treated as the unrelatable ‘place apart’454 or ‘special case’,455 a factor which to 
some extent has been aided by the lack of a comparable devolution settlement in England. This 
thesis takes a different approach, arguing that in order to effectively understand the effects of 
devolution on the UK constitution, analysis must be conducted on a UK-wide canvas. In 
achieving this aim, this chapter is split into two parts: 
                                                          
454 ‘Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom but it is also a place apart’, Hadfield, B., (ed.) Northern 
Ireland: Politics and the Constitution, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), p. 1 
455 For a differing perspective that frames the situation in Northern Ireland as more reflective of the weaknesses 
in the UK constitution, than of Northern Ireland as a ‘special case’, see: Morison, J., and Livingstone, S., 
Reshaping Public Power: Northern Ireland and the British Constitutional Crisis, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995)  
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Part One will address the processes that led to the devolution settlements of 1998 – and the 
absence of a system of devolved456 government in England. The analysis in this part of the 
chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the road to devolution, 
looking at the substantive political factors which motivated attitudes towards devolution in 
each of the four component parts of the UK. The second section will then adopt a theoretical 
analysis to investigate as to whether or not an overarching ‘logic’ exists in explaining the move 
towards devolved government in the second half of the 20th century.    
In Part Two, the focus will turn to analysing the substantive elements of the devolution 
settlements. This structure of this part of the chapter will also be divided into two sections. The 
first section will explore the substantive constitutional provisions of the devolution settlements, 
and will identify four themes as indicative of the resulting personality of devolved government. 
The second section will then transfer the substantive analysis into a theoretical consideration 
of the challenge’s devolution has raised for the arrangement of power and authority within the 
territorial constitution.   
By undertaking this approach in analysing the devolution process in the UK, this chapter will 
engage directly with the central research question of this thesis by providing a frame of analysis 
which directly measures the normative and substantive impacts of devolution upon the 
dynamics of the territorial constitution.  
 
Part 1 – Introducing Devolution 
                                                          
456 This thesis recognises that England has received a system of enhanced local government in tandem with the 
creation of Assemblies and a Parliament in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. However, the system of 
enhanced local government in England does not fit within the definition of devolution employed in this thesis – 
namely a system of substantive executive and legislative autonomy separate from, though subordinate to, the 
UK Parliament. In acknowledgment of the wider effects of devolution on England, however, there will be 
passing discussion throughout this chapter on the form of enhanced government rolled out in parts of England, 
its place within the territorial constitution, and relationship with the devolved parts of the UK.  
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4.2. The Road to Devolution 
This section of the chapter will investigate the political processes that led to the introduction – 
or lack thereof – of devolution in 1998. In achieving this aim, the structure of this section is 
divided under three headings: Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and England.  
4.2.1. Northern Ireland 
Devolution was not new to Northern Ireland in 1998. As outlined in Chapter One, the province 
had experienced a system of devolved government for much of the mid-20th century following 
the passage of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920.457 Under the terms of the Act, it was 
intended that devolved Parliaments would be created in Dublin and Belfast, as well as the 
provision for a Council of Ireland holding functional competence over all-Ireland matters.458 
Owing to the wider political situation, however, the Parliament in Dublin failed to take hold 
and the south of Ireland seceded from the Union in 1922, forming the independent Dominion 
of the Irish Free State.459   
This left the constitutional situation of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom 
and, under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, enjoying a significant measure of self-
government; an institutional reality which was initially questioned if still necessary following 
the independence of the Irish Free State.460 Nevertheless, despite initial protests, we find that 
after 1922 the Northern Ireland Parliament assumed a relatively settled position within the 
newly reconfigured state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
                                                          
457 See: Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) 
458 Wallace, M., British Government in Northern Ireland, (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1982) 
459 Ibid., p. 16-17 
460 The initial provision for a Northern Ireland Parliament was largely only seen as a concession to Protestant 
Unionists in Ulster, opposed to the idea of a single all-Ireland Parliament – a threat which seemingly passed 
after the independence of the Irish Free State. Mitchell, J., Devolution in the UK, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009), p. 69 
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As noted by Keating, the relative stability of the transition to self-government in Northern 
Ireland, and the autonomy conferred to it under the 1920 Act, meant that for much of the first 
half of the 20th century, successive UK Governments held an attitude of benign neglect towards 
the province; ‘as long as Ulster posed no threat to the stability of British politics, Whitehall and 
Westminster were content to leave it alone’.461 
Indeed, such was the extent of the practical separation of Northern Ireland in domestic policy 
from the rest of the UK, a convention put in place by the Speaker of the UK House of Commons 
in 1923 ruled that ‘transferred matters’ of Northern Irish competence – as provided under the 
1920 Act – would not be eligible for scrutiny in the UK Parliament.462 For much of the mid-
20th century, therefore, Northern Ireland was a self-governing, and to some extent a quasi-
independent,463 part of the UK, and it was not until the late-1960s that political issues on the 
island of Ireland would once again come to pose serious concern for UK Government. 
The reasoning for the UK Government’s renewed interest in the province during the 1960s was 
predominantly down to a shift in the delicate balance of sectarian politics – between Unionists 
and Nationalists. For the majority of the devolution period after 1920, the politics of the 
Stormont Parliament had been ruled by a Unionist majority which, on several occasions, passed 
legislation that discriminated Nationalist elements of the community. The effect of this was to 
lead to the Nationalists’ formation of the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association in 1967, a 
factor which played a significant part in effecting an escalation of the sectarian divide into a 
violent conflict.  
                                                          
461 Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State, (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 131 
462 Mitchell, J., Devolution in the UK, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 73 
463 Brigid Hadfield refers to Northern Ireland during this period as, in practical terms if not legally, something of 
a ‘mini-state’, whereby the Unionist government was ‘master of its own house’, encountering little in the way of 
criticism or scrutiny from the UK Government for its increasingly discriminatory actions towards the Catholic 
and Nationalist communities. Hadfield, B., (ed.) Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution, (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1992), p. 3 
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By 1969, the increasingly violent nature of political events in Northern Ireland moved to 
convince the UK Government that it could no longer rely on the Northern Irish Executive at 
Stormont to keep order and, in that year, British Troops set foot on the streets of Northern 
Ireland for the first time in nearly a half a century.  
The corresponding escalation of the sectarian conflict subsequently led to the eventual collapse 
of the Stormont Executive and, by 1972, the UK Government was called on to install direct 
rule over the province. In that year, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government passed the Northern 
Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act. As its title suggests, the UK Government’s intervention 
was designed only to be temporary; to reinstall peace and order, and to provide for the 
reintroduction of devolved self-government. Indeed, as noted by Ward, the UK Government 
was reluctant to become too involved in Northern Irish politics, seeing the province as ‘an 
exceptional place requiring exceptional measures’.464   
During the almost continual period of direct rule from 1972 to 1998, several attempts were 
made to secure a political compromise and to reinstall devolution in the province.465 In 1973, 
tripartite talks between the British and Irish Governments and political groups in Northern 
Ireland led to the publication of the Sunningdale Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement 
it was proposed that Northern Ireland should receive a new power-sharing executive, designed 
to replace the old hegemonic Unionist regime with a new body grounded on a consociational 
model, intended to foster a politics of accommodation, cooperation and consensus between the 
                                                          
464 Ward, A. J., ‘A constitutional background to the Northern Ireland crisis’, in Keogh, D., and Haltzel, M. H., 
(eds.) Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 
33-51 at 47 
465 In 1973, the UK Government was required to pass the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, specifying 
that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the UK unless voted for by a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland. This was required as a reassertion of the commitment made under the Ireland Act 1949 that stated that 
Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK unless contested by a majority in the Northern Ireland Parliament 
– a matter that was unachievable after the installation of direct rule in 1969. Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 
s.1 
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two groups in the territory.466 More significantly, the new Northern Ireland Assembly would 
send delegates to sit alongside counterparts from the Republic of Ireland in a resurrected 
Council of Ireland.  
Reflective of the delicate balance in Northern Irish politics, the terms of the Agreement, while 
treated favourably by Nationalists, were seen as a threat by Unionists. The Unionists’ rejection 
of the terms of the Agreement were essentially aimed at opposition to the Council of Ireland 
and of what they saw as a weaker measure of protection under the new ‘consent principle’.467 
Moreover, criticism from the Ulster Unionist Council directed its attention at the failure of the 
Agreement to amend the irredentist commitments in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Ireland, which continued to claim Northern Ireland as a rightful part of the 
Republic’s national territory.468  
Such was the extent of the Unionist’s opposition to the terms of the Agreement, in May 1974 
the Ulster Worker’s Council called a general strike. By the end of the month, the Unionist 
leader, Brian Faulkner, who had staked his political career on the Sunningdale Agreement, 
resigned, subsequently collapsing the not even five months old power-sharing executive. That 
same month, the UK Government passed the Northern Ireland Act 1974, which reinstalled 
direct rule over the province, a reality which would remain – largely469 – until the enactment 
                                                          
466 Wilford, R., ‘Designing the Northern Ireland Assembly’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, (2000), pp. 
577-590 at 578 
467 Under the new principle of ‘consent’ on the reunification of Ireland, the central source of criticism from 
Unionists was directed at the perceived incongruency between the Irish Government’s acceptance that the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only change via a decision made by the people of Northern 
Ireland, while at the same time maintaining its irredentist commitments over the territory of Northern Ireland. 
Tonge, J., ‘From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating devolved government in Northern 
Ireland’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2000), pp. 39-60 at 42 
468 Ibid., at 42 
469 Several attempts were made between 1974 and 1998 to reinstall a power-sharing executive in the province. 
In 1976, a Northern Ireland Convention was set up but received little support from either side and subsequently 
collapsed. Later, in 1982, a further Northern Ireland Act made provision for another Assembly, designed on the 
principle of ‘rolling devolution’ and the gradual repatriation of competences to the province. Despite initial 
good intentions, the abstention of the nationalists made the functioning of the Assembly impossible and its was 
dissolved and direct rule reinstated in June 1986. See: Wallace, M., British Government in Northern Ireland, 
(Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1981); Bogdanor, V., Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 104-105 
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of the Belfast Agreement 1998 (also known as the Good Friday Agreement).470 The main terms 
of the Agreement can be summarised as follows: 
First, the Agreement had the significant effect of providing for a reconfigured alternative to the 
traditional politics in Northern Ireland – itself, in part, a legacy of the earlier attempts made 
under the Sunningdale Agreement.471 Instead of framing political loyalties in the traditional 
binary manner of either/or (British or Irish), the Agreement mediated a new pluralised 
approach, whereby citizens could be both British and Irish.472  
Second, the Agreement provided two constitutional statements as to the overarching future of 
Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. The first, designed mainly as a concession to 
the Unionist community, guaranteed that: ‘Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the 
United Kingdom’.473 However, this was accompanied by a second (re)commitment to the 
consent principle; that Northern Ireland may join the Republic of Ireland, should a majority of 
the citizens of Northern Ireland vote in favour of it in a referendum474: 
‘…the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it 
appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern 
Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united 
Ireland.’475 
                                                          
470 The Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations, Cm 4292 (HMSO, 1998); For further discussion on the 
context of the Agreement, see: Burrows, N., Devolution, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 12-15 
471 Tonge, J., ‘From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating devolved government in Northern 
Ireland’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2000), pp. 39-60 
472 ‘[The two governments] recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves 
and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to 
hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future 
change in the status of Northern Ireland’, The Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations, Cm 4292 (HMSO, 
1998), Constitutional Issues, s. 1(vi); For commentary on this provision, see; Aughey, A., Nationalism, 
Devolution and Constitutional Change and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State, (London: Pluto Press, 
2001), p. 31 
473 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.1(1) 
474 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.1 
475 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch. 1 (2); This is qualified by the provision laid out in Schedule 1 paragraph 3, 
whereby it is indicated that a seven-year interval must exist between the holding of a previous referendum, and 
the action of a new referendum. 
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Additionally, this was also followed by the commitment in the Republic of Ireland to amend 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, which previously provided the irredentist claims to the 
territory of Northern Ireland. This was amended – following a referendum in the Republic of 
Ireland – to include an acknowledgement that a united island of Ireland will only be achieved 
‘by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in 
both jurisdictions in the island’.476 
Third, the emphasis on consociation embodied in the commitments providing for the possible 
future reunification of the island of Ireland was further enhanced by the provisions made under 
Strands 2 and 3 of the Agreement. Under Strand 2, provision was made for enhanced north-
south relations on the island of Ireland. This is constructed in two ways, first by the 
establishment of the intergovernmental mechanism of the North-South Ministerial Council 
and, second, by the North-South Implementation Bodies.477  
Under Strand 3, commitments were also made for enhanced relations on an east-west axis 
through the formation of a British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference. The aims of this provision may be seen as significant in that they exported the 
issue of Northern Ireland into the wider context of ‘these islands’478 – whereby the rest of the 
UK, the Republic of Ireland, as well as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, all take part.  
By 1998, we find the political situation in Northern Ireland had been transformed, moving from 
a hegemonic style of Unionist rule, itself a reflection of Ireland’s long colonial past – see 
Chapter One – to a new form of consociational politics, grounded on equality and consent 
between the two groups in the territory. While the formal legal status of Northern Ireland saw 
it remain as a part of the United Kingdom, the wider externalisation of the Northern Ireland 
                                                          
476 The Constitution of Ireland [1937], Art. 3(1) 
477 The Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations, Cm 4292 (HMSO, 1998), Strand Two 
478 The Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations, Cm 4292 (HMSO, 1998), Strand Three, s. 1 
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issue, both in the British Isles and Europe, meant that the province’s future was also to be 
distinctly tied to events within the external sphere.  
 
4.2.2. Scotland and Wales 
This chapter will now deal with the road to devolution in Scotland and Wales. In justifying the 
decision to analyse these two parts of the UK under one heading, it is recognised that while 
they both experienced very different conceptions of Union prior to the late 19th century – as 
identified in Chapter One – their experiences after this point, most notably in the rise of sub-
state nationalism, administrative devolution and, finally, calls for full legislative devolution, 
occurred within an interdependent and cross-cutting frame of political enquiry. 
As established in Chapter One, Scotland led the way in the early re-emergence of a distinct 
national consciousness during the 19th century. Since the Union of 1707, it had experienced a 
significant measure of administrative independence and, in 1885, received direct representation 
in central government through the reintroduction of the office of Secretary for Scotland, and 
the establishment of the Scottish Office.  
In Wales, the emergence of Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales) as a political force in 1925 had 
a significant effect in recalibrating politics in Wales. As identified in Chapters One and Three, 
the rise of Plaid Cymru ushered in a new era of political thought which sought to break free of 
the Westminster hegemony, and to defend Welsh interests through Welsh institutions479 – 
providing a significant watershed moment in the move away from the traditional ‘unionist 
nationalism’ of the Liberals and Labour in Wales.  
                                                          
479 Davies, D. H., The Welsh Nationalist Party, 1925-1945, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1983), p. 67 
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As argued in Chapter Three, from 1925 onwards Plaid relied on relatively abstract labels in 
regard to their constitutional aims, focussing initially on the philosophically framed aspirations 
of Saunders Lewis for the ‘freedom’ of the Welsh civilization – what D. J. Davies later came 
to construct under the similarly obtuse rubric of ‘sovereignty’. However, despite their relatively 
abstract construction, the movement of Plaid Cymru, particularly in the years immediately after 
the Second World War, proved more significant than events in Scotland in alerting political 
minds at Westminster to the rise of sub-state nationalism in the periphery.  
In explaining the transition towards an emerging sense of sub-state nationalism in Wales, the 
historian John Davies identified three factors in the post-war years which conspired to bolster 
support for Plaid Cymru, and for Welsh devolution in general. First, as the sun began to set 
with relative pace on the British Empire in the post-war years, the myth of belonging to the 
world’s greatest Empire began to diminish, and with it the bonds of attachment which had 
previously gelled Welsh interests into a British frame; diluting the common goals and sense of 
collective defence against the Other that had formed the bedrock of ‘Britishness’, as identified 
in Chapter Two.  
Second, what would transpire to be over a decade of Conservative government after 1951 raised 
significant questions of the ability of the Labour Party to retake power and to defend Welsh 
interests. Moreover, when read in tandem with the further decline of the Liberals in the 
periphery, opinions began to shift in favour of the establishment of a distinctively Welsh 
political movement, and of a Welsh parliament which could, it was claimed, return a political 
class that was far more reflective of the political will in Wales; at this point, as it is today, the 
majority of the centres of population in Wales voted primarily more left leaning than the UK 
average.480  
                                                          
480 Morgan, K. O., Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
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Third, and perhaps most significantly, was the decision of the UK Parliament in 1957 – despite 
opposition from every Welsh MP at Westminster – to vote in favour of allowing the Liverpool 
Corporation to drown the Tryweryn Valley and the village of Capel Celyn in Merionydd, to 
create a reservoir to supply Liverpool with water. The so called ‘Tryweryn incident’ marked a 
significant political moment in Wales, and a spike in membership for Plaid Cymru; not only 
did it highlight the powerlessness of Welsh MPs in the House of Commons, but it also provided 
a lasting symbolism and a political totem from which Plaid Cymru could campaign for the need 
for institutional representation to defend Welsh interests.481 
Accompanying the rise of a distinctive Welsh political movement, and to a large extent as a 
response to the steady rise of Plaid Cymru, the response of post-war governments at 
Westminster was to embark on a programme of piecemeal, though nevertheless significant, 
administrative devolution for Wales. In 1949 Clement Atlee’s Labour government created the 
Council for Wales and Monmouthshire as an advisory body to the UK Government on issues 
concerning Wales.482  
Two years later, in 1951, Winston Churchill’s Conservative government founded the office of 
Minister of Welsh Affairs, administration for which fell initially upon the Home Secretary, and 
later in 1957 transferred to the Minister for Housing and Local Government.483 As well as this, 
the years of Conservative rule at Westminster during the 1950s were also accompanied by a 
number of concessions to the recognition of Welsh civil society; Government financial support 
                                                          
481 Davies, J., A History of Wales, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 639-640 
482 This was predominantly an advisory body, with no legislative or executive functions, but was designed to 
provide a voice for Wales at central government. Under the chairmanship of Huw T. Davies, the Council 
continually laid forth the proposals for the establishment of a Welsh Office and Secretary of State for Wales; 
motivated largely by the argument of Welsh equality with Scotland’s position in central government. Johnes, 
M., Wales since 1939, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 217 
483 Bogdanor, V., Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 159 
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for Welsh books (1954); Cardiff made the official capital of Wales (1955); the Welsh dragon 
banner made the official flag of Wales (1959); the Eisteddfod Act (1959).484 
Additionally, under the newly returned Labour Government of Harold Wilson in 1964, the 
office of Minister of Welsh Affairs was elevated to a full Secretary of State for Wales, a move 
which was followed a year later by the establishment of a Welsh Office; in terms of its 
institutional nomenclature, Wales was now on a par with Scotland. However, despite its 
terminological parity, the initial powers transferred to the Welsh Office were significantly less 
than those enjoyed by the Scottish Office, having no control over education or healthcare in 
Wales, and largely only enjoying authority over the matters transferred from the Ministry for 
Local Government and the Ministry for Transport – a factor that would remain a reality until 
the 1970s.485 
Perhaps as a result of this continuing inferiority of Wales in comparison to Scotland, and 
catalysed by the memory of Tryweryn, as well as Plaid’s ability to pose a distinct alternative 
to Labour, we find the continual rise of political feeling in Wales during the 1960s. In 1966, 
simmering discontent reached political fruition through election of Plaid Cymru candidate and 
chairman, Gwynfor Evans, at the Carmarthen by-election; Wales was now firmly back on the 
political agenda at Westminster.  
However, it was the events that transpired the year after Evans’ historic victory in Carmarthen 
that were to truly shake the foundations of the political order at Westminster. In 1967, in the 
by-election at Hamilton, Scottish voters returned the SNP candidate Winnie Ewing; sending a 
shock to the heart of central government and, for the first time, producing a situation whereby 
MPs from sub-state nationalist parties in both Scotland and Wales sat at Westminster. 
                                                          
484 ‘These Conservative concessions were the result of external pressure on the Party but they also show how the 
existence of a Minister for Wales and the sensitivity over Treweryn increased the influence of Welsh interests in 
government’. Johnes, M., Wales since 1939, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 219 
485 Mitchell, J., Devolution in the UK, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 55-61 
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Moreover, the significance of Winnie Ewing’s electoral success was also to shift the focus of 
anxiety over the periphery at Westminster from Wales to Scotland.  
In the years after its success at Hamilton, the SNP rose to take six seats at the general election 
in February 1974, and a further five in October 1974, whereas over this same period the number 
of Plaid Cymru seats remained consistent at one. Scotland had leapfrogged Wales to become 
the leading protagonist in the devolution debate.486 Moreover, devolution had now re-emerged 
as a serious political issue for the first time since the silencing of the Irish Question in 1922. 
‘The more than doubling of the SNP vote between the 1970 and February 1974 
elections confirmed Wilson’s opinion that “something has to be done” about the Nats. 
The “something has to be done factor” in fact pervades the entire devolution saga. But, 
time and time again, the Labour and Conservative leaderships were far from clear about 
exactly what had to be done’.487 
The lack of clarity in framing a response to the rise of nationalism in Scotland and Wales is 
perhaps one of the central characteristic tenets of the devolution debate in the 1970s. On the 
one hand, the rise in electoral support for the SNP, and to a lesser extent Plaid Cymru, 
necessitated a response as the majority of the seats threatened by the nationalists fell in Labour 
constituencies.488 This was given a double significance at the time due to the reality that the 
Labour government enjoyed only a slim majority in the House of Commons, and was reliant 
on Scotland and Wales for a significant proportion of those seats.  
On the other hand, however, and despite the increasingly apparent threat that the nationalists 
posed to the Labour government, attitudes in the party were divided. To a significant proportion 
of party members, including several ‘big beasts’ such as Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tam 
Dalyell, the threats posed by the nationalists were not a credible enough reason to divert from 
the wider socialist commitment to UK-wide solidarity, and the institutions and economic 
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resources of the UK as a whole.489 Moreover, and in hindsight perhaps correctly, a number of 
party members saw devolution not as a means of silencing the nationalist threat, but of arming 
it against central government, posing the threat of creating an uncontrollable dynamic of the 
gradual moving of the periphery towards independence.490 
In addition, the ability for a smooth transition towards a commitment for devolution was further 
compounded by the inability of the party’s pro-devolution lobby to agree as to what type of 
devolved government should be created. This factor was perhaps best reflected through the 
report issued by the Kilbrandon Commission491 in 1973 – the Commission had been set up by 
Wilson in 1969 to investigate the possible options for devolution in the United Kingdom. 
However, its report, in similarity to the attitudes in the Labour Party at the time, was decidedly 
inconclusive and marked by several competing visions of devolved government, as well as an 
accompanying Memorandum of Dissent signed by two of its Commissioners.492  
Of the eleven Commissioners who signed the main report, eight favoured legislative devolution 
for Scotland, with six of those also favouring a similar system for Wales. The two 
commissioners who differed in respect to Wales framed their opinion more in line with the 
view that Wales should receive an Assembly with delegated and advisory functions. Of the 
remaining three Commissioners, two were of the opinion that both Wales and Scotland should 
receive non-legislative Assemblies with delegated and advisory functions, with the remaining 
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Commissioner favouring a system of executive devolution for all parts of the UK, excluding 
Northern Ireland.493  
Under the majority proposals for legislative devolution to Scotland and Wales, this was 
accompanied by a commitment to Assemblies elected by proportional representation; a 
reduction of Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster; and the dismissal of the Secretaries of 
State for both nations, and their replacement with a general Secretary of State for Regional 
Affairs in central government494 – an argument indicative of the pervasive ideology in central 
government that peripheral representation must be accompanied by a balance of reduced 
influence of the periphery at central government.495 
The Memorandum of Dissent (MoD), recommended a contrary mechanism for devolution to 
that articulated in the main report. The main area of differentiation in the MoD was its support 
for the creation of a system of elected assemblies in each of the three national units comprising 
Great Britain496 – ‘one for Scotland, one for Wales and one for each of, say, five English 
regions’.497 These assemblies were intended to enjoy identical powers and have broadly similar 
structures, being schemes of executive instead of legislative devolution.498  
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Perhaps the most significant element in the deviation of the MoD was its recognition that 
devolution, in order to be effective for the interest of the UK as a whole, must be symmetrical 
in its application, both in the powers that it conferred, but also in its territorial reach to also 
include England. This position was to a significant extent of a similar logic to that advocated 
by the Liberal Party at the time; that asymmetrical devolution to only certain parts of the UK 
would significantly reduce the future chance of devolution on a UK-wide scale. Indeed, under 
this understanding, we find perhaps the most enduring legacy of the majority report of the 
Kilbrandon Commission is its advocacy for asymmetrical over symmetrical devolution; a 
factor that we will see in the later analysis of this chapter as having proved crucial to inducing 
one of the central tenets of UK devolution. 
In the 1970s, the Labour Party initially attempted to deal with devolution in Scotland and Wales 
under one Bill – the Scotland and Wales Bill 1976. In critiquing this approach, we find a central 
tenet of its decision to deal with both parts of the UK under one Bill was so as to disarm – or 
rather raise – the low levels of support for devolution in Wales.499 However, the terms of the 
Bill were confusing, proposing separate devolution deals, but dealt with under the confusing 
rubric of a single legislative commitment. Understandably, it was poorly received by the 
Labour government, and failed to pass through a guillotine motion in February 1977. The 
Government then attempted to deal with devolution through separate Bills for Scotland and 
Wales. However, support was still divided within the Party, and most notably within a number 
of members directly opposed to its construction.  
The first obstacle put into the governments path was the strong support for a referendum by the 
back-bench anti-devolutionist lobby.500 The motivations for a referendum in this instance were 
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decidedly aimed at an attempt to defeat devolution by way of a popular vote, and to hopefully 
silence the nationalist cause: 
‘the referendum was not valued for its own sake – as a means of popular participation 
or legitimisation – but rather as a last line of defence for the territorial status quo if 
parliamentary opposition failed’.501 
Of additional significance, was the anti-devolutionist Labour MP, George Cunningham’s 
successful amendment to the Bills, requiring 40 per cent of the registered electorate in Scotland 
and Wales, respectively, to vote in favour of devolution. The terms of the so called 
‘Cunningham amendment’ were included into the text of the Scotland and Wales Acts and 
made specific provision for their repeal should the 40 per cent mark not be achieved.502 
In explaining the argument underpinning the Cunningham amendment, we find its logic as 
framed by the unreserved scepticism in the Labour party to the potential risk devolution posed 
to the future stability of the Union. Indeed, the Cunningham amendment was, in essence, an 
anti-devolutionary mechanism, designed to test the reality of support for devolution, and 
intended to hopefully counter what was viewed as the misguided approach of the Wilson-
Callaghan administrations.503 From an early stage, therefore, it is apparent that the leap towards 
devolution in Scotland and Wales was facing an uphill struggle before it had even really begun. 
Thus, by the time of the referendums in March 1979, the success of devolution seemed in the 
balance. 
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This was particularly the case in Wales, where attitudes in support of devolution were relatively 
low to begin with, and were related distinctly to a linguistic divide which corresponded to a 
significant extent to the territorial divergence in support for devolution.504 In 1979, support for 
Welsh devolution was confined primarily to those Welsh identifying areas with a distinctive 
Welsh linguistic majority in the north and west.505 In the remainder of Wales, outside of those 
areas with a distinct linguistically Welsh majority, even in areas with a strong sense of 
Welshness as a primary political identity, such as the south Wales valleys, support for 
devolution remained low. 
In explaining this, we may distinguish two factors as significant in explaining the low support 
for devolution in Wales, outside of the linguistic, Plaid Cymru identifying hinterland. First, 
there is the issue of the referendum’s translatability into a second-order vote, being a vote 
influenced more by attitudes towards central government than to the question being asked at 
the ballot.506 Second, the presence of prominent Labour figureheads such as Kinnock and Abse 
in the ‘No’ campaign provided something of a reassuring safety net whereby rejecting 
devolution would not necessarily mean rejecting Welsh interests.507  
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Therefore, the referendum in Wales was, to an extent, in those marginal areas outside of the 
linguistic hinterland, equally translatable to a ballot on the government at Westminster as well 
as a measured reading of support for Welsh devolution. It was unsurprising, therefore, when 
on the 1st March 1979, only 20.3 per cent (turnout: 59.0 per cent) voted in favour of devolution 
in Wales. Even without the insertion of the Cunningham amendment, devolution is Wales had 
received a strong rejection from the Welsh electorate.  
Comparatively, in Scotland, despite the significantly higher percentage of the population in 
support of devolution, Cunningham’s hurdle still ultimately proved too high. Whereas a vote 
of 51.6 per cent was recorded in favour of devolution in Scotland, Cunningham’s victory was 
assured when a turnout of 63.7 per cent of the registered electorate translated the result into a 
significantly lower 32.9 per cent in favour of devolution. Devolution had failed to materialise 
in both nations. 
Aside from the issue of the linguistic divide, and the undoubted influence of the Cunningham 
amendment, the reasoning of the result in Scotland is seen as broadly similar to that in Wales; 
a weak and divided Labour party, several of whose Scottish figureheads campaigned 
effectively against devolution in Scotland, and the translatability of the result into a second 
order referendum on the weak performance of the Wilson-Callaghan government emerging out 
of the Winter of Discontent.508 The subsequent failure of the referendums also signalled the 
collapse of Callaghan’s Labour Government and in May 1979, Margaret Thatcher secured a 
landslide election victory at the general election, returning a Conservative Government to 
power in the UK. 
The beginning of eighteen years of Conservative government from the 1979 general election 
added salt to the wounds of pro-devolution supporters in Scotland and Wales. As the Welsh 
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historian Gwyn A. William proclaimed in 1985; ‘a Welsh people, are now nothing but a naked 
people under an acid rain’.509 In hindsight, we find that to some extent, Williams’ pessimistic 
predications did indeed come true, with both Wales and Scotland experiencing severe socio-
economic transformations under the Conservative Government’s economic reforms of the 
1980s. To see 1979 as the end of the road in devolution, however, was to prove false.  
Through the increasing reality of the negative effect of Conservative economic policy on heavy 
industry, the apparent democratic deficit of the Labour vote in Scotland and Wales failing to 
prevent the return of Conservative governments at Westminster, and the recentralising efforts 
of the UK Government over these years helped to build popular support for devolution – uniting 
the communities against the obvious ‘threat’ posed by the Conservative spectre at 
Westminster.510 
Moreover, as well as serving to unite popular support for devolution in Scotland and Wales, 
the ‘wilderness years’511 of Labour also helped to refocus the party strategy, and to build 
support for devolution within the Party. As Ron Davies reminds us, this was to a large extent 
the result of a shift in the Party ideology during these years, with the watering down of the old 
socialist commitment to centralised provision, to a new diffused understanding based on a 
commitment to more pluralised values:  
‘Modern socialism must empower people; we must give them the tools to improve their 
own lives. Devolution is central to this vision and it represents a key part of the modern 
Labour Party’s philosophy’.512 
Underpinning this reframed ideology was the wider realisation within the Labour Party that 
devolving power to Scotland and Wales would provide a political safeguard that could help 
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protect against the policies of a Conservative Government at Westminster.513 Such a shift was 
– at least in Scotland – matched by the popular expectation that a devolved government would 
likely enhance welfare provision (schools, healthcare and social security), providing the 
opportunity for a Scottish response to Scottish issues, and an expectation of the reversal of the 
democratic deficit that Scotland had received under the last two decades of the Union.514  
In addition to the strong social and economic arguments for devolution, there was also a 
significant rise in political posturing during the ‘wilderness years’, with the formation of 
several political groups – generally aligned to the Labour Party – fostering support for 
devolution. In Wales, the foundation of the Campaign for a Welsh Parliament in 1987 built on 
the pre-existing roots of Labour Party support for an elected Regional Assembly in Northern 
England, and more significantly the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament set up in 1980.515  
More significantly, events in Scotland came to be dominated by the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC). Founded in 1988 following the signing of the Claim of Right,516 the aims 
of the group were to reinvigorate the debate on a Scottish Parliament, and to build upon the 
evidenced popular support for a Scottish Parliament.517 The Convention was formally launched 
in 30th March 1989 and comprised of members from the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, 
                                                          
513 Mitchell, J., ‘The Creation of the Scottish Parliament: A Journey without End’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 
52, No. 4, (1999), pp. 649-665 at 653 
514 ‘As Scots in general increasingly came to believe that Thatcherism was being imposed on Scotland, a 
growing number of Labour politicians came to conclude that a Scottish Assembly, even one as weak as that on 
offer in 1979, would have had responsibility for policies in areas in which the Conservatives were passing 
legislation to which they were deeply opposed. Labour’s hostility to the Conservatives and Margaret Thatcher 
made a Scottish Parliament look increasingly attractive to party activists, despite their suspicions of the SNP’ 
Denver, D., Mitchell, J., Pattie, C., Bochel, H., Scotland Decides: The Devolution Issue and the Scottish 
Referendum, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 30; See also, McEwen, N., ‘State Welfare Nationalism: The 
Territorial Impact of Welfare State Development in Scotland’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(2002) pp. 66-90 at 81; Brown, A., McCrone, D., and Paterson, L., Politics and Society in Scotland, 2nd Ed. 
(London: MacMillan, 1998) p. 163 
515 Andrews, L., Wales Says Yes: The Inside Story of the Yes for Wales Referendum Campaign, (Bridgend: 
Seren, 1999) p. 53-54 
516 Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’, (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1988) 
517 Ibid., para. 4.6 
202 
 
the Green Party, trade unions, local authorities, churches and other civic bodies – but no SNP 
presence.518  
The proposals put forward by the SCC were for an elected Scottish Parliament, holding primary 
legislative powers on a range of domestic competences. More significant, however, was the 
SCC’s ability to frame these demands within the overarching claim of Scottish popular 
sovereignty. Indeed, by the time of the 1992 general election, the political members of the 
Convention (Labour and Liberal Democrat) had been successful in securing 58 of the 72 
Scottish seats in the UK House of Commons. When coupled with its broad representation, we 
find that the SCC significantly questioned the ability of the UK Government to act with 
legitimacy in regards to Scotland but, more importantly, raised the significant argument of 
Scotland’s right to renegotiate the terms of its membership of the Union.519  
The response of the Conservative Government during this period was to offer a similarly 
piecemeal catalogue of administrative concessions to the representation of Scotland as had 
been offered to Wales in the 1950s. The Scottish Secretary, Michael Forsyth, offered the return 
of the Stone of Destiny, the creation of a Scottish Economic Council, and more frequent 
meetings of the Scottish Grand Committee – meeting in Scotland itself. However, as noted by 
Denver and others, these concessions came too late in the day to affect any meaningful turn 
away from devolution; by the time of the New Labour Government’s landslide victory at the 
1997 general election, the chance of successfully appeasing the nationalists through symbolic 
gestures and administrative concessions has passed, devolution was now all but inevitable.520   
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Following the election of the New Labour Government in 1997, its first public Bill was the 
Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Bill, which successfully passed through Parliament on the 
31st July 1997. Provision was then made for referendums to be held in the autumn.  
Indeed, in 1997, several aspects in relation to the devolution referendums had changed 
fundamentally. Perhaps the most notable, from a functional perspective, were the removal of 
the controversial Cunningham Amendment from the referendum criteria and the reliance on a 
simple majority in order for the referendum to pass. Also, the referendums were now pre-
legislative, and based on the UK Government’s general outline of Scottish and Welsh 
devolution, laid out in the white papers, rather than an already enacted statute.521  
Alongside these alterations to the substance of the referendum process were two further 
important changes in the context of the referendums. First, they were held within the first year 
of the New Labour Government’s term in office. Following the landslide electoral victory in 
1997, the Party was still very much in its honeymoon period, enjoying a high level of public 
support and a united parliamentary group. Unlike in 1979, the ‘big beasts’, for the most part, 
towed the pro-devolution party line. What was of further significance in Wales was the context 
of the referendum in being held a week after that of Scotland. As noted by Wyn Jones and 
Scully, the intention of this was for the ‘Scottish bounce’ to impact the result in Wales.522  
When these factors joined together, therefore – a rise in popular support for devolution; a New 
Labour Government commanding a high majority and still in its honeymoon period; a strong 
‘Yes’ campaign and a weak ‘No’ camp; the removal of the Cunningham Amendment; the effect 
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of the Scottish bounce in Wales – the result of the referendum in 1997 was, rather predictably, 
very different from that of 1979.  
On the 11th September, 74.3 per cent of voters in Scotland voted in favour of devolution, and 
63.5 per cent in favour of tax varying powers. A week later on the 18th September, the narrow 
but significant result in Wales saw 50.3 per cent of voters back devolution. Three months later, 
the New Labour Government introduced the Scotland Bill and the Government of Wales Bill 
into Parliament. Both were passed within a matter of months in 1998. After more than half a 
century of political rhetoric, devolution had finally become a reality in Scotland and Wales.  
 
4.2.3. England 
As an initial observation, it may appear ill-fitting to conclude our analysis of the ‘road to 
devolution’ with a discussion on England. As has already been identified, England failed to 
receive a system of devolution523 in 1998, and has since shown a ready reluctance for any 
mechanisms for self-rule – at least of a form comparable to that exercised in Wales or Scotland. 
This thesis argues, however, that this does not necessarily justify a bar on discussion of England 
within the architecture of the territorial constitution. 
Indeed, the significance of England within the territorial constitution, both demographically 
and politically, is such that its role is equal to that of the other component parts of the UK. 
Indeed, as noted by Bogdanor: ‘The success of devolution will depend in large part upon 
whether English opinion believes it to be a fair and equitable settlement’.524 Yet, in making this 
assumption, we find that while significant, the traditional attitudes of the political elite in the 
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UK – as well as the English themselves – have been relatively unreceptive of devolution. In 
framing this opinion, we find a useful guide through the following consideration made in the 
Kilbrandon Report: 
‘We are unanimously of the opinion that legislative devolution, even if it is applied to 
Scotland and Wales, as in each case a majority of us suggest, should not be applied to 
England or to the regions of England. The English people would generally regard it as 
inappropriate to have a separate legislature for England; and there is no public demand 
for English regional assemblies with legislative powers, whether under a federal system 
or otherwise’.525 
In moving forward, however, the views expressed in the majority report of the Commission 
lacked the unanimity present in the rejection of legislative devolution for England. Instead, the 
inability of the commissioners to form a consensus resulted in three separate options being 
presented for England. Under the majority view, backed by eight of the Commissioners, Lord 
Kilbrandon included, England would receive a system of ‘non-executive co-ordinating and 
advisory councils’, comprising indirectly elected representatives, nominated by both local and 
central government.526 One commissioner, Mrs Nancy Trenaman, advocated for a separate 
system of two tier regional government, consisting of the ‘maximum devolution to local 
authorities, together with a system of regional committees’, the composition of the latter being 
made up of representatives from the local authorities concerned.527 The view of the remaining 
two commissioners in the majority report was for the establishment of a system of ‘executive 
devolution to directly elected regional assemblies’.528 
This final view, being the recognition of the need for regional devolution in England – albeit 
while still supporting legislative devolution to Scotland and Wales – was supported by the 
separate report of the Memorandum of Dissent (MoD), which advocated for the establishment 
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of executive councils across the UK – with no legislative devolution – provisionally divided 
between five English regions.529 To a significant extent, the calls for symmetrical devolution 
contained in the MoD bore comparison with the longstanding commitment of the Liberal Party 
for ‘Home Rule All Round’ – by the 1970s, this had evolved into a commitment for a series of 
directly elected Regional Assemblies across the entirety of Great Britain.530  
Indeed, in 1976, the leader of the Liberal Party, Jeremy Thorpe, highlighted the importance 
that any scheme of devolution in Scotland or Wales must also be accompanied by a similar, 
symmetrical provision for devolved government in the English regions.531 Thorpe framed these 
demands under the wider rubric of federalism, itself a pervasive commitment for many in the 
Liberal Party since the Gladstonian era, however, at its core, it bore all the hallmarks and logic 
of the MoU’s calls for executive devolution all round: 
‘Federalism must come. If it does not, the United Kingdom will break up. We must first 
realise that there is an important English dimension. We ignore that at our peril. We 
must go further than the White Paper’.532 
As Bogdanor explains, the overarching concern that Thorpe had identified in the Wilsonian 
commitment to partial devolution, extending only to Scotland and Wales, was that the resulting 
asymmetry held the potential to both exacerbate the existing imbalance in the territorial 
constitution, but more significantly, reduce the likelihood of devolution later being created in 
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system of English regions: ‘That leave be given to bring in a Bill to establish Parliaments for Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland; to amend the Government of Ireland Act; and for purposes connected thereto’. Jeremy 
Thorpe, Hansard, HC Deb 21 February 1968 vol. 759 col. 432 
532 Jeremy Thorpe, Hansard, HC Deb 16 December 1976 vol. 922 col. 1850 
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England.533 The realisation that devolution in Scotland and Wales would leave England 
distinctly unrepresented, and to a lesser extent the neglected spectre at the feast, led to the 
fuelling of two political issues: 
First, was Tam Dalyell’s recognising of the ‘West Lothian Question’,534 arguing that the 
proposed double asymmetry of the devolution settlements would create a condition whereby 
MPs from the devolved parts of the UK are entitled to vote on English-only matters – a category 
created by default due to the devolution of competences to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland – while English MPs would not enjoy reciprocal rights in regards to the devolved parts 
of the UK.535   
Second, was the reflex of English regionalism, particularly in the North of England, in response 
to the designs for Scottish and Welsh elected Assemblies. Despite emerging movements in the 
North East and Yorkshire, however, a system of English regionalism failed to secure 
widespread support. Rather, its essence was characterised more by infighting within the 
political elite, framed between anti-devolutionists and quid pro quo regionalists, the latter of 
whom saw English regional assemblies as an act of reciprocity to accompany devolution in 
Scotland and Wales.536 
Moreover, following the defeat of the Scottish and Welsh devolution at the ballot box in 1979, 
the idea of English regional assemblies receded back into the political shadows. Under the 
recentralising practices of the Thatcher government, the regional tier of metropolitan councils 
in England was abolished. Indeed, it was not until 1994, under the Major administration, and 
                                                          
533 Bogdanor, V., Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 184 
534 Named after Dalyell’s constituency of West Lothian after he outlined the potential anomaly in the mechanics 
of asymmetrical devolution when discussing the Scotland Bill in 1977: ‘Under the new Bill, shall I be able to 
vote on may matters in relation to West Bromwich but not West Lothian, as I was under the last Bill, and will be 
right hon. Friend be able to vote on matters in relation to Carlisle but not Cardiff?’, Tam Dalyell, Hansard, HC 
Deb 3 November 1977 vol. 938 col. 31 
535 Hadfield, B., ‘Devolution, Westminster and the English Question’, Public Law, (2005), pp. 286-305 at 286-
287 
536 Mitchell, J., Devolution in the UK, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 201-202 
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in large part as a response to the need to formulate a regional tier for the competition of EU 
Structural Grants, that a regional tier of administration was reintroduced in England by way of 
the ‘Government Offices for the Regions’. By all accounts, these were comparatively weak 
bodies, remaining in central government, and having no direct representation from the citizens 
in the regions.  
Indeed, by 1998 the only from of directly elected decentralisation in England was the 
reintroduction of the old Greater London Council, now rebranded as the Greater London 
Authority, and responsible for a number of functional matters in relation to the Greater London 
area. In the years after 1998, New Labour maintained a commitment to elected regional 
assemblies, led primarily by the efforts of the deputy prime minister John Prescott, who in 2004 
published the White Paper ‘Your Region, Your Choice’, which laid out the basis for elected 
regional assemblies in England.  
The proposed structure of these bodies was as executive organs with the powers to influence 
regional development.537 By the time of action, however, only the North-East of England 
received a referendum, the result of which would go down in history as a significant rejection 
of regional policy, and would largely banish regionalism from the political agenda in England, 
a reality which, to some extent, continues to this day. 
 
4.3. The Logic of Devolution 
In summary, the first part of this chapter has identified that the devolution settlements of 1998 
came about as the result of a heterogeneous process. As has been identified, in each of the 
component parts of the United Kingdom, a complex mix of different historical experiences and 
                                                          
537 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English Regions, Cm. 5511 
(London: HMSO, 2003), p. 37  
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a unique set of more recent political pressures, transpired to create a system of devolved 
government which was characterised by a strong measure of asymmetry and region-specific 
thinking.  
Inherent to this logic is the idea of devolution as a response; a response to particular political 
pressures as and when they arise, as opposed to a principled holistic development of the 
territorial constitution towards the vision of UK-wide subsidiarity. Indeed, as argued by 
Burrows, had the latter been the case it could rightly be assumed that a moral interpretation of 
subsidiarity would have delivered a far more symmetrical system of devolved government, 
both in terms of the powers it transferred and the reach of its territorial application.538 The fact 
that this was not the case goes a long way in suggesting that devolution was, to a significant 
extent, a responsive mechanism.  
However, in drawing this conclusion, we must be cautious not to frame devolution as 
completely disassociated from any wider moral commitment to decentralised government. 
Indeed, as identified in the Kilbrandon Report, as well as providing a useful safety valve to the 
rise of national feeling in Scotland and Wales, devolution also offered an appropriate response 
to other ‘defects’ in the constitutional order, namely over-centralisation and weakened 
democracy.539 As argued by Bogdanor, in the post-war years leading up to 1998, there was 
certainly a strong functional case for devolution in the UK; during this period the UK was, with 
the exception of Japan, the largest of the worlds stable democracies to operate a centralised and 
unitary form of government.540 
With this in mind, the merits of democracy promotion seem, to some extent, to have influenced 
New Labour’s commitment to ‘rolling devolution’ after 1997. In illustrating this point, we find 
                                                          
538 Burrows, N., Devolution, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000), p. 121 
539 Kilbrandon, Lord. ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution’ (London: HMSO, 1973) Cmnd. 
5460, p. 329-330, para. 1096-1101 
540 Bogdanor, V., Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 1 
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the following quote by Dr John Reid, Secretary of State for Scotland in 1999, to be significant 
in demonstrating the idea of devolution as part of a wider scheme of democracy promotion: 
‘Devolution is a process of empowerment that should be spread geographically to all 
areas of the United Kingdom. It is not a one-size-fits-all solution; it is a policy that has 
been tailored to suit the various parts of the United Kingdom and the Union as a 
whole’.541  
In unpacking this quote, we are drawn to identify what is to some extent a juxtaposition. 
Initially, we see clear reference to the idea of devolution as a strategy of democratic 
empowerment, on a UK-wide basis. However, at the same time, this is qualified in its possibility 
for symmetrical application by a recognition of the need to tailor regional governance in order 
to meet the different needs of the component parts concerned.542 Under this second perspective, 
we find the logic of devolution to be far more nuanced in its construction; fostering support for 
democracy promotion, but at the same time, exercising a caveat in recognition that this will not 
be applied symmetrically.   
In furthering this point, we find that the factor primarily influencing the tailored nature of the 
devolution settlements was the perceived strength or will of political feeling in support of 
devolution in the different parts of the UK. In exploring this point, we find a useful 
demonstration of this juxtaposed position through the wording of the UK Government’s 1997 
white paper on Scottish devolution: 
‘The Government want a United Kingdom which everyone feels part of, can contribute 
to, and whose future all have a stake. The Union will be strengthened by recognising 
the claims of Scotland, Wales and the regions with strong identities of their own. The 
Government’s devolution proposals, by meeting these aspirations, will not only 
safeguard but also enhance the Union’.543  
                                                          
541 Dr John Reid, Hansard, HC Deb 21 October 1999, col. 336 col. 671 
542 ‘Needs’ both of devolution as a process for facilitating a gradual shift towards independence, but also of 
devolution as a means of countering the shift towards independence by way of constitutional concessions.  
543 Scottish Office, ‘Scotland’s Parliament’, Cm. 3658 (HMSO, 1997), p. 10, para. 3.1 
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From this statement, we find a perspective on devolution which seems inherently detached 
from an understanding of it as a means of symmetrically applied democracy promotion. More 
significantly, we find what we may term an ‘identity threshold’ in the facilitation of devolved 
government. Through the wording used in the white paper, we find the logic of devolution as 
meeting peripheral aspirations, as opposed to UK-wide democratic values. In explaining this 
dynamic, we are drawn to consider devolution as balancing on a ‘threshold principle’, with 
each settlement reflecting the strength of the peripheral movement to which it has been 
designed to address.544  
For example, the strong measure of devolution installed in Northern Ireland was a reflection of 
its aim at balancing the competing constitutional claims in the contested region.545 
Comparatively, in Scotland and Wales, devolution has been a measured response to sub-state 
nationalism, where strong cultural identities and a high degree of functional viability 
legitimised peripheral movements in demanding autonomy from central government.546 
Finally, in the regions of England, the most of which – with perhaps the exception of Cornwall 
– have relatively low levels of unique cultural identity, but who have a significant case for 
regional autonomy based on a perceived functional advantage, we find the provision for 
devolution to be much lower in the competences it is prepared to transfer.547  
                                                          
544 Elliott, M., ‘United Kingdom: Parliamentary sovereignty under pressure’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2004), pp. 545-554 at 553; Leyland, P., The Constitution of the United 
Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p. 247 
545 Parks and Elcock recognise Northern Ireland as a ‘contested region’ on account of the fact that its status as a 
territorial entity is viewed differently from both sides of the sectarian divide. Autonomising strategies in this 
region are, as differentiated from Scotland or Wales, designed to seek a compromise between two sub-state 
cultural identities, as opposed to merely providing the concession of autonomy to a singularly framed of sub-
state nationalism. Parks , J., and Elcock, H., ‘Why do regions demand autonomy?’, Regional and Federal 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, (2000), pp. 87-106 
546 Parks, J., and Elcock, H., ‘Why do regions demand autonomy?’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 
3, (2000), pp. 87-106 at 88 
547 Ibid., at 89 
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In conclusion, therefore, it is argued that the logic underpinning the introduction of devolution 
in 1998 – and its future development548 – was constructed by way of a nuanced answer to two 
political issues.  
First, we find the recognised practical need of devolution as a means of, on the one hand, 
enhancing the democratic process and widening the scope of governmental activity while, on 
the other hand, providing for the efficiency of the UK Parliament by reducing its scope in 
domestic matters. To some extent, we find this argument as coming full circle to the previously 
mentioned Gladstonian idea of Home Rule All Round549 as being a means of freeing up space 
in Parliament. 
However, as was recognised by Gladstone in 1879, the element of democratising efficiency is 
continually conditioned by the second political issue in the devolution debate, the rise of 
autonomy seeking units in the periphery. To some extent, this is comparable to what Alfred 
Stepan identified in federal systems as a ‘holding together’ logic; the concession of 
decentralised power in response to peripheral calls for autonomy, in an attempt to ultimately 
hold together the state. 550  Clearly, in each of the devolution settlements – and more notably 
the lack of devolution in England – there is an identification of the different political pressures 
they are seeking to address; devolving power to appease or disarm the nationalist threat, rather 
than pursuing a genuine commitment to democracy promotion.551  
Thus, in conclusion, we may see devolution as a reflective strategy, designed and implemented 
in response to the political pressures in the periphery. Similar to the theme identified in Chapter 
                                                          
548 This will be discussed in more detail in Part 2 of this chapter.  
549 See: Chapter One (1.4) 
550 Stepan, A., Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 320-323 
551 Bogdanor, V., ‘Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2, 
(April 1999), pp. 185-194 at 194 
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One in relation to the formation of the UK, the emergence of devolution was strategic as 
opposed to inevitable.   
In the second part of this chapter, we will analyse the substantive themes and challenges of 
devolution in the UK, and in particular we will focus on what extent the logic identified in Part 
One has influenced these processes.  
 
Part Two – The Themes and Challenges of Devolution 
The focus in Part Two of this this chapter will turn to analysing the substantive elements of the 
devolution settlements. In achieving this, this Part of the chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first section will explore the substantive constitutional provision of the devolution 
settlements, in order to seek to identify common themes in the devolution process. The debate 
in the second section will then move to consider the theoretical aspects of devolution and the 
challenges the new theoretical approaches pose to the territorial constitution.  
 
4.4. Themes in the Devolution Process 
The aim of this section of the chapter is to analyse the themes that have emerged in relation to 
the substantive structure of the devolution settlements. These will be identified under four 
headings.  
 
4.4.1. Asymmetrical 
It is argued that the first, and perhaps most significant, theme of the devolution process relates 
to the asymmetry of competences between the devolved administrations. In highlighting the 
significance of this theme, this section of the chapter will deal with the specific asymmetries 
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that existed as a result of the original 1998 devolution settlements. The logic underpinning this 
approach may be explained in two ways. First, it is recognised that the asymmetry between the 
devolution settlements themselves was most pronounced in 1998. Second, it is argued that by 
recognising the asymmetry of the devolution settlements at their inception, we gain a useful 
base for the later analysis on the evolution of devolution – the facilitation of which will take 
place in the later sections of this chapter.  
In keeping with the structure of Part One of this chapter, let us begin our analysis of the 
substantive elements of the devolution settlements by consulting the (re)introduction552 of 
devolution in Northern Ireland. As recognised in Part One of the chapter, devolution in this 
part of the UK was attached to the wider reconciliatory provision of the ‘peace process’. 
Correspondingly, the scheme of devolution introduced in Northern Ireland was, similar to the 
road towards its inception, distinct in its aims and objectives when compared to the settlements 
in Scotland and Wales. Evidence of the unique corpus of devolution in Northern Ireland can 
be understood through an analysis of the substantive provisions made in the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998. 
Under the Act, Northern Ireland received a new devolved Assembly553 at Stormont, comprising 
of 90 elected Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), elected by way of a proportional 
Single Transferable Vote.554 Under this system, Northern Ireland was divided into 18 electoral 
                                                          
552 The advent of devolution in Northern Ireland in 1998 must be seen as distinctly separated from the 
devolution settlements which had existed prior to 1973; the settlement resulting from the Good Friday 
Agreement advocated for the introduction of a new Northern Ireland Assembly, and not for an introduction of 
the old pre-1973 Stormont regime.  
553 The nomenclature underpinning the use of Assembly rather than Parliament for the new Northern Irish 
legislature was based on a desire to disassociate the reintroduction of devolution in Northern Ireland from the 
events that had occurred during ‘the troubles’ after 1969. This was to acknowledge the underlying theme in the 
Belfast Agreement of the need to acknowledge the past, but to start afresh with the aim of securing a peace 
settlement in the Province. See: The Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations, Cm 4292 (HMSO, 1998),  
554 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 34 
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constituencies, each returning 6555 MLAs to the Assembly.556 After such election, the formation 
of the Northern Ireland Executive comprised of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 
themselves nominated by the Assembly,557 as well as Northern Ireland Ministers.558  
In explaining the reasoning behind the highly proportional procedure in the voting system in 
Northern Ireland, we find its logic as primarily a reflection of the need to ensure broad 
representation of both communities in Northern Ireland.559 Under section 4(5) of the Northern 
Ireland Act, all MLA’s and candidates for election are required to register their community 
affinity – Nationalist, Unionist or Other – and the electorate rank the candidates in order of 
preference; as opposed to the single vote, first past the post system used in UK Parliamentary 
elections.  
Moreover, the filling of the offices of Northern Ireland Ministers is conducted not by way of 
the largest party in the Assembly – as is the tradition under the Westminster system – but by 
the proportional representation of ministers from the elected parties in the Assembly, as 
specified under the formula in section 18(5) of the Act.560 Thus, at all points, there is provision 
for the broad representation of the desperate parts of the political divide in Northern Ireland.  
Additionally, as a further demonstration of the reconciliatory logic of Northern Irish 
devolution, and the design of devolution as linked to the gradual reestablishment of devolved 
                                                          
555 This number was reduced from 6 to 5 in 2016 following the Assembly Members (Reduction of Numbers) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, s. 1(1) 
556 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 33; s.33(1) defined the boundaries of the Northern Ireland constituencies as 
those used in elections for the UK Parliament. s.33(2) outlines the number of MLA’s to be elected per 
constituency.  
557 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.26; Note that the election procedure for the Northern Ireland Executive was 
altered by s.8 of the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006 – becoming s.16A of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998. Under the new procedure, the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister is 
conducted via a vote in the Assembly on the nominees from the largest political party and largest political 
designation in the Assembly.  
558 The Northern Ireland Ministers are to be selected by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, with the 
total number of Northern Ireland Ministers not exceeding ten, unless duly authorised by the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.17 
559 Burrows, N., Devolution, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 37 
560 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.18(5) 
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government, we find that the definition of the competences of the Assembly are divided into 
three distinct categories: excepted, reserved and transferred matters.561 Most important of these 
categories is that of ‘reserved’ competences, which relate to those matters that were not 
expressly devolved to Northern Ireland in 1998, but are capable of being devolved should 
sufficient progress be deemed to have been made in the facilitation of the peace process.562   
Bearing some similarity to the system in Northern Ireland, the division of competences to the 
Scottish Parliament is provided under a similar frame of negative distinction, whereby 
devolved competences are construed as those that are not expressly ‘reserved’ by the UK 
Parliament. However, unlike in Northern Ireland, the Scotland Act 1998 deals with these under 
one heading: ‘reserved matters’.563 Moreover, direct provision was included into the 1998 Act 
declaring that the scope of reserved powers in Scotland were capable of being amended on the 
request of the Scottish Parliament by way of a Section 30 Order, whereby the list of reserved 
powers may be enhanced, upon the agreement of the UK Government.564  
In an additional move, we also find that membership and election of the Scottish Parliament 
also differs from that in Northern Ireland, being arranged by the Additional Member System. 
Under this system, Scotland is divided into 73 constituencies, elected via a simple majority 
‘first past the post’ system, as well as 8 regions, each returning 7 Members of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSP’s).565  
                                                          
561 Excepted competences relate to those areas defined under Schedule 2 of the Act which are expressly 
withheld for operation by the UK Parliament. Reserved matters are laid out under Schedule 3 of the Act and 
relate to those matters which, in 1998, were maintained by the UK Parliament but which may be devolved in 
future should experience show the ability of the power-sharing executive to work together. The final category 
relates to Transferred Powers. These are the powers which are not specified as either expected or reserved and 
so are, by result, devolved.  
562 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch. 3 
563 Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 5; The scope of reserved matters is capable of being amended by the request of the 
Scottish Parliament, making a Section 30 Order to the UK Government, provision of which is specified under 
the Scotland Act 1998, s.30(2) 
564 Scotland Act 1998, s.30(2) 
565 Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 1 
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Furthermore, we also find that the system of devolution employed in Scotland in 1998 was 
further distinguished by two additional provisions. First, alongside a substantial transfer of 
general legislative competence, we find that the Scottish Parliament received a narrow, but 
nonetheless significant, degree of competence in fiscal matters; being able to alter the basic 
rate of income tax by 3p in the pound.566 Second, in correlation to the strength of Scottish 
devolution, the nomenclature of the devolution settlement conferred responsibility to an elected 
Scottish Parliament, as opposed to an Assembly – a symbolic recognition of Scottish 
nationhood, and of the independence of the Scottish Parliament prior to the Anglo-Scottish 
Union of 1707.567  
In this regard, we may argue that to a significant extent, the construction of the devolution 
settlement in Scotland reflected a measured response to the political strength of Scottish 
nationalism. Indeed, as outlined in Part One of this chapter, the essential logic of devolution 
was constructed on the basis of a measured response to the weight of culturally mobilised 
political movements in the periphery – offering a range of devolved competences based on the 
strength of the peripheral movement. Thus, as argued, the significant electoral successes of the 
SNP, and the anxieties over this in the Labour Party, led to the system of devolution being 
introduced in Scotland in 1998 as being significant in the competences that it conferred.  
Correspondingly, the lower political capital of sub-state nationalism in Wales – and the 
questionable reception of devolution by the Welsh public – meant that the proposals for 
devolution in Wales were, by 1997, distinctly lesser in value than the scheme advocated in 
Scotland. While Wales received an Assembly of 60 Assembly Members (AM’s), elected by 
way of the Additional Member System568 – an identical system to that used in Scotland – the 
                                                          
566 Scotland Act 1998, Part IV 
567 Tierney, S., ‘Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 5, No 4, (2007), pp. 730-753 at 742 
568 Under the Additional Member System, as in Scotland, Wales was divided into ‘constituencies’ and ‘regions’; 
the former providing 40 AM’s and conforming to the existing constituency boundaries for Westminster 
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powers exercisable by Members of the new National Assembly for Wales were distinctly 
behind that of their counterparts in Edinburgh.  
Indeed, far from emulating the implied authority of the Scottish Parliament, the reduced 
nomenclature of the Welsh Assembly in 1998 received only the transferred functions of the 
Secretary of State for Wales and the Wales Office; having no direct legislative responsibility 
and being a mere ‘body corporate’569 as opposed to a Parliament with primary legislative 
powers, as was the case in Scotland. Moreover, unlike Scotland, Wales received no revenue 
raising powers in 1998, and was solely reliant upon the block grant from central government, 
know commonly as the Barnett Formula.570 
The distinct lagging behind of competences for the Welsh Assembly in comparison to the 
system in Scotland was further muddied by the peculiarities of the separation of powers within 
the new Welsh Assembly. Unlike the Scottish Parliament, which employed the traditional UK 
Parliamentary system of an executive comprised of members from the majority party in the 
legislative house, the Welsh system made no distinction between the executive and the 
legislature – a system that in itself was almost immediately recognised as ill-fitting and 
unsustainable.571 
                                                          
elections, with the latter providing 20 AM’s and reflecting the regions used in the elections for the European 
Parliament. Government of Wales Act 1998, s.2(1), Sch. 1 ss.1-3 
569 Government of Wales Act 1998, s.1(2) 
570 Government of Wales Act 1998, s.80(1) 
571 Wyn Jones and Scully reference the comments of the Australian academic, Rufus Davies, who in 1977 
remarked that the provisions under the Scotland and Wales Bill made provision for something of a unique and 
alien form of devolved government in Wales, a platypus; ‘The Welsh model of so-called “executive devolution” 
was a particular weird and unlikely combination: a body with its own democratic mandate exercising executive 
(and related, limited legislation) authority within the context of powers granted through the actions of another 
legislature and executive based on a wholly separate electoral mandate; a body exercising powers that had been 
established and defined without any thought that they might eventually be transferred to such an entity; a body 
whose internal structure and organization was certainly alien to Westminster and the many political institutions 
in that tradition’. Wyn Jones, R., and Scully, R., Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum, 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013), p. 27 
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Correspondingly, therefore, we find the asymmetry between the devolution settlements as a 
confirmation of the already established logic of devolution as a reactive and measured 
mechanism of constitutional change. Moreover, however, we find that this assumed a 
heightened significance in respect of the fact that England, aside from the creation of the 
Greater London Authority,572 received no measure of devolution in 1998.573  Thus, on a 
territorial basis, devolution was not a UK-wide project, but rather a project effecting only three 
of the four component parts of the UK; a reality which in itself further suggests a correlation 
between devolution and culturally defined nationalism.574  
In focussing specifically upon this point, we find that the essence of the ‘double asymmetry’575 
embodied in the devolution settlements had a significant effect upon England. This may be 
summarised in two parts: 
First, as a result of the creation of devolved administrations in the other three parts of the UK, 
England became a territorialised entity in itself, receiving, by default, its own set of 
competences, but without a specifically English institutional personality. Rather, the exercise 
of legislative competence on English-only matters continued to be exercised by the UK 
Parliament; becoming the de facto Parliament for England.576  
Second, owing to the unique circumstances of England-only matters continuing to be dealt with 
under the legislative process of the UK Parliament, there emerged significant questions in 
                                                          
572 Greater London Authority Act 1999 
573 Hopkins, J., Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union, 
(London: Cavendish, 2002), p. 170 
574 It must be noted that in this debate, Northern Ireland is to be treated as unique – reflecting a logic not of the 
accommodation of one sub-state nationalist group, but of a balance between two groups. It is argued that this is 
in essence a reflection of the need for devolution to accommodate the existence of nationalism, but its logic is 
distinctly opposed to that applied in the creation of the Scottish Parliament or National Assembly for Wales.  
575 Tierney, S., ‘Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state’, in Choudhry, S., (ed.) 
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) pp. 438-460 
576 Jeffrey, C., ‘Dis-United Kingdom’, Juncture, Vol. 19, No. 1, (2012), pp. 14-16; Kenny, M., ‘English 
Politicised?: Unpicking the Normative Implications of the McKay Commission’, The British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Vol. 17, (2015), pp. 152-170 at 154 
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relation to democratic accountability and representation in England. As noted in Part One of 
this chapter, the essence of this challenge was initially hypothesised in 1970s, coming to be 
known as the ‘West Lothian Question’; recognising the double asymmetry of the devolution 
settlements as creating a condition whereby MPs from the devolved parts of the UK are entitled 
to vote on England-only matters, such as healthcare or education, while MPs sitting in English 
constituencies do not enjoy the reciprocal right to vote on matters inside the competence of the 
devolved administrations.577   
Yet, while delivering a distinct sense of political imbalance following its introduction in 1998, 
we find that in relative terms, the introduction of devolution failed to amount to a significant 
moment of instability in the territorial constitution. Instead, the introduction of devolution in 
1998, despite its heavily asymmetrical character, assumed a relatively smooth path. The 
reasoning for this may be summarised in three parts: 
First, was the relative fact that while creating new sites of political authority, the political 
composition of the new devolved executives in Scotland and Wales – Northern Ireland being 
the unique case – was congruent with that of the UK Government. Indeed, it would take just 
under a decade, with the election of the SNP in Scotland in 2007, for a notable incongruity to 
emerge between the devolved administrations and the UK Government. 
Second, while the respective devolution settlements largely transferred the powers of the 
respective territorial offices of central government to the new devolved administrations,578  the 
administrative architecture remained relatively unchanged, with the administrative staff in each 
                                                          
577 Hadfield, B., ‘Devolution, Westminster and the English Question’, Public Law, (2005), pp. 286-305 at 286-
287 
578 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.23; Scotland Act 1998, s.53; Government of Wales Act 1998, s.22 
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of the devolved administrations being primarily comprised of civil servants from central 
government.579    
Third, while creating a new multi-level polity, the devolution settlements did not transform the 
normative legal reality of the UK as a unitary state; each of the devolution settlements making 
express recognition of the continuing legal authority of the UK Parliament to legislate on behalf 
of the devolved administrations. However, this was qualified in 1999 through the introduction 
of the Sewel Convention. 
Under the Convention, as embodied in the Memorandum of Understanding, it was 
acknowledged that the UK Parliament would not normally legislative on devolved matters 
without first seeking the authority of the devolved administrations concerned. The provision 
for the Convention was in itself a recognition of the longer acknowledgement that any measure 
of devolution would similarly require a political mechanism designed to curtail the exercise of 
the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament.580 Its significance, however, was to provide a 
degree of stability in the acknowledgement that, while still legally sovereign, the actions of the 
UK Parliament would remain respectful of the limits of devolved competence.  
 
4.4.2. A Process, Not an Event 
The first theme identified the double asymmetry which existed between the devolution 
settlements – and England – at their inception in 1998. The second theme seeks to build upon 
                                                          
579 Gallagher, J., ‘Intergovernmental Relations in the UK: Co-operation, Competition and Constitutional 
Change’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 2, (2012), pp. 198-213 at 
198-199  
580 ‘Parliament would retain ultimate legislative authority in all matters, but it would be a convention that in the 
ordinary course this power would not be used to legislate for Scotland or Wales on a transferred matter without 
the agreement of the Scottish or Welsh Government’. Kilbrandon, Lord., ‘Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Constitution’, (London: HMSO, 1973), Cmnd. 5460, p. 337, para. 1126; ‘We would expect a convention to 
be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland 
without the consent of the Scottish parliament’. Lord John Sewel, Hansard, HL Deb 21 July 1998, vol. 592, col. 
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this recognition of the asymmetrical construction of the devolution settlements by recognising 
that the evolution of devolution after 1998 developed along distinctly bilateral tracks, which 
saw increasing powers transfer from central government to the periphery, while at the same 
time sustaining the overarching asymmetry between the settlements. 
The essential personality of this theme is able to be summarised through the now often cited 
phrase of the Secretary of State for Wales in 1998, Ron Davies; ‘Devolution is a process. It is 
not an event and neither is it a journey with a fixed end-point’.581 A more illustrative account 
of Davies’ observation is provided through the earlier, pre-devolutionary remarks of the Labour 
MP for Swansea East, Donald Anderson, who likened devolution to a ‘mystery tour’:  
‘Any new constitutional advance can be a sort of mystery tour… I recall the fine story 
of a Welsh mystery tour by bus from Cwmrhydyceirw in my constituency. There was 
a sweep about where the tour would end, and it is said that the driver won. The people 
of Wales are driving the mystery tour. They will decide the pace and the direction, and 
I have confidence in our people’.582 
It is perhaps significant that these two well-known commentaries on the dynamics and future 
of devolution came from politicians in Wales. Indeed, in Wales, more than any other part of 
the UK, it was acknowledged from an early point that the devolution settlement created in 1998 
would not be a lasting solution; telling of this point, we find that early devolution in Wales was 
more indicative of the beginning of a train of momentum, as opposed to a defined destination. 
However, before focussing on the specifics and complexities of the devolution process in 
Wales, let us first address the evolution of devolution in the rest of the UK: 
In Northern Ireland, devolution after 1998 has largely taken form through the gradual transfer 
of powers back583 to Stormont, interspaced by periods of direct rule (or no executive rule at 
                                                          
581 Davies, R., ‘Devolution: A Process Not An Event’ Institute of Welsh Affairs: The Gregynog Papers, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, (1999), p. 15 
582 Donald Anderson, Hansard, HC Deb 25 July 1997, vol. 298, col. 1164 
583 This is to argue that the situation in Northern Ireland is ultimately inclined for a return to the level of 
competences held in the pre-1972 era, albeit under a reformed system of consociational governance.  
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all).584 The most significant enhancement of powers came in 2006 after the provisions agreed 
in the St Andrews Agreement, and embodied in the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) 
Act 2006. Under the Act, provision was made for the devolution of policing powers, as well as 
other functional matters such as renewable energy provision.   
More importantly, however, were the provisions made under the Act for the reform of the 
power-sharing system in Northern Ireland, leading to the amendment of the electoral procedure 
of the Northern Ireland Executive585 – a further reflection of the logic of devolution in Northern 
Ireland as being primarily a response to its status as a contested region, as opposed to 
embodying a response to the aims of one particular group.  
In Scotland, as already identified, the system of devolution provided through the 1998 Act 
amounted to a considerable transfer of legislative competences and, in particular, the provision 
for minor tax-varying powers. The subsequent evolution of devolution in Scotland has largely 
taken place through the provision for further devolution of fiscal power, accompanied by a 
broader thickening of the overall legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.  
Under the Scotland Act 2012, based largely on the recommendations made by the Calman 
Commission,586 a package of enhanced financial provision was transferred to the Scottish 
Parliament; stamp duty, landfill tax, as well as the increased threshold for the varying of income 
tax.587 This was further enhanced by the Scotland Act 2016, which devolved income tax in its 
entirety, as well as certain other taxes in areas such as Air Passenger Duty.588 
                                                          
584 As is currently the case in Northern Ireland, there remains neither a Northern Ireland Executive or a system 
of Direct Rule.  
585 Northern Ireland Act, s.16A 
586 Calman, Kenneth, ‘Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century’ 
(Edinburgh: Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009), Executive Summary, p. 9-11, para. 41  
587 Scotland Act 2012, Part 3 
588 Scotland Act 2016, Part 2 
224 
 
However, in additional to the direct increase in devolved competences, we also find a distinct 
culture of symbolic enhancement of the devolution settlement in Scotland. First, under the 2012 
Act, the nomenclature of the ‘Scottish Executive’ was transformed to the ‘Scottish 
Government’.589 More significantly, under the Scotland Act 2016, following the 
recommendation of the Smith Commission, the permanence of the Scottish Parliament was 
guaranteed in statute,590 as was the operation of the Sewel Convention.591 While both changes 
amounted to little more than statutory recognition of an already existing political reality, there 
implementation points to the fact that as well as thickening the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament, the understanding of devolution as a process is also significant in 
explaining the symbolic enhancement of devolution within the territorial constitution.  
In Wales, devolution has taken place through a number of clearly identifiable ‘stages’. As 
already identified, the initial 1998 settlement delivered a weak model of devolution to Wales, 
and one that was, from the start, recognised as needing reform. While the initial elements of 
this reform came by way of minor changes in the procedural workings of the National 
Assembly, and its relationship with the UK Parliament, the first substantive change to the 
devolution settlement in Wales came in the Government of Wales Act 2006, itself a response 
to the report of the Richard Commission.  
Under the report of the Richard Commission, reporting in 2004, it was recommended that 
Wales should receive an enhanced system of government. Most notable in this process were 
two aspects. First, it was recognised that the peculiarities and inefficiencies of the 1998 
                                                          
589 Scotland Act 2012, s.12 
590 ‘The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional arrangements’ Scotland Act 2016, s.1 
591 Smith Commission, ‘Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’, (September 2014), para. 22 
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settlement would need to be amended, and for direct provision to be made for the separation of 
powers in the Assembly.  
Second, it was recognised that the National Assembly should also receive a system of enhanced 
legislative competence. Under the Commission’s proposals, it was recommended that Wales 
should move directly to a primary legislative powers model, however, the realities put in place 
under the Government of Wales Act 2006 were distinctly qualified in their conferral of primary 
legislative powers to the Assembly.  
Under this scheme, Wales was able to pass Assembly ‘measures’,592 thus removing its reliance 
upon the Secretary of State for Wales to push legislation through the UK Parliament – but was 
still necessarily reliant on seeking he broader consent of the UK Parliament before exercising 
such powers.593 More significantly, under s.103-104 of the 2006 Act, provision was made that 
a referendum could be held – no earlier than 2011 – on the further adaptation of the legislative 
process in Wales.  
Under this scheme, provision was made that in the event of a positive vote, Part 4 of the Act 
would be made effective, which would confer powers upon the National Assembly to pass 
‘Acts of the Assembly’, not requiring of consent from the UK Parliament if legislated within 
the respected competences of the Assembly.594 A referendum was held on this issue on the 3rd 
March 2011, and delivered a strong vote of 63.5 per cent in favour of the further enhancement 
of devolution in Wales.  
This was further enhanced through the Wales Act 2012, which significantly enhanced the 
financial provision of the Assembly, reflecting the recommendations made under Part I of the 
Silk Commission report. In March 2014, Part II of the Silk Commission Report made the 
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recommendation that the model of devolution in Wales should be reconfigured from a 
conferred to a reserved powers model.595 The basis for this argument was based largely on the 
fact that a reserved powers model would reverse the uncertain boundaries of devolved 
competence existing under a conferred powers model, thus reducing the change of litigation 
and increasing the stability of the devolution settlement in Wales.596 However, it rests beneath 
the wider arc of devolution in Wales as a symmetrising action mirroring, to an extent, of the 
path already channelled by Scotland. 
In regards to England, the continuing lack of support for a meaningful system of devolution 
comparable to that of the rest of the UK has led to a unique formation of scattered devolution 
to ‘combined authorities’ – holding only executive functions, with no legislative authority. To 
some extent, as in the Cornish sense, which enjoys the peculiar status of a unitary authority 
holding the powers of a combined authority, the introduction of this system is indicative of a 
reflection of the unique cultural identity of the region. However, framed more broadly, the 
essence of the introduction of the combined authorities is more a top-down than a bottom-up 
initiative, and bears little systematic comparison with devolution in Scotland or Wales, and is 
decidedly removed from the situation in Northern Ireland.  
In delivering a summary of this theme, we are drawn to consider its character as arranged in 
two parts. First, in line with its logic as a pragmatic or tailored response to peripheral pressures, 
devolution has emerged not as a single constitutional fix, but as a process, with no specific end 
point. Second, we find that devolution, as a process, is driven by popular will and the political 
rhetoric of the devolved administrations, as opposed to any proactive policy by the UK 
Government. Paradoxically, it appears that this second element has come to gain rather than 
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lose traction after 1998 – particularly in Wales, which was initially reluctant towards 
devolution.  
In this regard, we see that devolution as a process also reflects another underlying theme: that 
of the failure of devolution to deliver on its aims to ‘kill nationalism stone dead’. Indeed, on 
this issue, we find that devolution has served more to arm as opposed to disarm nationalism in 
Scotland and Wales, whereas the process in Northern Ireland remains united to the delicacies 
of the sectarian divide and is ruled more by pragmatism, than on catering for a single 
dissatisfied group. 
 
4.4.3. Bilateral  
Thus far, the argument in this chapter has come to recognise devolution as an asymmetrical 
and open-ended process. Building upon these themes, it is now argued that the third theme of 
devolution relates to its bilateral character. In framing this theme, we are able to divide its 
construction between two parts. 
First, through the logic of devolution as a process, tailored to meet the needs of the component 
parts of the UK, we find that the relationship that emerged between the UK Government and 
the devolved administrations has been one of a series of isolated lines of communication. For 
Trench, this system is indicative of a series of ‘bi-lateral bargains’,597 framed by the already 
identified asymmetry between the devolution settlements.  
As argued by Swenden and McEwen, the essence of this asymmetrical system has, in itself, 
created a condition whereby bilateralism is the necessary reality for intergovernmental relations 
in the UK: 
                                                          
597 Trench, A., ‘Scotland and Wales: The Evolution of Devolution’, in Hazell, R., (ed.) Constitutional Futures 
Revisited: Britain’s Constitution to 2020, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 29-42 at 32 
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‘asymmetry ensures that there remain few issues around which the devolved 
administrations can find common cause, and bilateral intergovernmental relationships 
remain the order of the day’.598 
Through consideration of these remarks, we are now directed to the second aspect of the 
bilateral character of the devolution settlements; the reduced possibility for multi-lateral 
relations between the new sites of governmental authority. Indeed, through consideration of 
the history of the devolution settlements, we are drawn to realise the distinct lack of joined-up 
thinking which governed their construction. This is perhaps best demonstrated through the fact 
that the facilitation of intergovernmental relations (IGR) came largely as an afterthought, being 
hastily constructed as an annex to the initial devolution process in 1998, and laid out in the 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1999:599  
‘This Memorandum is a statement of political intent, and should not be interpreted as a 
binding agreement. It does not create legal obligations between the parties. It is intended 
to be binding in honour only’.600 
Under this system, the primary601 system of IGR connected to the devolution process – on a 
UK-wide basis – falls onto the operation of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), comprising 
of representatives from the UK Government and the devolved administrations, meeting in 
either plenary or functional format,602 and designed to facilitate the coordination of the 
                                                          
598 Swenden, W., and McEwen, N., ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? Intergovernmental relations and 
party politics’, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4/5, (2014), pp. 488-509 at 501 
599 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government, 
Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly of Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee, Cm. 5240 (London: HMSO, 2001); For useful commentary, see: Trench, A., ‘Devolution: The 
withering-away of the Joint Ministerial Committee’, Public Law, (2004), pp. 513-517 at 516;  
600 Memorandum of Understanding and supplementary agreements between the United Kingdom Government, 
Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee, Cm. 5240 (London: HMSO, 2001), para. 2 
601 It must also be noted that provision for IGR is also provided through the institutionalised system of the 
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602 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government, 
Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly of Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive 
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229 
 
relationship between the UK Government and the devolved administrations.603 Under this 
provision, we find the operation of the JMC as exhibiting three themes: 
First, as noted from the quote of the Memorandum of Understanding, the scope of IGR within 
the devolution process is decidedly weak; being reliant only upon the honour of the parties, 
and being a statement of political intent, as opposed to being legally binding. Moreover, the 
essential scope of the JMC itself is designed for the consultation as opposed to the co-decision 
of the devolved administrations – a factor that in recent years has led to it receiving significant 
criticism as being a ‘talking shop’, over and above a meaningful mechanism for IGR.604 
Second, through this weak foundation, we find a distinct cultural of hierarchy within the 
provision of the JMC. Both its facilitation and agenda are the responsibility of central 
government, and as indicated in the above statement of intent, central government has no legal 
obligation to call the JMC, or to reach binding agreements. The UK Government has, instead, 
seemed to prefer to rely on bilateral relations with the devolved regions concerned – a factor 
which in itself helps to reinforce the hierarchical basis of constitutional relations between the 
centre and the periphery.605 
Third, there is the reality that the JMC, in being reliant on the will of the UK Government, has 
largely been applied only in times of constitutional crisis. Indeed, between 1998 and 2007, we 
find that the JMC failed to meet, aside from in areas of EU policy.606 It was not until the election 
of the SNP government in 2007, marking the beginnings of political incongruence between the 
UK Government and the devolved administrations, that more regular – though still far from 
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consistent – meetings of the JMC have begun to emerge.607 More recently, after the Scottish 
independence referendum, and in particular in relation to the negotiations on the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, we find a relatively regular calendar of JMC meetings. 
This reality of the JMC’s use indicates it’s importance for central government is generally 
linked to particular moments of constitutional unsettlement, as opposed to a lasting 
commitment to cooperative governance with the devolved administrations.608 In this regard, 
the practical realities of the JMC tie in heavily with the overarching logic of devolution 
identified in Part One; it is ultimately a responsive mechanism to peripheral pressures, as 
opposed to a coherently framed constitutional instrument. 
Indeed, as will become clearer through the argument in Chapter Five, the effects of – or rather 
the response of – devolution to peripheral pressures has fostered a constitutional environment 
whereby co-decision or shared rule is lacking.   
 
4.4.4. Reactive Dynamic 
The final theme of the devolution process relates to its ability to foster a reactive dynamic 
between the component parts of the United Kingdom. In considering this point, we are required 
to refocus our lens of enquiry from an investigation into the substantive construction of the 
devolution settlements, to a consideration of the wider systematic quality of devolution as a 
process. The logic underpinning this new approach is motivated by the recognition that in the 
space between each part of the territorial constitution, there exists the potential for a reactive 
dynamic, whereby changes in one part of the UK have follow-up effects in the remaining parts.  
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To some extent, this idea has already been discussed within the earlier corpus of the thesis. For 
example, it has been recognised that the emergence of the Irish Home Rule movement at the 
end of the 19th century had a significant effect in motivating the rise of home rule movements 
in Scotland and Wales.609 Moreover, in Part One of this chapter, it was demonstrated that the 
rhetoric surrounding devolution to Scotland and Wales in the 1970s, motivated an English 
response, characterised by a rise in regional feeling, particularly in those areas in the North of 
England close to Scotland.  
This thesis argues that following the introduction of devolution in 1998, these pre-existing fault 
lines of reactive potential became more pronounced. Through its ‘territorialising’ of UK 
politics,610 and the distinctly asymmetrical, bilateral and open-ended nature of its construction, 
devolution created a constitutional environment that was highly interdependent and, by result, 
increasingly volatile to changes in other parts of the territory. For Neil Walker, the reality of 
this underlying dynamic is: 
‘apt to produce a ratchet effect, with each national constituency framing its claim [for 
further autonomy] in terms of its discrete collective interests in response to a 
constitutional landscape disrupted by a sequence of previous such claims’.611   
While, in relation to Northern Ireland, specific qualification must be recognised in Walker’s 
claim, it is nonetheless hypothesised that following the introduction of devolution in 1998, the 
potential for a reactive dynamic to emerge increased significantly. In translating this hypothesis 
into a frame of theoretical enquiry, this thesis will now distinguish between two areas of 
constitutional action which have demonstrated the existence of a reactive dynamic. 
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The first area relates to the vertical relationship between central government and the devolved 
parts of the UK. In identifying the scope of reaction within this challenge, we find its 
construction located in the challenge of the devolved institutions to the pervasive doctrine of 
the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament. As noted previously, in each of the devolution 
settlements provision is made for the continuing ability of the UK Parliament to exercise its 
rights of sovereignty over the devolved administrations.  
Translated into the potential for a reactive dynamic, we find the central sustaining tenet of this 
challenge as motivated by fear in the devolved administrations that the exercise of the 
theoretical right will transpire to become a political reality. For Hadfield, this is illustrative of 
a fear not necessarily of the supremacy of the UK Parliament, but of the freedom that such 
supremacy creates to legislate on behalf of the devolved administrations; a freedom which is 
ultimately unpredictable and, at least theoretically, unchallengeable.612  
In evidencing the existence of this dynamic, we find its provision as best characterised in the 
relationship between Scotland and the UK Parliament, particularly after the election of an SNP 
government at Holyrood in 2007. More significantly, however, following the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU, the nature of this challenge has transcended to include all three devolved parts 
of the UK in opposition to the centralised ideology of the UK government613 – the essence of 
this challenge will be considered in more depth in Chapter Five.  
The second area to foster a reactive dynamic is identified in the horizontal relationship between 
the devolution settlements themselves. In framing the essence of this challenge, we find its 
personality as conditioned by the desire within the less autonomous parts of the United 
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Kingdom to play ‘catch-up’ to the leading autonomous unit – Scotland.614 In accurately framing 
this dynamic, we find its potential mode of operation as divisible between two processes.  
The first, characterised best in the example of devolution in Wales, is for that unit to seek to 
emulate the powers of the Scottish Parliament. Thus, the potential for reaction in this regard is 
motivated not necessarily by opposition to devolution in Scotland, but rather by the reliance 
on Scotland as a guide, and a legitimising point of reference for enhanced autonomy in Wales. 
To some extent, this dynamic may be summarised as having its essence in a desire to foster a 
re-symmetrising process, motivated by the desire to further the devolution process in Wales 
through reference to a Scottish precedent615 – an attempt both to further enhance self-
government in Wales, but also to correct the inefficiencies in the devolution settlement, a factor 
that, as we have seen, was particularly pronounced between 1998 and 2006.      
The second process of reaction is exemplified in the lack of devolution in England. It is argued 
that the essence of this process rests on the response in England to its perceived lack of an 
effective and independent voice in comparison to the other devolved parts of the UK; enjoying 
a distinct lack of democratic reciprocity in regards to its ability to vote on devolved 
competences – framed most generally within the title of the ‘West Lothian Question’. For 
Aughey, the gene of this English grievance emerged directly after the introduction to the rest 
of the UK in 1998: 
‘English national identity had become an urgent matter of dignity. Englishness was now 
defined in terms of what it lacked on the (questionable) assumption that everyone else 
does possess a dignified and proud national identity… The pitch of English grievance 
rises once Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland acquire institutions after New 
Labour’s election victory in 1997.’616 
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The strength of this argument is questioned by other writers, such as John Curtice and Anthony 
Heath who declare that the essence of the English challenge was slower in gathering 
momentum, and was relatively unpronounced after the initial 1998 settlement.617 However, 
regardless of the point of its emergence, we find that the essence of the reaction in England is, 
unlike Wales, framed by opposition to devolution – particularly in Scotland – due to its 
perceived effect of impeding English representation within the UK. Indeed, in illustrating the 
reality of this effect, the report of a 2013 public attitudes survey confirmed a strong sense of 
‘devo-anxiety’ in England, and a fear of England being ‘overlooked’ within the UK, 
particularly in response to the leadup to the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence.618 
Such was the strength of this dissatisfaction with the position of England within the territorial 
constitution that it ranked second on a list of constitutional issues requiring urgent attention; 
second only to the desire for a renegotiated settlement with the European Union, and far 
outweighing other domestic concerns on matters such as electoral reform, reform of the House 
of Lords, or Scottish independence.619 
Added to the significance of the reaction in England to devolution elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom, however, is the curious rejection by the majority in England of a system of 
devolution to match that of Scotland or Wales. While some political support does exist for the 
creation of an English Parliament,620 or a system of English Regions,621 and with evidence 
suggesting spikes in support for these institutions after specific constitutional moments, support 
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for English devolution remains relatively low. Moreover, following the significant rejection of 
plans for an elected regional assembly in the North East of England in 2004, devolution in 
England remains an unconvincing policy for any of the UK-wide political parties, aside from 
the Liberal Democrats.622 Indeed, current trends show the UK Government (and public 
opinion) as only supportive of a piecemeal conferral of powers to ‘combined authorities’, as 
opposed to a system of devolution comparable to that in the rest of the UK.623  
Nevertheless, in response to the clear dissatisfaction felt within England following the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum, the Prime Minister announced on the morning after the 
result that a ‘decisive answer’ would be sought to the West Lothian Question in England.624 
Six days later, on the 25th September, the Leader of the Commons, William Hague, chaired the 
first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Devolution.  
In regards to seeking a solution to the English Question, the Cabinet Committee considered 
four possible solutions, each of which had originated from the earlier findings made by a 
mixture of Parliamentary commissions or political committees.625 The overarching consensus 
within the Cabinet Committee report was to follow the recommendations made a year earlier, 
in 2013, by the McKay Commission. The aims of the McKay Commission had been set out as 
follows: 
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‘to consider how the House of Commons might deal with legislation which affects only 
part of the United Kingdom, following the devolution of certain legislative powers to 
the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly for 
Wales’.626  
While framed in the context of seeking a UK-wide solution, the implied aims of the 
Commission were to seek a solution to the West Lothian Question within the UK Parliamentary 
system. This is perhaps best evidenced in its results, which drew as their primary conclusion 
the need to rectify the lack of an English voice within the constitutional arrangements.627 The 
solution advocated by the Commission to rectify this issue was for an amendment to 
Parliamentary procedure, known most commonly as ‘English Votes for English Laws’ 
(EVEL): 
‘Decisions at the United Kingdom level with a separate and distinct effect for England 
(or for England-and-Wales) should normally be taken only with the consent of a 
majority of MPs from constituencies in England (or England-and-Wales)’.628 
The introduction of EVEL was passed by a Commons vote on the 22nd October 2015, and was 
formally introduced into Parliamentary procedure from January 2016 by way of an amendment 
to Standing Orders.629 However, as recognised by Gover and Kenny, it is unlikely that the 
provision of EVEL is a watertight solution to the reactive dynamic in England and the lack of 
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628 The McKay Commission, ‘Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of 
Commons’, (March 2013), para. 119 
629 Standing Orders 83J-83X; The scope of EVEL adds three new elements to the traditional parliamentary 
procedure. First, all new Bills must pass through a new ‘certification’ phase designed to screen for Bills coming 
before the House of Commons which concern solely English (or English and Welsh, or English, Welsh and 
Northern Irish) matters. If certification is awarded to a Bill recognised as effecting England-only matters, it then 
passes through the second element; the ‘committee’ stage, which is inserted within the existing procedure 
between Second Reading and the Report stage. At the committee stage, England only legislation is scrutinised 
by English-only MPs (this only applied to England-only matters and does not concern Bills also applying to 
Wales or Northern Ireland). Following the Report stage, the Bill then undergoes a second Certification test, and 
should it be deemed to still apply to only England (or England and Wales, or England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland) it passes to the final new phase, the Legislative Grand Committee (LGC). Under the LGC, MPs from 
the territorial regions concerned in the Bill scrutinise the Bill. After this stage, the Bill continues through the 
traditional procedure to the House of Lords. For a more detailed account, see: House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper, ‘English voted for English laws’ CBP-7339, (December 2015) 
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an English voice.630 Indeed, when read in tandem with the other themes identified above, in 
particular the acknowledgement of devolution as a process, it appears that the scope for a 
further reactive dynamic between the devolved parts of the UK and England is inevitable; 
particularly if devolution should enter a further phase of enhancement in Scotland.  
In summary, therefore, it appears that the identification of the reactive dynamic in the 
devolution process offers a useful insight into the ideological maelstrom currently existing 
within the territorial constitution. Riding this theme further, the final section of this chapter 
will now move to consider the competing ideological conceptions of the territorial constitution 
that have emerged in tandem to the devolution process. 
 
4.5. Competing Claims of Power and Authority 
In summary, it has thus far been argued that the advent of devolution in 1998 stemmed from a 
delicate balance of realpolitik concessions and democracy promotion, measured against – and 
tailored to reflect – the strength of cultural identity across the component parts of the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, it has also been demonstrated that in the years after 1998, devolution has 
been significantly enhanced through the staged transfer of further powers from central 
government to the periphery. This recognition of devolution as a process, and in particular the 
effects that this process has had in enhancing the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland after 1998, raises the question of its impact upon the balance of power, 
and the arrangement of sovereignty, within the territorial constitution.  
Assisting in the formulation of an answer to this question, we find a useful framework for 
theoretical investigation provided by Martin Loughlin. For Loughlin, the essential criteria in 
                                                          
630 Gover, D., and Kenny, M., ‘Finding the good in EVEL: An evaluation of “English Votes for English Laws” 
in the House of Commons’, Centre on Constitutional Change, (November 2016), p. 37 
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understanding the construction of sovereignty within a constitutional system lies in the 
separation of its corpus into two parts; ‘both an expression of official power and… the product 
of a political relationship’.631 In explaining this distinction, Loughlin relies upon two labels; 
competence – the expression of official power – and capacity – the product of the political 
relationship between the citizen and the state.632 Further explanation of these terms can be 
provided as follows: 
In regards to the identification of competence within a constitutional system, Loughlin frames 
its tenets as primarily legal in nature, and relatable to the institutional and absolute authority of 
a state to enact a system of laws: 
‘In a technical jurisdictional sense, competence reflects both internal coherence (that is, 
the existence of a viable system of rule) and external independence (the identity of the 
state as an entity in the international arena)’.633 
Constructed internally, the identification of competence in the UK in this sense, relates not to 
the ‘competences’ of the devolved institutions as provided for under the relevant legislation, 
but to the overarching legal authority of the UK Parliament to legislate on behalf of the 
devolved parts of the UK without legally having to receive their consent.634 Framed 
substantively, therefore, the question of competence is relatable to the reading of sovereignty 
as the absolute, unitary and supreme authority to act in any situation.635  In translating this 
principle to the United Kingdom, we find its articulation best displayed through the pervasive 
Diceyan tome of the legislative supremacy of Parliament; Parliament has the ‘right to make or 
                                                          
631 Loughlin, M., The Idea of Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 84 
632 Ibid., p. 84 
633 Ibid., p. 84 
634 Significant comment is found on this principle in the recent case of R (on the application of Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Existing the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; analysis of which is contained in Chapter 5 
of this thesis.  
635 Bellamy, R., ‘Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy 
and Rights within the EU’, in Walker. N. (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp.167-189 at 
175 
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unmake any law’ with ‘no person or body… having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament’.636  
The relatively straightforward construction of Loughlin’s first principle, however, becomes 
distinctly more nuanced when read in tandem with the identification of the capacity to act 
within constitutional systems. For Loughlin, the efficacy of this second principle seems not to 
suggest a substantive challenge to the justiciability of legal competence, but rather a more 
abstract political challenge which calls into question the legitimacy of the locus of sovereign 
competence to act in accordance with the views of its citizens.637 Reflectively, the limits of this 
second principle are translatable to what T. H. Jones cogently described as, ‘what is legally 
possible may not be constitutionally or practically achievable’.638 
Against the present construction of the devolution process, this thesis argues that it is this 
second principle which poses the most significant challenge to the established constitutional 
order. As has already been recognised, the frame of legal competence within the territorial 
constitution is both theoretically and substantively still reliant upon the Diceyan interpretation. 
However, through a combination of realpolitik conditions and functional realities, the 
devolution process has ushered in a new wave of constitutional thought which challenges the 
Diceyan orthodoxy.  
This section of the chapter will now chart these challenges in two parts; the first challenge 
relates to the reconfigured ideological interpretations of the balance of power within the 
territorial constitution, and the second relates to the substantive and functional challenges posed 
by the devolution settlements themselves. This section of the chapter will then conclude with 
                                                          
636 Dicey, A. V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982), p. 
3-4; Loughlin, M., The Idea of Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 84 
637 Loughlin, M., The Idea of Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 85 
638 Jones, T. H., ‘Devolution and Sovereignty’, Statute Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2012), pp. 151-162 at 153 
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a discussion as to whether or not these challenges have ushered in a new constitutional reality, 
or have maintained the constitutional orthodoxy of the UK as a unitary state. 
 
4.5.1. The Union State View 
The nature of the first challenge relates to the ideological framing of the United Kingdom as a 
‘union state’ or ‘state of unions’. As identified in Chapter One of this thesis, the crux of this 
interpretation lies in the history of the UK as a gradual coming together of independent political 
units to form a legal unitary state, but with the continuation of certain rights of peripheral 
autonomy.639 Fundamental to this interpretation is the idea of the retained pre-Union legacies 
of each of the component parts of the UK, which by effect frames the UK as both a multi-
national, but also a never fully unified state, both culturally or institutionally. In this regard, it 
is argued that the ideological basis of this challenge poses two distinct problems to the 
interpretation and arrangement of power and authority within the territorial constitution.  
First, through the historical recognition of the UK as a ‘state of unions’, there is the implied 
acknowledgement, from the perspective of nationalist groups, that sub-state entities entered the 
state as ‘national societies’.640 The significance of this idea can be interpreted from two 
perspectives. On the one hand, through the recognition of the continued cultural distinctiveness 
of certain sections of the polity there is, as identified previously, a high degree of democratic 
legitimacy afforded to arguments for sub-state autonomy.641 On the other hand, and as 
evidenced in the case of Scotland, the continuation of certain pre-union rights and 
infrastructures, as well as the Scottish interpretation of the Union as a coming together of 
                                                          
639 Reference to the UK as a ‘unitary state’ in this context applies to the legal reading of sovereignty maintained 
at the level of central government and does not include the wider political interpretation offered by the ‘state of 
unions’. 
640 Tierney, S., Constitutional Law and National Pluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 6-7 
641 Parks, J., and Elcock, H., ‘Why do regions demand autonomy?’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 
3, (2000), pp. 87-106 
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‘equals’, there is the assumption of a reinterpreted perspective on the balance of power and the 
political legitimacy to argue separately from the logic of the central state.  
The essence of this second perspective was referenced in the case of MacCormick v Lord 
Advocate, in which Lord Cooper produced the following remark in regard to the converse 
interpretation of the balance of power and authority within the Union;  
‘The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English 
principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law… Considering that 
the Union legislation extinguished the Parliaments of Scotland and England and 
replaced them by a new Parliament, I have difficulty in seeing why it should have been 
supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar 
characteristics of the English Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all 
that happened in 1707 was that the Scottish representatives were admitted to the 
Parliament of England’.642 
In considering this position, we find that the second part of the ideological challenge relates to 
its furtherance through the vehicle of institutional recognition in the shape of the devolution 
settlements. As Keating reminds us, through the institutionalisation of the Scottish Parliament, 
the pre-devolution arguments of the Scottish National Party became enhanced within an 
institutional frame: 
‘nationalists have been arguing that it is the heir of the old Scots Parliament and thus 
of an element of original sovereignty’.643  
Moreover, the settlements underpinning devolution in both Scotland and Wales receive 
heightened significance through their validation and legitimisation by way of popular 
referendums. Indeed, it may be argued that through the provision for referendums to justify the 
creation of – and in Wales further transfer of power to – the devolution settlements, a strong 
measure of accompanying political capacity is to be seen as also being transferred.  
                                                          
642 MacCormick v Lord Advocate [1953] SC 396, 411 
643 Keating, M., ‘Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereignty Order’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. 
53, No. 4, (2002), pp. 351-365 at 363 
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Framed from an ideological or theoretical perspective, the institutionalisation of this challenge 
has the effect of what Augey describes as a reconditioned understanding of the logic of 
Britishness. For Aughey, the interpretation of power within the Union was traditionally 
sustained from the view of the United Kingdom as a solidarity pact, whereby decisions are read 
from a UK-wide perspective. However, following the introduction of devolution, Aughey notes 
how the perspective of the Union changed when viewed from the periphery – increasingly 
being seen as a contract, whereby the terms of the Union can be renegotiated at any time, and 
the ultimate future of the constitution rests on the will of the citizens concerned.644 
Reflectively, we find a comparative analysis of this new ideological frame with the view of 
devolution as a process. Under the gradual thickening of the legislative competence of the 
devolved administrations, we find an accompanying rise in the calls for further devolution – a 
matter which is made more significant by its reliance on the political capacity transferred to 
the devolved administrations via the initial 1998 referendums.  
 
4.5.2. Functional Division of Power 
So far, we have seen how peripheral reinterpretations of the territorial constitution raise 
significant political questions as to the locus of sovereign competence. Under this second 
challenge, we will consider the transformation of the ideological challenge into a functional 
challenge – whereby the devolution settlements translated the ideological argument into a 
functional reality. In this regard we may divide this challenge between two frames: 
 
The Permanence of Devolution 
                                                          
644 Aughey, A., ‘The Future of Britishness’, in Hazell, R., (ed.) Constitutional Futures Revisited: Britain’s 
Constitution to 2020, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 90-105 at 91-93 
243 
 
It is argued that the first aspect of the functional challenge relates to the recent 
acknowledgement within the devolution settlements that the devolved administrations are 
permanent elements of the UK’s constitutional architecture. As already identified, in Scotland 
and Wales, this became enshrined through legislative provision in 2016 and 2017 respectively, 
whereby it was guaranteed that the settlements could not be abolished without the popular 
support of the devolved nations concerned.645 
In framing this provision as a distinct challenge, we find its existence as significant for two 
reasons. First, it is argued that through the inclusion of such provision in the devolution 
settlements, the UK Government makes the implied recognition that the introduction of 
devolution has, to an extent, altered the normative understanding – or at least the theoretical 
structure – of the territorial constitution. Fundamental to this argument is the understanding 
that devolution has installed an irreversible transfer of political power to the periphery: 
‘It is in constitutional theory alone that the supremacy of Parliament is preserved. Power 
devolved, far from being power retained, as implied by constitutional theory, will be 
power transferred, as dictated by political reality; and it will not be possible to recover 
that power except under pathological circumstances, such as those of Northern Ireland 
after 1968.’646 
This leads us onto the second aspect of the challenge, being that the Scottish Parliament and 
Government – with a similar provision being made in Wales647 – are not to be abolished without 
the consent of the people of Scotland, voting in a referendum.648 Thus, while the subtle nuance 
must be acknowledged between amend and abolish, it is clear that the overarching existence 
of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales is acknowledged by the UK 
Government as being protected by a popular veto. Conclusively, therefore, from a theoretical 
                                                          
645 Scotland Act 2016, s.63A; Wales Act 2017, s.A1 
646 Bogdanor, V., ‘Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration?’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2, 
(April 1999), pp. 185-194 at 187 
647 Government of Wales Act 2006, s.A1(3) 
648 Scotland Act 1998, s.63A(3) 
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perspective, devolution has created an environment whereby the construction of the UK’s 
territorial constitution is no longer assumed as unitary from a territorial perspective, and has 
entered an age whereby the UK has increasingly come to be recognised as a multi-level polity.  
 
The Sewel Convention 
The second aspect of the functional challenge relates to the operation of the Sewel Convention 
within the devolution settlements. As with the provision in relation to the permanence of the 
devolution settlements, the Sewel Convention received symbolic recognition in 2016 when it 
was embodied within the text of the Scotland Act (followed a year later by an almost identical 
provision in the Wales Act 2017649): 
‘But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament’.650 
Under this construction, we find two crucial elements in the definition of the Convention. The 
first element relates to the substantive political issue of the convention as providing that the 
UK Government will no normally legislative on behalf of the devolved administrations without 
their consent. From a matter of pure constitutional analysis, we find this to be a relatively weak 
element of constitutional provision. For example, when compared against the legislative 
restriction on the UK Parliament in regards to the Dominions, as framed under the Statute of 
Westminster, we find the Sewel Convention to be distinctly lacking in certainty and substance:  
‘No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this 
Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that 
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, 
and consented to, the enactment thereof’.651 
                                                          
649 Wales At 2017, s.2; becoming: s. 107(6) Government of Wales Act 2006 
650 Scotland Act 2016, s.2; becoming: s.28(8) Scotland Act 1998 
651 Statute of Westminster 1931, s.4 
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However, while acknowledging the relative weakness of the Sewel Convention from the 
perspective of it being a substantive element of constitutional practice, it is argued that the true 
essence of the Convention, as translatable to a constitutional challenge, comes by way of its 
symbolic significance. Under this second element of the Convention, it must be acknowledged 
that the essence of this argument will be reflected upon more in Chapter Five, however, at this 
stage, it is important to note that through its provision in the devolution settlements, the Sewel 
Convention has assumed a position as a distinctive instrument in defining the limits of UK 
Parliamentary authority over the devolved administrations.  
 
4.5.3. Quasi-Federal? 
As a summative point, this final section of the chapter will now consider as to what extent the 
challenges outlined above have resulted in a fundamental shift in the normative understanding 
of the arrangement of competence and capacity within the territorial constitution. As framed 
above, the challenges presented by the devolution process have had significant effects upon the 
territorial constitution; calling into question the legitimacy of the UK Parliament to act in 
contrivance of the democratic will of the periphery, and the translatability of this challenge into 
the reality of the functional limitations it places upon the rights of the UK Parliament to exercise 
its sovereignty authority against the devolved parts of the UK.   
In recognition of these challenges, several academic accounts have come to attribute devolution 
as transforming the traditional unitary interpretation of the territorial constitution of UK into 
something akin to a ‘quasi-federal’ union.652 Indeed, as argued by Rick Rawlings, devolution 
                                                          
652 Bogdanor, V., ‘Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration?’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2, 
(April 1999), pp. 185-194 at 187; Some, such as Baroness Hale, go further in identifying the UK as a ‘federal 
state’, Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, ‘The Supreme Court in the UK Constitution’, A Lecture Delivered 
at the Legal Wales Conference, 12 October 2012, <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121012.pdf> 
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is ‘a slippery concept which is de facto not dissimilar from federalism’.653 For Ronald Watts, 
the UK after devolution evolved into a ‘decentralised union with some federal features’.654  
However, in interpreting the UK as bearing similarity to, or shifting towards a federal system, 
it is first necessary to recognise that the currents underpinning the last two decades of 
constitutional change are not, in themselves, new. Indeed, as noted by Livingstone in 1952, the 
existence of legislative devolution in Northern Ireland; the system of administrative devolution 
in Scotland; the lack of legal opposition from central government to the possibility of the 
secession of Northern Ireland or Scotland; and the likely opposition to any action by central 
government to recentralise power from the periphery, all presumed the existence of a 
significant degree of federal thought within the United Kingdom.655 
Revisiting Livingstone’s observations in light of the above discussion on devolution post-1998, 
we find that the legislative devolution in Northern Ireland has been accompanied by a Scottish 
Parliament and a Welsh Assembly; the statutory recognition exists of the right for Northern 
Irish secession from the Union, and reunification with the Republic of Ireland; a referendum 
on Scottish independence was legally provided for by central government in 2014; the Sewel 
Convention and the permanence of the devolution settlements are on a statutory footing; and 
the opposition of the devolved administrations to recentralisation by central government 
continues.  
In summary, therefore, we find that devolution post-1998 has enhanced the shifting tide of the 
constitutional order towards a distinctly more decentralised system of government. To attribute 
this to a formal shift towards federalism, however, would be premature. Rather, instead of 
                                                          
653 Rawlings, R., Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National Devolution, 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), p. 2 
654 Watts, R., ‘Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s’, (Kingston, Ontario: Queens University, 1996), p. 12 
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providing for a distinct shift in the binary framing of the UK’s territorial constitution from a 
unitary to a federal system, devolution provides for a more nuanced recalibration of the 
ideology underpinning the formal constitutional structure. Indeed, as noted above, the United 
Kingdom remains, at the very least theoretically, a unitary state, with a sovereign Parliament 
at Westminster. 
The nuance of this observation is that the theoretical distinction is accompanied by the political 
reality in the underlying currents of the territorial constitution in a move towards a politically 
federal polity, which by sheer weight of the transfer of capacity towards the periphery, calls 
into question the legitimacy of the theoretical construction of sovereignty competence in 
central government: 
‘As time passes, and as devolution is woven ever more closely into the constitutional 
fabric of the United Kingdom, the theoretical ability of the U.K. Parliament to interfere 
unilaterally with devolved matters will be seen increasingly as a vestige of an 
unreconstructed doctrine of absolute legislative authority’.656 
The ability of this transfer to lead the UK towards a federal system will be discussed in depth 
in Chapter Five. At this point, however, it remains necessary to characterise the devolution 
settlements as ushering in a period of unsettlement into the constitutional order, which while 
perhaps not indicative of a normative change, raises significant political questions as to the 
arrangement of power and authority within the Union.  
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented the argument that devolution is a reactive mechanism of 
constitutional change. Through consideration of the four component parts of the UK, we have 
found that devolution – and the absence of devolution – emerged as a response to the level of 
                                                          
656 Elliott, M., ‘United Kingdom: Parliamentary sovereignty under pressure’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, No 3, (2004), pp. 545-554 at 554 
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political instability and strength of cultural feeling within these parts of the UK. 
Correspondingly, under the logic of devolution as a reactive and measured device of 
constitutional reform, it has been demonstrated that the system of devolution that emerged out 
of the 1998 settlements was characterised by four key themes: being asymmetrical, bi-lateral, 
a process and, as a result of these factors, a mechanism of constitutional change ripe for 
fostering a reactive dynamic between the component parts of the territorial constitution.  
Moving forward, the debate in the next chapter will take these themes and analyse the current 
state of devolution in regards to the Brexit process.  
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Chapter 5 
Brexit and the Territorial Constitution 
 
The previous chapter argued that the devolution process has created a number of themes that 
have served to unbalance and unsettle the territorial constitution of the UK; asymmetry, 
bilateralism, open-ended, reactive and competing ideologies on power and authority. This 
chapter seeks to develop these themes – on a UK-wide basis – and apply them to the recent 
events associated with the rubric of the ‘Brexit’ process. This chapter will identify the 
challenges posed to the territorial constitution by the Brexit process, and possible solutions for 
the future mediation of these challenges in delivering a scenario of constitutional settlement.   
 
5.1. Introduction 
On the 23rd June 2016, the electorate of the United Kingdom (UK) voted, by a margin of 51.9 
to 48.1 per cent, to leave the European Union (EU). While not expressly legally binding, the 
referendum decision was read in realpolitik terms as an irrevocable mandate upon the UK 
Government to formally declare its intention to withdraw from the EU. Although significant 
from an external perspective, this chapter argues that the process of the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU – hereinafter ‘Brexit’657 – has raised a number of equally significant challenges within 
the territorial constitution of the UK.  
In addressing these challenges, this chapter takes a UK-wide approach in analysing the political 
and constitutional issues connected to the Brexit process, and their reception in each of the four 
component parts of the UK. In pursuing this approach, however, it is also important to 
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acknowledge the limitations affecting the equal application of a UK-wide analysis in relation 
to Brexit. This is due to the fact that, like devolution, the organisation of substantive political 
opinion on the Brexit process is affected by the double asymmetry of the territorial constitution. 
While a wealth of primary resources remain available in regards to the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments, the collapse of the Northern Ireland executive in January 2017, and the absence 
of devolution in England, has limited the range of primary materials available in relation to 
these parts of the UK. Therefore, elements of the UK-wide analysis in this chapter will, by 
necessity, be traced through analysis of the rhetoric and policy of the UK Government, 
representing the interests of Northern Ireland and England. 
With these considerations in mind, the structure and analysis of this chapter is divided into two 
parts. Part One will deal with the substantive political and constitutional challenges that have 
emerged within the territorial constitution as a result of the Brexit process. Focussing 
specifically on the constitutional aspects of these challenges, this part of the chapter will begin 
by analysing two of the key constitutional events that have emerged in response to Brexit – the 
Miller case and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 – and will then move to consider 
the wider political challenges associated with the competing constitutional ideologies between 
the UK Government and the devolved administrations on these issues. This part of the chapter 
will conclude with the recognition that overarching all three of these issues lies the concern of 
ensuring the equality and security of the devolution settlements within the territorial 
constitution.  
In recognition of these two points of concern in relation to the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution, Part Two of the chapter will then seek to investigate the possible solutions 
available for rebalancing the territorial constitution by ensuring the equality and security of the 
devolution settlements – as well as making allowances for an English political voice. The 
debate in this part of the chapter will fall upon discussion of the rubric of ‘federalism’ as a 
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category for constitutional change. The debate on this issue will be divided into two sections, 
separating analysis between the institutional and normative interpretations of the federal idea.  
In pursuing this approach, this chapter seeks to contribute to answering the central research 
question of this thesis by reframing the normative and theoretical arguments made in the 
previous four chapters, and applying their findings to the contemporary events of the Brexit 
process. Through adopting this line of investigation, this chapter will provide an up to date 
account of the effects of the Brexit process upon the dynamics of devolution and the territorial 
constitution, as well as providing possible solutions for future reform.  
 
5.2. Brexit and Devolution: Three Challenges to the Constitutional Order 
This Part of the chapter argues that the process for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has 
produced three political events that have come to challenge the settlement of the territorial 
constitution, across each of the four component parts of the UK.  
 
5.2.1. The Miller Case 
The first substantive constitutional challenge to arise as a result of the UK’s decision to leave 
the EU came in the form of the Miller case. The main question for the Supreme Court in this 
case – on appeal658 – was as to whether or not the UK Government could rely on its foreign 
affairs prerogative to notify the European Council of its intention to withdraw, or whether the 
formal consent of Parliament was required before such notice could be served. 
By way of a brief summary of the main facts of the case, the argument made by the UK 
Government was that under the well-established position of the foreign affairs prerogative, 
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notice of withdrawal was able to be sent to the European Council without the formal consent 
of Parliament.659 The chief elements of this argument hinged on what some have come to term 
the ‘May doctrine’660 – based on the assumption that the responsibility for the ‘implementation, 
delineation and definition’ of Brexit is the sole responsibility of the UK Government.661  
The case put forward by the Respondents was that the serving of notice to the EU without the 
legislative consent of Parliament would override the advisory nature of the referendum, and 
would begin an ‘irreversible’ course of action.662 Moreover, as the UK had entered the 
European Union – then the European Community – by way of parliamentary assent to the 
European Communities Act 1972, it  would require an additional Act of Parliament in order to 
provide the constitutional prerogative for the UK to withdraw: 
‘it would be tantamount to altering the law by ministerial action, or executive decision, 
without prior legislation, and that would not be in accordance with our law.’663 
On the 24th January 2017, by a majority verdict of eight to three, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favour of the Respondents, thus requiring the UK Government to seek the legislative consent 
of Parliament before issuing notice upon the European Council of its intention to withdraw 
from the EU: 
‘We cannot accept that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be 
achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution 
recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.’664 
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In response to the judgement, David Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, introduced the European Union (Intention to Withdrawal) Bill into Parliament on the 
26th January 2017.665 The Bill received Royal Assent on the 16th March 2017,666 and notice of 
the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU was delivered to the European Commission 
President, Donald Tusk, on the 29th March 2017.667 The ‘Brexit’ process had now formally 
begun.  
In addition to its ruling on the legislative authority of the UK Parliament, the decision in the 
Miller case also had a significant effect on the territorial constitution. Running parallel to the 
main question of the requirement of consent from the UK Parliament was the additional 
question as to whether or not the UK Government would be required to seek the consent of the 
devolved administrations, via a legislative consent motion. The Supreme Court addressed this 
question in two parts:  
First, in considering the appeal by the Lord Advocate of Northern Ireland from the Belfast High 
Court case of McCord v Agnew,668 the UK Supreme Court was asked to consider as to whether 
or not the decision to leave the EU undermined the provision of the Good Friday Agreement. 
This issue fell upon the scope of section 1(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 whereby, as 
outlined in Chapter Four,669 provision is made for the requirement of the ‘consent’ of the people 
of Northern Ireland regarding matters pertaining to constitutional change of the future of 
Northern Ireland as part of the UK.  
                                                          
665 The Guardian, ‘Brexit: government publishes bill to trigger article 50’, 26 January 2017, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/26/brexit-bill-mps-will-get-five-days-to-debate-article-50-
plans> (Accessed: 28/06/18) 
666 Becoming: European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 
667 The Independent, ‘Article 50 letter: Read Theresa May's full message to the EU as Brexit begins’, 29 March 
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669 Chapter 4 
254 
 
The argument put forward by the Lord Advocate of Northern Ireland on this point was two-
fold. First, the scope of the provision for the ‘consent’ of the people of Northern Ireland on 
constitutional change extends to the decision to leave the EU, as membership of the EU forms 
a key element of the Good Friday Agreement.670 This leads onto the second point, which related 
to the provisions made in the devolution settlements that restrict the devolved administrations 
from legislating contrary to EU Law. It was argued that this provision carried with it the implied 
requirement that the UK would remain within the EU.671  
In response to the first question, the Supreme Court summarised its position as follows: 
‘In our view, this important provision, which arose out of the Belfast Agreement, gave 
the people of Northern Ireland the right to determine whether to remain part of the 
United Kingdom or to become part of a united Ireland. It neither regulated any other 
change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland nor required the consent of a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
from the European Union.’672 
The decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, weighed in favour of the UK Government, and 
pronounced the notice for withdrawal as not amounting to an act of constitutional amendment 
warranting a referendum under the s.1(2) Northern Ireland Act 1998. In response to the second 
question, the Supreme Court declared its position as follows: 
‘Accordingly, the devolved legislatures do not have a parallel legislative competence 
in relation to withdrawal from the European Union. The EU constraints are a means by 
which the UK Parliament and government make sure that the devolved democratic 
institutions do not place the United Kingdom in breach of its EU law obligations. The 
removal of EU constraints on withdrawal from the EU Treaties will alter the 
competence of the devolved institutions unless new legislative constraints are 
introduced. In the absence of such new restraints, withdrawal from the EU will enhance 
the devolved competence.’673 
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In identifying that the removal of EU constraints from the devolution settlements would alter 
the competence of the devolved institutions, the Supreme Court then went on to consider the 
next part of its question on the role of the devolved administrations in the Brexit process; 
whether or not the consent of the devolved institutions would be required as specified under 
the Sewel Convention.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the operative scope of the Sewel Convention was framed so that 
the UK Parliament will not normally legislate in regard to devolved matters without first 
seeking the consent of the devolved institutions.674 This was given additional significance in 
the period immediately before the Miller case, whereby the Convention became enshrined in 
section two of the Scotland Act 2016 – and was, at the time of judgement, undergoing its final 
Parliamentary phase in the case of clause two of the Wales Bill.   
In delivering its judgement on this issue, we find that the Supreme Court failed to provide a 
definitive answer on the overall scope of the Convention. Rather, it opted instead to declare on 
the non-justiciability of the Sewel Convention as a political rule, lying outside of the remit of 
the Courts. The decision was summarised as follows: 
‘Judges therefore are neither the parents nor the guardians of constitutional 
conventions; they are merely the observers. As such, they can recognise the operation 
of a political convention in the context of deciding a legal question… but they cannot 
give legal rulings on its operation or scope, because those matters are determined within 
the political world.’675 
After outlining its position, the Supreme Court then went further into ruling on the significance 
of the statutory recognition of the Sewel Convention in the Scotland Act 2016 and, as was its 
status at the time of the ruling, the Wales Bill.676 The Court concluded that the decision to 
enshrine the Sewel Convention into statute did not amount to an intention on the part of the 
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Miller. 
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UK Government to create a legally enforceable rule but, instead, merely enshrined the 
Convention – in almost identical wording – into statute: 
‘the UK Parliament is not seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which 
can be interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts; rather, it is recognising the 
convention for what it is, namely a political convention, and is effectively declaring 
that it is a permanent feature of the relevant devolution settlement.’677 
The conclusion of the Supreme Court, therefore, was that from a legal perspective, the 
operation of the Sewel Convention was non-justiciable, and thus lay outside of the discretion 
of the Courts. To some observers, this amounted to little in the way of a watershed moment, 
and merely confirmed what was already understood as the legal reality of the Sewel 
Convention; ‘delaying’ as opposed to ‘settling’ the issue at hand on the nature of the overall 
power of the Convention.678 This was complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision to leave 
the question of the political scope of the Convention open to interpretation: 
‘In reaching this conclusion we do not underestimate the importance of constitutional 
conventions, some of which play a fundamental role in the operation of our constitution. 
The Sewel Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious relationships 
between the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures. But the policing of its scope 
and the manner of its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the 
judiciary, which is to protect the rule of law.’679 
In summary, therefore, the decision in Miller can be viewed as answering only half of the 
question on the operative scope of the Sewel Convention. Confirming, on the one hand, that 
the Convention did not affect the legal competence of the UK Parliament to legislate on behalf 
of the devolved administrations. But, on the other hand, leaving open the question as to the 
scope of its effect on the political capacity of the UK Parliament to do so, contrary to the will 
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of the devolved administrations. In this regard, this thesis argues that the decision in Miller 
highlighted two issues in relation to the overall dynamics in the territorial constitution.  
First, through its recognition of the pervasive nature of the legislative supremacy of the UK 
Parliament, the decision in Miller limited the implied theoretical understanding of the 
devolution process as a gradual ‘federalizing’ action, and instead reconfirmed the UK as – in 
legal terms – a unitary state.680 In this regard, it is argued that the decision in Miller amounted 
to little in the way of a watershed moment, and merely reconfirmed the legal orthodoxy of the 
legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament. From a political perspective, however, this thesis 
argues that the decision delivered a symbolic re-grounding of devolution as a subordinate form 
of territorial governance. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, by ruling against the judicial enforceability of the 
Sewel Convention, the decision also highlighted the vulnerability of the devolution settlements 
when framed against the legal supremacy of the UK Parliament. The significance of this issue 
lies in its potential to foster a reactive dynamic on the part of the devolved administrations, 
whereby through the realisation of their inability to protect themselves in times of constitutional 
crisis, they may subsequently demand increased autonomy from the centre in an effort to 
increase the guarantees of their defence in future.681  
In this regard, as we will see in the later discussion in this chapter, the true significance of the 
Miller case lies more in its legacy than in the corpus of its judgement. In explaining this point, 
we find that while Miller was significant in ruling on the non-legal nature of the Sewel 
Convention, the overarching effect of the case has been to highlight – or reconfirm – anxieties 
                                                          
680 Keating, M., ‘Brexit and Devolution in the United Kingdom’, Politics and Governance, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
(2017), pp. 1-3 at 3 
681 Burrows, N., and Fletcher, M., ‘Brexit as a constitutional “shock” and its threat to the devolution settlement: 
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in the devolved parts of the UK relating to the limited extent of their legal rights when faced 
with an uncompromising UK Government.   
 
5.2.2. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
The second constitutional challenge to arise as a result of the Brexit process, relates to the 
formal legislative procedure for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU: the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018. When first introduced into the House of Commons on the 13th July 
2017, the preamble to the Bill declared its purpose to be to ‘repeal the European Communities 
Act 1972’682 – thus ending the supremacy of EU law in the UK.683  
However, owing to the voluminous catalogue of EU law implemented in the UK, and the desire 
for a smooth transition in the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the Bill also sought to create a 
new category of ‘retained EU law’, converting all existing EU law in the UK into domestic 
legislation. The logic behind this decision was largely functional:  
‘As powers are repatriated from the EU, it will be important to ensure that stability and 
certainty is not compromised, and that the effective functioning of the UK single market 
is maintained… Our guiding principle will be to ensure that no new barriers to living 
and doing business within our own Union are created as we leave the EU.’684 
In seeking to prevent the emergence of any new barriers to living and doing business within 
the UK, the Bill outlined that the majority of EU competences would be repatriated back to the 
UK Government as opposed to the devolved administrations. This was largely designed for the 
creation of new regulatory mechanisms on a UK-wide level – thus securing the stability of the 
UK’s internal market after Brexit. Its reception by the devolved administrations, however, was 
                                                          
682 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, s.1, (as first introduced 13th July 2017) 
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immediately critical, with a joint-statement by the Welsh and Scottish First Ministers,685  
released on the same day as the Bill was introduced into Parliament, declaring it to be a ‘naked 
power grab’ and ‘an attack on the founding principles of devolution’.686 
The substantive basis for the devolved administrations criticism of the Bill was primarily aimed 
at Clauses 10 and 11 (as first introduced). Under Clause 11, the competences of the devolution 
settlements would be altered, replacing the existing provision restricting legislation contrary to 
EU Law,687 with a provision restricting legislation contrary to the new category of ‘retained 
EU law’.688  
Under Clause 10, giving effect to Schedule 2, the devolved administrations would assume the 
power to rectify deficiencies in ‘retained EU law’ via subordinate legislation. However, the 
scope of this ability would be limited to regulations in areas where the devolved administrations 
enjoy legislative competence in every provision of the matter.689 In all other instances, the 
devolved administration would be required to work with, or seek the consent of, a UK 
Government Minister.690 Moreover, through the nature of repatriated competences, the UK 
Government would enjoy legislative competence in those areas overlapping with devolved 
competence, but are not within the exclusive competence of the devolved administrations.691  
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On this point, the requirement for the UK Government to seek legislative consent from the 
devolved administrations on the passage of such subordinate legislation was also unclear. The 
result was to create significant anxiety – and constitutional reaction – in the devolved 
administrations as to the ability of the UK Government to unilaterally pass secondary 
legislation in matters of previously devolved competence, without any effective measure to 
prevent this from occurring on the part of the devolved administrations.   
In addition to the substance of the Bill, the Welsh and Scottish administrations also directed 
criticism towards the wider negotiation process surrounding the Bill, noting that while 
reference had earlier been made to the opportunity for discussion between the UK Government 
and the devolved administrations,692 it largely failed to materialise. On this point, the nature 
and substantive effects of the issue may be divided into two parts: 
First, the provision for cooperation on the terms of the Brexit deal was weak. Indeed, similar 
to the weak provision of intergovernmental relations highlighted in the previous chapter, the 
Brexit process further drew reference to the weak position of the Joint Ministerial Council 
(JMC) in formulating intergovernmental relations between the UK Government and the 
devolved administrations. While provision was made for the meeting of a new JMC (European 
Negotiations), its meetings have proven to be dominated by a similar characteristic to the 
preceding JMC’s693 – meeting only when required by the UK Government, and presenting little 
in the way of an ethos for cooperation or co-decision.694   
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Second, in instances where the devolved administrations raised significant concerns and 
disagreement on the terms of the Brexit negotiations – especially in relation to the above 
discussed Clauses 10 and 11 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill – there failed to emerge a genuine 
dialogue with the UK Government. Indeed, we find that it took a decided constitutional shock 
– the threatening to withhold legislative consent – in order to force the hand of the UK 
Government into a meaningful period of negotiations with the devolved administrations. 
While this led to certain concessions being granted – particularly in the reduced scope of the 
Clauses 10 and 11; implemented under s.12 of the Act695 – it failed to reach a position on which 
the Scottish Government was willing to provide legislative consent. Conclusively, on the same 
day on which the Welsh Assembly granted legislative consent to the Bill,696 the Scottish 
Parliament refused its consent697 - owing to the view that the provisions of the Bill would fail 
to provide the Scottish Parliament with a meaningful veto over the UK Parliament’s ability to 
act unilaterally in relation to the amendment of ‘retained EU law’.698    
While this amounted to a significant constitutional moment, its significance was exceeded by 
the UK Government’s decision to continue with the legislative process – passing the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill into law on the 26th June 2018. In the aftermath of this decision, the extent 
                                                          
695 Under the terms of section 12 of the Act, the blanket restriction on the devolved administrations ability to 
amend areas of ‘retained EU Law’ is lifted, though still subject to the approval of a Minister of the UK 
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of application of the Sewel Convention remains a relative empty shell. Moreover, this decision 
went against the goodwill procedures committed to by the UK Government after the Miller 
case, in promising to continue to seek the legislative consent of the devolved administrations.699 
Reflecting on this point, as well as the wider analysis contained above, we may draw two 
conclusions as to the impact of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act on the territorial 
constitution: 
First, although weakly provided for, we find evidence of the UK Government’s ability to seek 
a compromise on an issue which the devolved administrations are refusing to provide 
legislative consent. However, we find the evidence of such compromise to be weak and limited, 
motivated only by the presence of a distinct environment of constitutional unsettlement – an 
environment that is by no means indicative of a healthy, coordinate or equal sense of 
intergovernmental cooperation. In this regard, we find conformation of the idea of the UK’s 
territorial constitution as operating on a series of constitutional shocks – responding only to 
‘threats’ to the stability of the territorial constitution, as opposed to seeking a culture of genuine 
and long-lasting dialogue and cooperation. 
Second, the UK Government’s decision to continue with the legislative process and to pass the 
Act, despite the Scottish Parliament refusing its legislative consent, highlights the continuity 
of the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of the Crown in Parliament. Indeed, from analysing 
the political process surrounding the passage of the Act, we find that the devolved 
administrations have little or no security when facing the UK Government. Moreover, it also 
shows the lack of credibility in the statements made by the UK Government in regards to 
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seeking legislative consent; appearing as hollow promises as opposed to genuine commitments 
to a form of cooperative constitutionalism.   
In this regard, we find that the European Union (Withdrawal) Act provided a definitive answer 
to the question left open in the Miller case: that the overall power of the Sewel Convention is 
at all points subordinate to the final authority of the UK Government. Indeed, after the Act, we 
find that the Sewel Convention is, both legally and politically, an empty vessel – signalling a 
statement of intent, but now detached from constitutional reality. In the next section, we will 
discuss the effect that these constitutional realities have had on the devolved administrations, 
as well as the wider political environment in the devolved parts of the UK.  
 
5.2.3. The Response of the Devolved Administrations 
So far, the argument in this chapter has demonstrated how the constitutional events of the 
Miller case and the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, have highlighting the 
subordinate and insecure position of the devolution settlements. It has also noted how the 
devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales were on the opposing side to the UK 
Government on both matters, and have consistently held a line of constitutional opinion that 
counters the ‘solidarity’700 argument of the UK Government. In this section, we will chart the 
wider themes of disagreement in the dynamics of the territorial constitution, relating to the 
more general terms of the Brexit process.  
In this analysis, the focus will turn away from the substantive issue connected to the Miller 
case and the EU (Withdrawal) Act, and will instead focus on the political issues associated 
with Brexit in each of the four component parts of the UK. This analysis will consist of a focus 
                                                          
700 Aughey, A., ‘The Future of Britishness’, in Hazell, R., (ed.) Constitutional Futures Revisited: Britain’s 
Constitution to 2020, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 90-105 at 91-93 
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on the response of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, as well as consideration 
of the wider political rhetoric shown in Northern Ireland and England – both of which, due to 
their territorial circumstances, have come to be represented in Brexit proceeds by the UK 
Government at Westminster.  
In beginning this analysis, it is important to consider what is perhaps the central source of such 
unsettlement: the referendum vote itself. As already stated, the United Kingdom, taken as a 
whole, voted to Leave the European Union on the 23rd June 2016. The attitude of the UK 
Government to this vote was to frame it as a simple UK-wide majority, incapable – or 
underserving – of distinction between its internal parts, and exercisable through the sole 
authority of the UK Government.701   
However, in adopting this approach, the UK Government chose not to acknowledge the wider 
issue of the territorial incongruity in the referendum result; whereas England and Wales had 
voted by majority to leave the EU,702 the results in Scotland and Northern Ireland had delivered 
significant votes in favour of remain.703 Reflecting this issue, we find that when read from a 
territorial perspective, only two of the four component parts of the UK voted in congruency 
with the UK-wide result; a matter that while not influencing the demographic reality of a 
majority vote in favour of leave – on a UK-wide basis – created a significant symbolism of a 
divide in the national consensus. This may be seen as significant for three reasons:   
First, it politicised the territorial divide in the UK, drawing distinction to Scotland and Northern 
Ireland as voting against the majority UK referendum result; a matter which has raised distinct 
questions for the presumed UK-wide unity expressed in the etymology of Brexit as a ‘British 
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Exit’ from the EU. Second, it provided a powerful mandate in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
for seeking recognition of the fact that only two of the four component parts of the UK voted 
to leave. Moreover, this has also created a number of issues for the Welsh and UK governments, 
both of which comprise substantial lobbies of support for remaining in the EU. Third, through 
there being devolution in three of the four component parts of the UK (and in both of those 
parts that voted to remain) the territorial incongruity of the result became an issue of 
constitutionally significance.704 In analysing the substantive challenges this raises for the 
territorial constitution, this chapter will now address the response of each of the devolved 
administrations and the UK government in turn: 
In Northern Ireland, the territorial incongruity of the result was initially matched by a joint 
statement by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister outlining their commitment to finding 
common ground and practical solutions for Northern Ireland in the Brexit process.705 Yet, just 
over a month after the statement, the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinnes resigned from 
office, leading to the subsequent dissolution of the Northern Ireland Executive.706 After this 
event, political rhetoric in Northern Ireland returned to the familiarity of the divide between 
Unionists and Nationalists.  
On the 26th June 2017, the DUP entered into an agreement with the UK Government to support 
its Brexit programme, on the express provision that Northern Ireland would not receive a 
differentiated deal to the rest of the UK.707 Conversely, the Nationalist parties in Northern 
Ireland began to mobilise in support for the defence of the political congruity of the result. On 
                                                          
704 McHarg, A., and Mitchell, J., ‘Brexit and Scotland’, The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, (2017), pp. 512-526 at 513 
705 Foster, A. and McGuinness, M., ‘Foster and McGuiness: We’re not into gimmicks or grandstanding, just 
ministers getting on with their work’, Belfast Telegraph, 21 November 2016, 
<https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/foster-and-mcguinness-were-not-into-gimmicks-or-
grandstanding-just-ministers-getting-on-with-their-work-35230868.html> (Accessed, 23/04/2016) 
706 At the time of writing this thesis, the Northern Ireland Executive remains dissolved. 
707 BBC, ‘Conservatives agree pact with DUP to support May government’, 26 June 2017, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-40403434> (Accessed: 03/09/18) 
266 
 
the 22nd September 2017, the leader of the Sinn Fein, Mary Lou McDonald, called for Northern 
Ireland’s need for ‘special status’708 in the EU, echoing earlier calls made by the SDLP leader, 
Colum Eastwood.709 In addition, the territorial incongruity of the Brexit result has also been 
translated by Sinn Fein as synonymous with a mandate for a referendum on Irish 
reunification.710 Although this has been met with consistent opposition from the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, James Brokenshire, who declared: 
 ‘We joined the Common Market in 1973 as one United Kingdom… and we will leave 
the European Union in 2019 as one United Kingdom.’711  
In Scotland and Wales, the initial approach taken by the devolved administrations was to foster 
a rare show of unity, referenceable in three ways. First, that the vote to Leave the EU did not 
translate to a mandate for leaving the Single Market and Customs Union – thus, arguing that 
while the UK may leave the EU, it must remain in the EEA.712  Second, that the repatriation of 
powers from the EU should be such that the majority of such repatriated powers – with the 
exception of certain matters of macro-economic policy – should transfer directly to the 
devolved administrations.713  Third, that the significance of this process on the rearrangement 
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712 ‘There is no basis whatsoever for the assumption that all those who voted to leave the EU also wanted to exit 
the European Single Market. Indeed, it is arguable that quite the opposite was the case – that there is simply no 
majority support for taking the UK out of the European Single Market or EU Customs Union. Membership of 
the EU and the European Single Market are, after all, quite distinct propositions.’ Scottish Government, 
‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016), para. 97; Welsh Government, ‘Securing 
Wales’ Future’ (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2017), p. 6 
713 Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016), para. 184 
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of competences would require a fundamental redrawing of the structure of the territorial 
constitution.714   
However, while maintaining similarities in overarching policies, the terms of pursuit in 
translating these objectives into political realities became significantly pronounced in the 
subsequent process, with the two administrations going their separate ways.  
The approach taken by the Scottish Government may be seen as a distinctive reflection of the 
political realities underpinning the referendum result; a majority in favour of Remain, and a 
majority SNP Government consistently at odds with the UK Government. In this regard, the 
SNP framed its demands in its white paper, Scotland’s Place in Europe, as follows:  
First, it outlined its preference for the UK as a whole to remain in the Single Market and 
Customs Union.715 Second, failing this, it presented the argument that provision should be 
made for Scotland to remain in the Single Market and Customs Union while the rest of the UK 
left – a ‘differentiated deal’ for Scotland.716 Third, as contained in the First Minister’s foreword 
to the white paper, should Scotland not be allowed to remain in the Single Market or Customs 
Union – either as part of the UK as a whole or as a differentiated deal – consideration should 
be made for a second referendum on Scottish independence: 
‘If the real and substantial risks that Brexit poses to Scotland’s interests cannot be 
mitigated within the UK, the option of choosing a better future through independence 
should be open to the Scottish people.’717 
                                                          
714 Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016), para. 172; 
Welsh Government, ‘Securing Wales’ Future’ (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2017), p. 26 
715 Ibid., para. 97-105 
716 Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016), para. 106-107; 
For a wider discussion on the form of some of the ‘differentiated deals’ discussed in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, see: Riddoch, L., and Bort, E., McSmorgasbord: What post-Brexit Scotland can learn from the Nordics, 
(Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2017); O’Leary, B., ‘The Dalraida Document: Towards a Multi-National Compromise 
That Respects Diversity in the United Kingdom’, 13 July 2016, 
<https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/papers/The%20Dalriada%20Document.pdf> 
(Accessed: 02/09/18); Hartmann, J., ‘Scotland’s Relationship with the EU after Brexit: Lessons from the 
Faroes’, 29 March 2017, <http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-4731> (Accessed: 02/09/18)   
717 Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2016), foreword by 
the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon.  
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The reality of the UK Government’s ‘one-nation’ response to Scotland’s demands, refusing the 
first and second grounds, made the prospect of an independence referendum a reality. On the 
28th March 2017, MSPs voted by 69 to 59 to back calls for a second referendum on Scottish 
independence.718 The response of the UK government was similar to its later actions in relation 
to the EU (Withdrawal) Act; the Prime Minister declared that ‘now is not the time’ for a second 
referendum, and delayed it until after the Brexit process was formally complete.  
While amounting to something of an anti-climax, we find the result of the push for a second 
independence referendum as indicative of two key points in the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution. First, it amounted to a further indication of the overarching supremacy of the UK 
Government in dictating the limits of constitutional action. Second, while disagreeing with the 
UK Government, the position of the Scottish Government remained within those demarcated 
lines, reluctantly accepting the UK Government’s decision – a matter that may be distinctly 
compared to the unconstitutional means of action taken by the Catalan Government in Spain.  
In now considering the position in Wales, we find that the approach taken by the Welsh 
Government, in conjunction with Plaid Cymru,719 was to seek to defend Welsh interests within 
the UK. To some extent, this reflects the realities of the referendum result in Wales: a majority 
in favour of Leave left the Welsh Government with a weak mandate for seeking a 
‘differentiated deal’ similar to those argued for in Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, in 
addition to this, we also find the approach in Wales was also reflective of the Welsh 
Government’s longstanding tradition of ‘unionist-nationalism’: seeking to defend Welsh 
interests, but at all times advocating for Wales to remain a part of the UK.720  
                                                          
718 BBC, ‘Scottish Parliament backs referendum call’ 28 March 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
scotland-39422747> (Accessed: 29/06/18) 
719 Plaid Cymru aided in the production of the Welsh Government’s White Paper on Brexit, Securing Wales’ 
Future.  
720 Reflective of this fact, we find that since 2014 the First Minister, Carwyn Jones, has consistently argued for a 
‘new union mindset’ – not only in relation to Wales’ relationship with central government, but on also on a UK-
wide basis – as opposed to seeking (or threatening) Welsh autonomy outside of the UK. Carwyn Jones, ‘Our 
269 
 
Illustrative of these facts, the Welsh Government’s white paper on Brexit, Securing Wales’ 
Future, while arguing for enhanced devolution for Wales, also argued for the internal reform 
of the UK toward a federal-like system. Central to these proposals were the reconfiguration of 
the existing system of intergovernmental relations and the operation of the Joint Ministerial 
Committee.721 As highlighted in Chapter Four, the current operation of intergovernmental 
relations between the UK Government and the devolved administrations is characterised by a 
hierarchical and bilateral approach – in its accompanying white paper, Brexit and Devolution, 
the Welsh Government argued for this to be reformed into a more equal and multi-lateral 
approach, advocating for the inclusion of an independent secretariat for the JMC, and for a 
qualified majority system of voting on issues in the JMC.722  
Where perhaps the essence of this challenge is transformed into an issue of divisive 
significance, is through the actions of the UK Government in response to each of the calls for 
differentiation in the Brexit process, as requested by the devolved administrations. As has 
already been argued, the nature of the devolved administrations responses to events in the 
Miller case and the EU (Withdrawal) Act, were largely motivated by the recognised inequality 
and lack of security of the devolution settlements when framed against the hegemony of the 
UK Government.   
In pursuing a political programme which has continually ignored the requests of the devolved 
administrations, relied upon the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament to 
legislate contrary to Sewel convention, and remained synonymous only with the majority of 
political opinion in England; the UK government has failed to mitigate the negative political 
dynamics in the territorial constitution, created by the Brexit process. Viewed from a UK-wide 
                                                          
Future Union: A Perspective From Wales’, Institute for Government, 15 October 2014, 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/events/keynote-speech-rt-hon-carwyn-jones-am-minister-wales-
our-future-union-%E2%80%93-perspective-wales> (Accessed: 18/04/18) 
721 Welsh Government, Securing Wales’ Future, (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2018), p. 28 
722 Welsh Government, ‘Brexit and Devolution’, (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2018), p. 18 
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perspective, it is visible that the political rhetoric associated with the Brexit process has 
increasingly come to be defined by four separate and distinct territorial perspectives – with 
ever reducing lines of UK-wide solidarity.  
 
5.2.4. Summary 
In summary, it is clear that constitutional relations in the UK are, at present, distinctly unsettled. 
While this thesis stops short of declaring this to be synonymous with a period of constitutional 
crisis, it is clearly apparent that a divide exists between the ideologies of the UK Government 
and the devolved administrations and, more broadly, between the four component parts of the 
UK. In reference to the Brexit process, this divide may be summarised in three parts: 
First, through the ideological practice of the UK Government, we find a clear demonstration 
of the lack of equality between the UK Government and the devolved administrations. Second, 
through the Miller case, and as confirmed in the rhetoric surrounding the EU (Withdrawal) Act, 
we find that the devolved administrations lack any legal security to challenge the actions of the 
UK Government. Third, in reflection of this lack of equality and security, we see the devolved 
administrations have increasingly been forced to rely upon grand constitutional strategies in an 
attempt to counter the constitutional practice of the UK Government.   
In this regard, we find that political relations in the territorial constitution have come to be 
framed by a series of constitutional moments whereby, in the absence of a constructive 
environment for reform, changes have largely only taken place in response to periods of intense 
unsettlement. To some extent, this is indicative of the wider theme identified in this thesis – 
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the historical ambivalence of the centre towards the periphery, an ambivalence that is only 
periodically reversed as a result of constitutional shocks.723 
However, to a more significant extent, it is also the realisation that while conferring self-
government to the periphery, devolution has failed to provide effective mechanisms for the 
exercise of such self-government outside of the devolved territories themselves. More 
specifically, we see that the devolved administrations have little or no say in influencing the 
direction of UK-wide policies and, in that regard, remain subject to the legal and political 
supremacy of the UK Government – containers on a ship on which they have little say in its 
destination.  
 
 
5.3. Towards a Rear-guard Defence of the Union 
In reflection upon the previous arguments in this chapter, and more broadly in this thesis, we 
find a common theme: the UK finds itself in a period of intense and prolonged constitutional 
unsettlement. In Chapter Four, it was argued that the unmapped, asymmetrical, bilateral, and 
reactive dynamics of the devolution process have created a condition that breeds unsettlement 
and disunity within the territorial constitution. In this chapter, it has so far been argued that this 
process is likely to continue for as long as the devolved administrations feel the need to seek 
equality and security within the territorial constitution – a process which is further exacerbated 
by the continuing growth of a distinct reactive dynamic of political disharmony in England, in 
response to the devolution process in the other three parts of the UK. 
                                                          
723 Burrows, N., and Fletcher, M., ‘Brexit as a constitutional “shock” and its threat to the devolution settlement: 
reform or bust’, Judicial Review, No. 1, (2017), pp. 49-57 
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In tandem with this process, we find that a number of constitutional strategies have emerged 
which call for the need – and necessity – for a system of UK-wide reform to emerge. The 
content of these “Unionising” strategies vary significantly in their argument and form; from 
substantive proposals for a new Act of Union724 recognising the permanency of devolution and 
safeguarding those powers already devolved, to a ‘Charter of the Union’, designed to capture 
the values of the Union and, more abstractly, of Britishness.725 However, perhaps the most 
significant and discussed of these proposals has been the wider idea of directing the UK 
towards a new and reconditioned constitutional structure, associated with the rubric of 
‘federalism’.   
As we have seen over the course of this thesis, ideas of federalism have a rich history in the 
ideology of constitutional reform to the UK. At intermittent stages, dating back to the Anglo-
Scottish Union of 1707, the idea of a ‘federal’ solution has formed the counterpoint to ideas of 
incorporating union or Westminster centralisation. More recently, arguments for federal-style 
reform have emerged as a token concession to sub-state nationalist groups during periods of 
political and constitutional unsettlement; first in Ireland at the turn of the 19th Century726 and, 
more recently, as a strategy in response to the rise of sub-state nationalist movements in 
Scotland and Wales.727  
                                                          
724 Constitution Reform Group, ‘Towards a New Act of Union’, Constitution Reform Group Discussion Paper, 
01 September 2015, <http://www.constitutionreformgroup.co.uk/publications/> (Accessed: 26/06/18); Kezia 
Dugdale, ‘The UK needs a new Act of Union to prevent it breaking once and for all’, Guardian, 7 December 
2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/07/uk-needs-new-act-union-stop-break-brexit-
scotland> (Accessed: 26/06/18) 
725 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, ‘A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United 
Kingdom’, (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, May 2015)  
726 Kendle, J., Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921, 
(Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1989), p. 13 
727 Hepburn, E., ‘Degrees of Independence: SNP Thinking in an International Context’, in Hassan, G., (ed.) The 
Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 190-203; a 
reconfigured union along federal lines has also been a longstanding commitment of the Liberal Democrats, 
which gained reinvigorated form after the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 Liberal Democrats, 
‘Power to the People: Policies for Political and Constitutional Reform’, Policy Paper 117, (Liberal Democrats: 
March 2014); The provision was amended (amendment F41) by an emergency motion to the Autumn 
Conference of 2014: https://www.libdems.org.uk/f41_towards_a_federal_uk (Accessed: 26/01/18)   
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Traditionally, advocacy in favour of the ‘federal’ idea, or ‘federalism’, has – at least since 
1789728 – been synonymised with a single identifiable constitutional model; the federation.  
However, this thesis argues that in order to understand federalism in its entirety, a wider frame 
of analysis must be applied to interpret it as a homonymous729 term, referring to a wider gene 
of normative political practice, capable of application across several types of constitutional 
models. A distinction between these two interpretations of the federal idea may be summarised 
as follows: 
First, as already mentioned, we find reference to the synonymous character of federalism with 
the institutional idea of the federation.730 Under this distinction, the predominant understanding 
of federalism is connected to a distinct institutional form, located midway between the absolute 
constructions of the unitary state (power concentrated at the centre) and the confederation 
(power held in the peripheral units).731  
Through this interpretation of federalism as synonymous with federation, power – and 
sovereignty – is understood as divided between two levels of government: a ‘federal’ centre, 
and two or more ‘federated’ units.732 Unlike in the case of confederation, however, the division 
of power between multiple levels of government in federation does not impede upon the 
external personality of the state. Rather, the federation forms a unified whole in the external 
perspective – being ‘sovereign’ – while maintaining a division of sovereignty internally, 
through its entrenched provisions in the constitution.733  
                                                          
728 Being the year of the ratification of the US Constitution which is commonly held as being the first mature 
example of federation.  
729 Burgess, M., ‘Federalism and Federation’, in Cini, N., (ed.) European Union Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 69-84 at 72 
730 The synonymising of federalism to the idea of the federation is a bi-product of America scholarship, whereby 
the two terms are used interchangeable. In the European tradition, greater emphasis is placed on the distinction 
between the two terms as signifying two distinct modes of constitutional identification. 
731 King, P., Federalism and Federation, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 140 
732 Ibid., p. 140 
733 In describing the arrangement of sovereignty within the Federation of the United States, Robert Keohane 
provided the following useful observation of constitutional personality of federation; ‘the constitution upholds 
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Through the second interpretation, we find federalism as applicable to a wider frame of 
theoretical and ideological interpretation, associated with ‘a marked degree of regional 
independence and autonomy.’734 Under this understanding, federalism is disassociated from 
any single institutional model and instead pertains to a broader church of theoretical enquiry 
and normative description, transcending several institutional forms.  
Reflecting this second interpretation, Daniel Elazar provided a definition of federalism as 
‘constitutionalized power-sharing through systems that combine self-rule and shared rule.’735 
This definition, which is readily understood as the most agreeable and cogent explanation of 
the theoretical personality of the idea, hones its reliance upon two distinct principles of 
constitutional action: self-rule and shared rule. While these principles are relatable to the 
already identified institutional idea of federation, the nuanced character of their construction 
also extends their application to a far broader church of systematic distinction. In demonstrating 
this, Preston King concluded: 
‘Although there may be federalism without federation, there can be no federation 
without some matching variety of federalism.’736 
Perhaps the key word to be taken from this statement is that of variety, reflecting the design of 
federalism as malleable to a number of institutional forms, and not necessarily synonymous 
with the required necessity for a strict division of sovereignty, as is characteristic of federation. 
This understanding of federalism, as a broad normative theory of description, was taken further 
by Ronald Watts, who identified a ‘spectrum of federal political systems’: 
‘a broad category of political systems in which, by contrast to the single central source 
of authority in unitary states, there are two (or more) levels of government which 
combine elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for 
                                                          
the concept of external sovereignty, but rejects the idea of unitary sovereignty.’ See; Keohane, R. O., ‘Ironies of 
Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 
(2002), pp. 743-765 
734 King, P., Federalism and Federation, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 74 
735 Elazar, D., Federalism: an overview, (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), p. 2 
736 King, P., Federalism and Federation, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 76 
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the governments of the constituent units… ranging from “quasi-federations” and 
“federations” to “confederations” and beyond.’737 
From this statement, and with consultation of the variety of systems identified within the 
spectrum,738 we may interpret the normative understanding of federalism as comprising of two 
parts: 
The first, as identified above, is to understand its form as theoretical, and not necessarily 
conforming to a single institutional model, but rather a pantheon of models, each displaying 
varying and unique constructions of the central tenets of ‘self-rule and shared rule.’  
The second, is to see its form as primarily concerned with a political mode of understanding 
the arrangement of constitutionalised power within states. While it is true that the division of 
federal powers between two levels of government, indicative of the normative understanding 
of federalism, is capable of assuming an institutionalised legal personality – as seen in the 
example of federation. It is also true to see its substance as applicable to a wider catalogue of 
institutional systems whereby the division of political power is not expressly guaranteed by a 
division of legal sovereignty, but is capable of forming a set of constitutional rules that, in 
political terms, appear similar739 to those seen under formal federation 
Following this analysis and distinction between the two interpretations of federalism, this 
chapter will now move to discuss their applicability in the UK. This will begin with a discussion 
                                                          
737 Watts, R., Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1996), p. 7 
738 For a tabled distinction of the various constitutional models within the spectrum, see; Watts, R., Comparing 
Federal Systems in the 1990s, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1996), p. 6-15 
739 For Ronald Watts, the United Kingdom historically conformed to a form of federalism through the 
institutional reality of a ‘decentralized union with some federal features.’ Watts, R., Comparing Federal Systems 
in the 1990s, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1996), p. 12; Under this construction, Watts was referring 
to the United Kingdom in both its pre- and post-1998 forms – i.e. identifying the United Kingdom as an 
institutional model sharing some features of federalism before the introduction of the devolution process, at least 
to Wales and Scotland. Inherently, Watts’ argument hinged on the identification of the United Kingdom as a 
‘union state’, which as discussed in pervious sections of this chapter, had distinct effects on the constitutional 
understanding of the United Kingdom as an asymmetrical union, dating back to the retention of certain 
administrative competences in Scotland following the Union of 1707. See Chapter 1 for a wider discussion as to 
the historical construction of the United Kingdom as a ‘union state’. 
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of the possibility of a UK Federation. This will then be followed by a discussion on the 
malleability of the broader normative idea of federalism.  
 
5.3.1. A UK Federation? 
As recognised above, federation has a particular resonance in the UK as the longstanding 
protagonist to reform of the territorial constitution. Since the debates on the Irish Question in 
the 19th Century, ideas of federation have been a steady commitment of many pro-Union 
groups, most notably the Liberal Party.740 Moreover, at intermittent stages up to the 1980s, 
ideas of federation have also held resonance with sub-state nationalist groups in Wales and 
Scotland.741 For example, in 1971, Plaid Cymru chairman, Gwynfor Evans, identified 
federation as the ‘most practical solution’ to solving the issues of political and representative 
imbalance in the territorial constitution.742 
More recently, and in particular in response to the issues connected to the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014, and the referendum on EU membership of 2016, federation 
has once again emerged as a salient political solution to unsettlement in the territorial 
constitution. In response to these two constitutional events, we find that the emphasis for 
federation has, once again, come predominantly from unionist groups.  
In the Autumn of 2014, the Liberal Democrats reconfirmed their longstanding commitment to 
federation through an emergency motion at their annual party conference – three weeks after 
the Scottish independence referendum.743 Later, in 2016, after the territorial divisions of the 
                                                          
740 Chapter 1 (section 1.4) 
741 Chapter 3 (section 3.4) 
742 Evans did, however, qualify this remark by identifying that, in order to be a success, any scheme of 
federation must first deal with the seemingly unanswerable question of how to accommodate England. Evans, 
G., Commonwealth Status for Wales, (Bangor: Plaid Cymru, 1971) p. 14-15 
743 Liberal Democrats, ‘Power to the People: Policies for Political and Constitutional Reform’ Policy Paper 117 
(Liberal Democrats: March 2014); The provision was amended (amendment F41) by an emergency motion to 
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Brexit process began to sharpen, the Scottish Labour Party leader, Kezia Dugdale, advocated 
for a reframing of the Union along federal lines744 – a view supported by a significant majority 
at the Scottish Labour Party annual conference at Perth in February 2017,745 and followed later 
by a more abstract commitment made by the leader of the national Labour Party, Jeremy 
Corbyn, in the run up to the 2017 general election.746  
In unpicking the political rhetoric surrounding these more recent commitments, we find their 
motivations as largely reflecting what Alfred Stepan identified as holding together 
mechanisms: power is decentralised and recast into a federation in an act of political concession 
to sub-state nationalist groups, intended to ‘hold together’ the state.747 Stepan identified 
particular examples of this process as taking place in Belgium, India and Spain – although the 
latter is questionable from a legal perspective748 – whereby previously unitary states were 
transformed into federations, in an attempt to counter political discontent in certain parts of the 
territory of multi-national states.749  
Additional to this motivation, however, there are also a number of wider benefits assumed to 
relate to federation in the UK. First, as argued by Burrows and Denton, federation, when 
compared to devolution, holds the possibility for a more positive result in the facilitation of a 
                                                          
the Autumn Conference of 2014: <https://www.libdems.org.uk/f41_towards_a_federal_uk> (accessed: 
26/01/18)   
744 ‘This would mean a radical reshaping of our country along federal lines where every component part of the 
United Kingdom – Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the English regions – take more responsibility for 
what happens in their own communities, but where we still maintain the protection of being part of a greater 
whole as the UK.’ Kezia Dugdale, ‘The UK needs a new Act of Union to prevent it breaking once and for all’, 
Guardian, 7 December 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/07/uk-needs-new-act-
union-stop-break-brexit-scotland> (Accessed: 26/06/18) 
745 BBC News, ‘Scottish Labour conference delegates back federal UK motion’, 24 February 2017, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-39079408> (Accessed: 28/06/18) 
746 Corbyn promised to put federalism ‘on the table’ if he was elected leader at the 2017 general election; The 
Independent, ‘Jeremy Corbyn puts federal government 'on the table' if Labour win power’, 26 August 2017, 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-labour-federal-government-kezia-dugdale-
devolution-scotland-wales-northern-ireland-stv-a7913876.html> (Accessed: 26/06/18) 
747 Stepan, A., Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 320-321 
748 Spain remains, in formal legal terms, a unitary state; however, much of the political commentary on Spain 
identifies it as ‘quasi-federal’ owing to the high degree of regional self-rule. See: Tierney, S., Constitutional 
Law and National Pluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 242-244 
749 Stepan, A., Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 320-323 
278 
 
coherent, stable, and more straightforward category of constitutional distinction – providing 
for more equality between its constituent parts.750 Second, in response to the issue of territorial 
disparity in the Brexit vote, we find Dugdale’s commitment to federation as to a large extent 
influenced by the idea of federation as reducing the ‘us vs. them’ thinking across the territorial 
constitution.751 
However, despite these implied benefits, we find that federation, while oft discussed as an 
option for reform, has never reached fruition. Indeed, despite its design being advocated for 
consideration at most periods of constitutional unsettlement, there remains no precedent of 
federation as having been applied in the UK. In explaining this phenomenon, this chapter will 
now turn to discuss two issues that have consistently stifled the debate on federation in the UK. 
The first issue, relates to the theoretical idea that federation is incompatible with the UK’s 
constitutional tradition. In explaining this in more detail, we find a useful example of its design 
in the work of A. V. Dicey who, writing in the mid-19th century, gave the following argument 
against federation as an answer to the Irish Question: 
‘Federalism, in short, is in its nature a scheme for bringing together into closer 
connection a set of states, each of which desires, whilst retaining its individuality, to 
form together with its neighbours one nation. It is not, at any rate as it has hitherto been 
applied, a plan for disuniting the parts of a united state… When, therefore, it is 
suggested that Federalism may establish a satisfactory relation between England and 
Ireland, a doubt naturally suggests itself whether the United Kingdom presents the 
conditions necessary for the success of the Federal experiment.’752 
Moreover, through further analysis, we find that Dicey was by no means an isolated figure in 
demonstrating reservations to the federation of the UK in the 19th century. Indeed, writing at 
                                                          
750 Burrows, B. and Denton, G., Devolution or Federalism? Options for a United Kingdom, (London: 
MacMillan, 1980), p. 16-28 
751 Kezia Dugdale, ‘Speech by Kezia Dugdale, Leader of the Scottish Labour Party’ IPPR: London, 7 December 
2016 http://scottishlabour.org.uk/blog/entry/a-new-act-of-union-to-save-the-uk (accessed: 08/02/18) 
752 Dicey, A. V., England’s Case Against Home Rule, (London: John Murray, 1886), p. 161-162 
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the same time as Dicey, the Oxford academic and Liberal politician, Edward Freeman, 
provided the following argument against federation: 
‘No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a federation, to invest English 
Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to 
the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal 
Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establishment of a closer tie between 
elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been 
hitherto closely united’.753 
In both instances, we find the arguments against federation as framed on the understanding of 
it as an action solely reserved to examples of union between previously independent political 
units. This may be interpreted as simply a reflection of what was, at that time, a political reality 
– federation, up until the mid-20th century, was an action primarily reserved to the formation 
of new states.754 Indeed, it was not until the second half of the 20th century that we find 
federation additionally becoming a ‘holding together’ mechanism, applied in previously 
unitary states such as India or Belgium755 - a factor which possibly informed the decision of 
the Kilbrandon Commission to conclude on federation as follows: 
‘Federalism was designed and is appropriate for states coming together to form a single 
unit, and not for a state breaking up into smaller units’.756 
However, despite this contextual explanation, this thesis argues that a more important aspect 
of this issue is to be found in its political economic redress of federation as weakening the 
unitary authority of the UK Parliament. Indeed, as John Kendle reminds us, during the 19th 
century debates on federalism, the underlying concern lay not in a theoretical critique of the 
federal idea, but in the fear that its design would weaken the political authority of the UK 
                                                          
753 Freeman, E. A., History of Federal Government: Volume I, (London: MacMillan 1863), p. 90-91 
754 Riker, W. H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 
12-13; Stepan, A., Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 320-323 
755 Stepan, A., Arguing Comparative Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 320-321 
756 Kilbrandon, Lord., ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution’, (London: HMSO, 1973) Cmnd. 
5460, p. 157, para. 526 
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Parliament: ‘a weakening of the union would lead to a weakening of both the United Kingdom 
and the Empire’.757 
To some extent, we find the corpus of this argument as reflecting the historical anxiety of UK 
– or more accurately, English758 - constitutional theory, as reflected in Chapter One; that the 
‘official mind’ is distinctly opposed to the idea of divided sovereignty. Thus, as a consequence, 
we find the primary interpretation of categories of constitutional change designed to reduce the 
legal authority as well as the political power of central government as treated with opposition; 
a reflection more of the historical past, and the traditional relationship between the parts of the 
territorial constitution, than of a concurrent opposition to the specific category of federation.759 
In this regard, we may conclude the essence of this first challenge as facing an ideological as 
opposed to an institutional barrier – needing to convince the official mind of the logic for 
divided sovereignty, as opposed to necessarily justifying its institutional form.   
The second issue of applying federation to the UK relates to its territorial application. Central 
to this theme, we find the notion of federation as being unable to navigate a suitable solution 
to the accommodation of the UK’s largest component part, England. In this regard, we must 
see this issue as constructed in three parts: 
First, we find the problem of accommodating England’s size within the makeup of a federal 
UK. In this regard, it is a fact almost universally acknowledged that a single English federal 
unit would be so unbalanced that it would be unworkable within the territorial constitution – 
                                                          
757 Kendle, J., Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921, 
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1989), p. 16 
758 Indeed, as noted by David Marquand, the notion of ‘UK’ reluctance, is largely only manifested in the 
distinction of an English ‘emotional barrier to dividing sovereignty’ – a factor which, as this thesis has shown, 
has far less resonance in the periphery. Marquand, D., ‘Federalism and the British: Anatomy of a Neurosis’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2, (April-June 2006), pp. 175-183 at 181 
759 For a broader account of the history of this idea, see: Kendle, J., Federal Britain: A History, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 150-169 
281 
 
not only due to its size in relation to the other three component parts of the UK,760 but also of 
its size in relation to the UK as a whole.761  
The alternative option is to divide England into a number of federated ‘regions’762 – a solution 
that has a considerable salience in regards to regional devolution, and may be capable of 
transplantation over to a federal design. However, this thesis argues that such a system, while 
perhaps proportionally more stable, would fail to rectify one of the central issues in the 
territorial constitution – asymmetry. Under the proposed designs for English Regions put 
forward by New Labour, the relatively weak executive Assemblies were roundly rejected by 
the voters of the North-East in 2004. Thus, it remains unlikely that English voters will suddenly 
accept a system of legislative federation equal to that currently experienced in Wales or, more 
significantly, Scotland. Indeed, we find that while regionalism has recently regained some 
traction in certain metropolitan areas in England, the central issue of English constitutional 
anxiety remains fixed on a solution for England as a whole.763 
Second, is the problem that a system of English federal regions would not necessarily solve the 
psychological or symbolic issues associated with the dominant position of England within the 
territorial constitution. This critique is based primarily on the fact that through dividing the 
national territory of England, the over weighted position of England – while reduced in the 
sense of direct political power – would not necessarily be symbolically reduced. In this regard, 
we find a useful note of guidance provided by Erk and Anderson:  
                                                          
760 ‘A federation consisting of four units – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – would be so 
unbalanced as to be unworkable. It would be dominated by the overwhelming political importance and wealth of 
England.’ Kilbrandon, Lord., ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution’, (London: HMSO, 1973), 
Cmnd. 5460, p. 159, para. 531 
761 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom, 
(London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, May 2015), para. 3.6  
762 Several constructions exist for the number and boundaries of a system of English Regions, for a useful 
overview of some of the advocated for configurations, see: Burrows, B., and Denton, G., Devolution or 
Federalism: Options for a United Kingdom, (London: MacMillan Press, 1980) 
763 The McKay Commission, ‘Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of 
Commons’, (March 2013), para. 68 
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‘The general observation seems to be that federalism tends to be more stable with 
multiple constitutional units rather than two or three large units or a single dominant 
one. A federal system defined by multiple units produces more room for shifting 
alliances and reduces an ‘us vs. them’ mindset. At the same time, when only a handful 
or one of the subunits is ethno-culturally distinct (Spain, Canada), subunits of the 
minority culture(s) might feel overpowered by the rest of the subunits representing the 
majority culture.’764 
In unpacking this quote, we find the argument that by dividing the territory of the majority 
culture into a number of subunits, its ability to re-form a cohesive national block is not 
necessarily reduced. Instead, it is recast within a different form, but continues to carry the same 
symbolic significance. Moreover, as recognised in the Memorandum of Dissent in 1973, the 
division of England into a network of Regions would unlikely allay the sense of division within 
England itself – creating a demographically and economically unbalanced system whereby 
London and the South-East would be unquestionably dominant.765 Thus, federation holds little 
opportunity for delivering an effective (re)balancing of the onus of political power in the 
territorial constitution.  
The third obstacle, and perhaps the most damning, is that there remains little appetite within 
England for a system of federal government – either as a whole or regionally. While some 
evidence suggests that this may be gradually changing,766 the consensus acknowledged in the 
recent McKay Commission Report show that the wider concern in England remains with its 
                                                          
764 Erk, J., and Anderson, J., ‘The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic 
Divisions?’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2009), pp. 191-202 at 197 
765 Crowther-Hunt, Lord., and Peacock, A. T., ‘Royal Commission on the Constitution, Vol II: Memorandum of 
Dissent’, (London: HMSO, 1973), Cmnd. 5460-I, p. 223, Appendix E 
766 Arianna Giovannini suggests that a ‘new regionalism’ is in its embryonic form in certain parts of England, 
whereby the rise of identity politics in areas such as Yorkshire, as well as the wider economic calls for 
regionalism in areas such as the North East, indicate a possible growth in support for regional assemblies in 
parts of England – particularly in the North. Giovannini, A., ‘Towards a “New English Regionalism” in the 
North? The Case of Yorkshire First’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 4, (2016), pp. 590-600. Yet, there 
remains little evidence that the rise in support for ‘regionalism’ translates to a support for ‘federation’ and the 
formal division of legal sovereignty within England.  
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governance as a whole, as opposed to anxiety over the essence of government within 
England.767 
Finally, by way of an additional fourth point, it is also important to recognise that while 
England creates several issues relating to the applicability of federation in the UK, there is also 
no evidence of widespread support for federation in the periphery. Indeed, while federation is 
often framed as beneficial to the periphery in allowing for division of sovereignty and the 
facilitation of equality and security, we find that this argument has largely failed to take form 
with sub-state nationalist groups in the periphery who ultimately seek to leave the UK, as 
opposed to be tied into it in a federal system.768 
On this note, we find that the provision for federation in the UK faces significant obstacles; in 
part as a reflection of an historical legacy of ideological opposition to the division of 
sovereignty, but also by a notable lack of support and inability to effectively accommodate – 
or more importantly, mitigate – the dominance position of England within the territorial 
constitution.  
 
5.3.2 Federalism in the UK 
The previous section of this chapter identified the proposals for, and possible unworkability of, 
federation in the UK. The issues identified in this argument were both functional and symbolic 
in nature, relating to a reluctance towards divided sovereignty and, most notably, the tenuous 
position of England within a new territorial framework. However, such difficulties are not to 
be seen as a conclusion to the possible applicability of the federal idea in the UK. In this last 
                                                          
767 The McKay Commission, ‘Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of 
Commons’, (March 2013), para. 68 
768 Dalyell, T., The Question of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2016), p. 75 
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section of the chapter, we will look at the idea of federalism as a normative concept, and the 
possibilities it holds for instilling a system of UK-wide constitutional settlement.  
In beginning this discussion, let us first briefly be reminded of what is meant by reference to 
federalism as a normative idea. In explaining this, we are once again drawn to revisit the work 
of Daniel Elazar, and the recognition of federalism as comprising of two parts: self-rule and 
shared rule.769 The first (self-rule) relates to the provision for peripheral autonomy, the second 
(shared rule) relates to the provision for intergovernmental cooperation and codecision and, 
when in symbiosis, are indicative of the existence of federalism.   
On the basis of this definition, we find that some commentators have already come to identify 
the UK as having a federalist mentality. As recognised in Chapter Four, William Livingstone 
saw federalism as evident in the constitutional order in the UK during the mid-20th century, 
prior to the introduction of full-scale devolution in 1998.770 For Paolo Dardianelli, a federal 
tradition can be traced back even further to the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, which he argues 
combined ‘union wide unity with regional autonomy.’771 Moreover, for Jim Bulpitt, the 
relationship between the centre and periphery in the UK was, from the 17th century onwards, 
effected by an ‘operational federalism’ of administrative independence in the periphery, 
sustained by a separation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics – the former being maintained in 
central government, while the latter is open to decentralisation to the periphery.772 
However, in passing critique upon these three observations, we find that in each instance the 
conclusion on the existence of federalism is largely only framed through recognition of a 
practice of self-rule, connected to an understanding of the UK as a ‘union state’. Indeed, in 
                                                          
769 Elazar, D., Federalism: an overview, (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), p. 2 
770 Livingstone, W. S., ‘A Note on the Nature of Federalism’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1, 
(1952), pp. 81-95 at 92-93 
771 Dardianelli, P., and Kincaid, J., ‘A New Union? Federalism and the UK’, Political Insight, (December 2017), 
pp. 12-15 at 14 
772 Bulpitt, J., Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2008), p. 82 
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each instance, we find little effort or connection placed on the identification of federalism as 
an idea synonymous with a sense of shared rule. It is such lopsided study and obedience of 
federal rule in the UK that, arguably, could be seen as one of the central characteristics 
impeding the effectiveness of devolution.   
Indeed, in the process leading up to devolution, it was implied in the Kilbrandon Report that in 
order to be effective, devolution would require, alongside the provision for self-rule, a reform 
of the ideology of central government to embody a culture of shared rule.773 However, through 
analysis of the devolution settlements, drawing particular reference to the bilateral aspect of 
the devolution process, we find that there has failed to emerge a strong tradition of shared rule 
to accompany the unprecedented march of self-rule.  
This can, at least in part, be explained through the already identified logic of devolution which 
held – and continues to hold – in favour of the appeasement of peripheral groups through self-
rule, rather than forming a structured UK-wide attempt at constitutional reform. In practical 
terms, as identified in Chapter Four, this has resulted in devolution assuming an asymmetrical 
character, whereby the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish settlements each seek to appease 
specific sub-state demands through a practice of ‘bi-lateral bargains’.774 As we have seen, this 
has created an asymmetrical system which reduces the possibility for cooperation and overlap 
between the devolved administrations and the UK Government on a multi-lateral basis.775  
                                                          
773 ‘a new style of thinking, positively favourable to devolution and based on co-operation rather than the 
exercise of central authority.’ Kilbrandon, Lord. ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution’ 
(London: HMSO, 1973) Cmnd. 5460, p. 89, para. 282; for a useful commentary on this point, see: Bogdanor, 
V., ‘Devolution and the British Constitution’, in Butler, D., Bogdanor, V., and Summers, R., (eds.) The Law, 
Politics and the Constitution: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Marshall, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p. 54-77 at 75 
774 Trench, A., ‘Scotland and Wales: The Evolution of Devolution’, in Hazell, R., (ed.) Constitutional Futures 
Revisited: Britain’s Constitution to 2020, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 29-42 
775 Swenden, W., and McEwen, N., ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? Intergovernmental relations and 
party politics’, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4/5, (2014), pp. 488-509 at 501; House of Lords, 
‘Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom’, Select Committee on the Constitution, 11th Report of 
Session 2014-15, HL Paper 146 (27 March 2015), para. 21 
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Perhaps as a latent recognition of the failure of an effective mechanism for shared rule to take 
hold, several academic commentators have come to argue that in moving forward, federalism 
provides a number of useful precedents on reform of the territorial constitution. In evidence 
given to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Adam Tompkins stressed 
the possibilities from this ‘the United Kingdom can borrow from and learn from… in terms of 
improving the governance arrangements of the United Kingdom.’776 In evidence to the same 
Committee, Michael Keating went further in advocating in favour of federalism as the ‘ideal 
solution’ to the current constitutional crisis.777  
Behind both endorsements, we find a comparable logic – namely that the opportunities offered 
by shared rule present valuable lessons for the rebalancing of constitutional relations between 
the UK Government and the devolved administrations, and for the ultimate fulfilment of the 
equality and security of the devolution settlements. Indeed, this was further recognised by the 
devolved administrations themselves. In its recent white paper, Brexit and Devolution, the 
Welsh Government described the current operation of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) 
as a ‘consultative body’ or ‘talking shop’.778 In its subsequent white paper, Securing Wales’ 
Future, the Welsh Government argued for the enhancement of the JMC to assume the role of 
a permanent UK Council of Ministers – perhaps made more significant by its acknowledgement 
as being equally important to the provision for further self-rule.779  
                                                          
776 House of Lords, ‘The Union and devolution’, Select Committee on the Constitution, 10th Report of Session 
2015-16, HL Paper 149 (25 May 2016), para. 272 
777 Prof. Michael Keating – Revised transcript of evidence taken before The Select Committee on the 
Constitution Inquiry on The Union and Devolution, Evidence Session No. 11, Questions 149-159, (Friday 11th 
December 2015) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitution-
committee/the-union-and-devolution/oral/26656.html> (Accessed: 23/11/17) 
778 Welsh Government, ‘Brexit and Devolution’ (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2017), p. 17 
779 Welsh Government, ‘Securing Wales’ Future’ (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2017), p. 28 
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Yet, despite such widespread endorsement on the inclusion of a federalist logic into the existing 
fabric of the devolution settlements, this thesis highlights that there remain a number of 
significant obstacles restricting its introduction. It summarises these in two parts: 
First, the pervasive nature of the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament 
significantly undermines the ability to imagine the successful application of a meaningful 
system of shared rule in the UK. While this may be countenanced to some extent by the 
argument that legal theory can be kept in check by statutory recognition780 or political reality781 
– as agued by Lord Sankey in British Coal Corp. v The King782 – the recent realities of the 
Miller case and the EU (Withdrawal) Act seem to have significantly diminished the ability for 
a relationship to emerge based solely on political trust.   
Indeed, perhaps the only possibility of a lasting solution in this regard, hinges on the ability of 
the UK Government to alter its constitutional ideology: acknowledging the UK as a multi-
national state;783 abandoning the perspective of the UK as a Union of solidarity; and enhancing 
a system of intergovernmental relations, conditioned with a genuine commitment to shared 
rule.784 This, at present, appears unlikely.  
                                                          
780 House of Lords, ‘Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom’, Select Committee on the 
Constitution, 11th Report of Session 2014-15, HL Paper 146 (27 March 2015), para. 86 
781 Elliott, M., ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Legal, Constitutional, and Political Perspective’, 
in Jowell, J., Oliver, D., and O’Cinneide, C., (eds.) The Changing Constitution, 8th Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp. 38-66 at 43-44 
782 ‘It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to pass on its own initiative any legislation that 
it thought fit… remains in theory unimpaired: indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, 
repeal or disregard s. 4 of the Statute [of Westminster]. But that is theory and has no relation to realities.’ British 
Coal Corporation v The King [1935] AC 500 at 520 
783 Tierney, S., ‘Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state’, in Choudhry, S., (ed.) 
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 438-460 at 447; McHarg, A., ‘What does the Union Need to Do to Survive?’, Scottish Constitutional 
Futures Blog, 25 September 2014, 
<https://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/Artic
leView/articleId/4325/Aileen-McHarg-What-Does-the-Union-Need-to-Do-to-Survive.aspx> (Accessed: 
26/01/18) 
784 Evans, A., ‘Back to the Future? Warnings from History for a Future UK Constitutional Convention’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 1, (January-March 2015), pp. 24-32 at 30; The recent report of the House of 
Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee noted that the role of the Joint 
Ministerial Committee requires enhancement in the nature of its purpose, requiring a clear constitutionally 
defined role, rather than its current function as an organ for the airing of grievances, but with no concrete 
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Second, even in the instance where an effective alteration is achieved in the constitutional 
ideology of the UK Government, it is also important to recognise the current structure of the 
territorial constitution as being ill-suited to fostering a system of shared rule. As identified in 
Chapter Four, the asymmetrical and bilateral construction of the devolution settlements places 
several obstacles in the way of a balanced obedience of the two-tenets of federalism.  
Through asymmetry, we find that the scope for shared rule is diminished due to the lack of 
overlap in shared competences between the devolved administrations.785 This is made 
additionally problematic by the position of England which is at present represented by the UK 
Government in IGR. As has already been identified, this holds the position not only of creating 
a noticeable imbalance in the political weight of IGR negotiations, but also in removing the 
impartiality of the UK Government which currently conducts IGR under ‘two hats’ – 
representing the interests of both the UK and England.786 
While the Welsh Government’s proposals sought to rectify this situation through a qualified 
majority voting system in proceedings of the Joint Ministerial Committee – whereby the UK 
Government could continue to represent the dual interests of the UK and England787 – more 
recent proposals have come to suggest the need for England to be represented separately from 
the UK Government.788 This thesis tends to agree with this latter suggestion – however, on the 
                                                          
mechanisms for shared rule. House of Commons, ‘Devolution and Exiting the EU: reconciling differences and 
building strong relationships’, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 8th Report of 
Session 2017-19, HC Paper 1485 (31 July 2018), para. 135 
785 Swenden, W., and McEwen, N., ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? Intergovernmental relations and 
party politics’, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4/5, (2014), pp. 488-509 at 501 
786 House of Commons, ‘Devolution and Exiting the EU: reconciling differences and building strong 
relationships’, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 8th Report of Session 2017-19, HC 
Paper 1485 (31 July 2018), para. 86 
787 The Welsh Government’s white paper, Brexit and Devolution, advocated that the UK Council of Ministers 
should comprise of four administrations: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the UK Government acting 
on the dual interests of the UK and England. The voting mechanism between the four administrations would be 
over and above democratic majority and, instances where consensus could not be achieved, require the vote of 
the UK and one of the devolved administrations (Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland). Welsh Government, 
‘Brexit and Devolution’, (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2017), p. 18 
788 The proposals for England’s representation are primarily in favour of English Regions rather than an all-
England block. This is to a large extent motivated by the position of the elected mayoralties in England who feel 
underrepresented by the UK Government. House of Commons, ‘Devolution and Exiting the EU: reconciling 
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tentative recognition that any separate representation of England must also be accompanied by 
an overarching ideological commitment to multi-lateralism; reversing the current trend for bi-
lateral bargains between the UK Government and the devolved administrations.789  
Upon this note, we may conclude that the current lack of substantive provision for shared rule 
is, perhaps, the biggest single challenge facing the chances for settlement in the territorial 
constitution.790 In light of the factors identified in this final chapter; the hierarchical approach 
taken by UK Government in the Brexit negotiations, and its seeming failure to answer the calls 
of the devolved administrations for equality and security, significantly raises the chances of the 
current period of constitutional unsettlement continuing into the future.  
In advancing this rather pessimistic conclusion, this thesis does not necessarily advocate in 
favour of federalism as the only solution for settling the fault-lines in the territorial constitution. 
Rather, as recognised above, it notes that there are considerable obstacles to the ability of 
federalism – as a balanced commitment to both self-rule and shared rule – to emerge in the UK.  
What this thesis does recognise, however, is that the devolution issue has now moved beyond 
the simple need for self-rule. Indeed, it is argued that the time has now passed whereby the 
provision for self-rule is no longer an effective strategy on its own – and arguably never was791 
– for managing unsettlement in the periphery. In this regard, this thesis recognises that the 
                                                          
differences and building strong relationships’, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 8th 
Report of Session 2017-19, HC Paper 1485 (31 July 2018), para. 88-89 
789 Hazell notes that the culture of bi-lateral relations is not solely confined to the mentality of the UK 
Government, but also has notable application in the mind of the devolved administrations who, in certain 
instances, prefer bilateral arrangements in regard to provision for tailor made deals and enhanced competences. 
Hazell, R., (ed.) ‘Devolution and the Future of the Union’, UCL, The Constitution Unit (April 2015) para. 3.3.3; 
McEwen, N., and Petersohn, B., ‘Between Autonomy and Interdependence: The Challenges of Shared Rule 
after the Scottish Referendum’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 2, (April-June 2015), pp. 192-200 at 200 
790 O'Leary, B., ‘Detoxifying the UK’s exit from the EU: a multi-national compromise is possible’, LSE Brexit, 
27 Jun 2016, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/27/de-toxifying-the-uks-eu-exit-process-a-multi-national-
compromise-is-possible/> (Accessed: 26/04/18) 
791 House of Lords, ‘The Union and devolution’, Select Committee on the Constitution, 10th Report of Session 
2015-16, HL Paper 149 (25 May 2016), para. 252 
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debate has now moved onto the need to guarantee the equality and security of the devolution 
settlements within the territorial constitution.  
In recognising this issue, there are a variety of constitutional strategies open to both the UK 
and devolved governments; from the revisiting of old principles such as ‘dominion status’,792 
to the more recent doctrines of constitutional pluralism relating to the theoretical ideas of post- 
and late-sovereignty. This thesis does not seek to recommend any particular strategy, but rather 
recognises that any future reform would find benefit to draw its inspiration from the broad 
corpus of the federal idea in settling on a strategy that balances any measure of self-rule, with 
an equal measure of shared rule.  
 
5.4. Concluding Remarks 
The argument in this chapter has highlighted two crucial elements in the contemporary makeup 
of the territorial constitution: First, as a result of the Brexit process, and in particular the events 
of the Miller case and the EU (Withdrawal) Act, the divides and imbalances in the territorial 
constitution have grown more pronounced. Second, the pursuit of remedies in answering the 
current episode of constitutional unsettlement are, while not impossible, significantly restricted 
by the continuing hierarchical position of the UK Government and the pervasive nature of the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament.  
Central to these two elements has been the identification of the need for equality and security 
on the part of the devolved administrations, as well as the increasing calls for an independent 
                                                          
792 This idea has recently regained salience in Wales: BBC, ‘Welsh devolution is being betrayed, says Lord 
Elystan-Morgan’, 06 October 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-41524304> (Accessed: 
29/06/18); and was recommended for inclusion in the Wales Bill 2016, Hansard, HL Deb, 07 November 2016, 
Vol. 776, Col. 999. For a general discussion on the structure and governing ideology of dominion status, see: 
Brock, W. R., Britain and the Dominions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951); Wheare, K. C., The 
Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); Roberts-Wray, K., 
Commonwealth and Colonial Law, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966); Oliver, P. C., ‘Dominion Status: History, 
Framework and Context’, Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper, No. 13, (July 2013) 
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political voice for England. It has been argued that through the Brexit process, the ‘solidarity’ 
approach taken by the UK Government has been significant in highlighting the lack of unity or 
cooperation in the dynamics of the territorial constitution. In moving forward, this thesis argues 
that the ability to recapture the essence of UK-wide constitutional settlement is inherently 
linked to finding a solution to these two issues; a reality that in itself predicts the need for 
notable reform, but is certainly not impossible to achieve.  
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Conclusion 
 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter One identified the United Kingdom as a ‘State of Unions’. In this chapter, it was 
concluded that the terms of the Union’s that formed the UK state were far from inevitable, but 
instead emerged as English-sponsored, pragmatic responses to particular political conditions. 
Moreover, the argument in this chapter also highlighted the substantive reality that the ‘State 
of Unions’ did not create a single culturally homogeneous society but, rather, a multi-national 
state. Reflecting this reality, the final part of this chapter acknowledged that due to the weak 
provision of nation-building in accompaniment to the substantive constitutional formation of 
the UK, forces of sub-state nationalism began to emerge within the territorial constitution 
during the 19th century.  
The arguments made in Chapter Two sought to deal with the connection between identity and 
the state. In Part One of the chapter, it was argued that the state emerged as a result of wider 
changes in the global political economic sphere which, in turn, necessitated the increase in the 
size and scale of the state as a means of political organisation. Part Two of the chapter extended 
the debate to consider as to how the political unit of the state became associated with the 
essence of identity of the individual. In this part of the chapter, a debate was undertaken on the 
current theories on nations and nationalism, and a synthesis drawn in favour of the nation as an 
imagined political community, albeit reconditioned in the British context through reference to 
the system of Othering and common goals, as identified in the theoretical ideas of Carl Schmitt 
and Giuseppe Mazzini. Part Three of the chapter demonstrated that the fundamental tenets of 
Britishness, being the essence of identity associated with the political unit of the United 
Kingdom, have historically been sustained through a complex system of Others and common 
goals, unreservedly tied to the fortunes of the state.  
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The importance of this chapter in answering the central research question of this thesis was 
two-fold. First, this chapter sought to highlight the historical significance of state-based 
political identity in influencing the design of constitutional systems. Second, this chapter also 
provided context on the fundamental tenets of Britishness; information which provided 
valuable insights for the debate in Chapters Three and Four, which considered the current 
impact of the diluting salience of Britishness on the dynamics of the territorial constitution.  
Chapter Three refocussed the debate of this thesis by consulting the essence of constitutional 
change in the UK from an external perspective. Part One of this chapter began by defining the 
essential elements of the overarching rubric of globalisation; concluding it to be a gradual 
process of the thickening of the various strands of globalism. Part Two then highlighted the 
challenges raised by processes connected with globalisation, and their impact upon state power 
and authority. These were identified in three parts: the new multi-level construction of the 
global sphere; the normative reinterpretations of the balance of power within the state; and the 
new pluralised ambitions of sub-state nationalist groups – commonly referred to as ‘neo-
nationalism’. Part Three of this chapter then moved to identify the impacts of these changes in 
the four component parts of the UK.  
In this analysis, it was concluded that no single definition exists as to the effects of globalisation 
upon the different parts of the UK, but that in each of the four component parts – aside from 
England – new understandings of authority and power have emerged which increasingly seek 
to influence constitutional objectives outside of the traditional frame of the UK state. This 
debate was important in understanding the wider normative changes impacting the dynamics 
of state systems, and the place devolution inhabits within these changes.  
Chapter Four dealt directly with the substantive issues associated with devolution in the UK, 
and presented the argument that devolution is a reactive mechanism of constitutional change. 
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Through analysing the devolution process on a UK-wide basis, this chapter found that 
devolution – and the absence of devolution in England – emerged as a response to the level of 
political instability, and strength of cultural feeling, within the non-English parts of the UK. 
Correspondingly, under the logic of devolution as a reactive and measured device of 
constitutional reform, it was argued that the system of devolution that emerged in 1998 was 
characterised by four key themes: being asymmetrical, bi-lateral, a process and, as a result of 
these factors, a mechanism of constitutional change ripe for fostering a reactive dynamic 
between the component parts of the territorial constitution.  
In considering the central research question of this thesis, this chapter provided valuable insight 
into the changing dynamics of the territorial constitution. Yet, while making an original 
contribution on its own, this chapter also borrowed considerably on the themes raised in the 
preceding three chapters of this thesis, and highlighted valuable themes in relation to the 
significance that constitutional history and studies into political identity hold for understanding 
the wider dynamics of the territorial constitution. In this regard, this chapter concluded that 
devolution must not be read in isolation, but must be seen as part of a much wider process of 
normative change within the UK territorial constitution; change which first began more than a 
century prior to 1998, and has arguably influenced certain parts of the dynamics of the 
territorial constitution since the respective Acts of Union which formed the UK.   
The argument in Chapter Five updated the findings made in the preceding chapters by 
highlighting two crucial elements in the contemporary dynamics of the territorial constitution. 
First, as a result of the Brexit process, and in particular the events of the Miller case and the 
EU (Withdrawal) Act, it was argued that the divides and imbalances in the territorial 
constitution have grown more pronounced. Second, it was recognised that the pursuit of 
remedies in answering the current episode of constitutional unsettlement are, while not 
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impossible, significantly restricted by the continuing hierarchical position of the UK 
Government, and the pervasive nature of the legislative supremacy of Parliament.  
It has been argued that central to these two elements of analysis lies the identification of the 
need for equality and security on the part of the devolved administrations. It has also been 
argued that through the Brexit process, the ‘solidarity’ approach taken by the UK Government 
in facilitating the negotiations with the European Union, has been significant in highlighting 
the lack of equality or security of the devolved administrations. In moving forward, this thesis 
has argued that the ability to recapture the essence of constitutional settlement within the 
territorial constitution is inherently linked to finding a solution to these two issues – a reality 
that in itself predicts the need for notable reform, but is certainly not impossible to achieve.  
 
Conclusion 
The United Kingdom is at a constitutional crossroads. From a legal perspective, devolution has 
had little impact upon the sustaining doctrine of the UK constitutional order; the legislative 
supremacy of parliament. From a political perspective, however, it is also recognised that the 
introduction of devolution has instigated a process which has little or no road back, and an 
uncertain road ahead. In providing for the institutional recognition of nationalist sentiments – 
initially proposed as a means of silencing nationalism – this thesis has shown how devolution 
has territorialised the dynamics of the UK constitutional order, and provided a distinct platform 
for the political aims of sub-state nationalists groups.  
Moreover, this thesis has also charted the declining role of the United Kingdom as the primary 
totem for individual political identity, and the effects of this phenomenon on reducing the 
cohesive bonds of unionism in the UK. As we have seen in this thesis, the cohesive institutional 
and ideological bonds which once guided and sustained a sense of Britishness have become 
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reduced, both by the thickening of globalism’s strands, and the dilution of UK-wide sentiment 
through devolution. In addition to these factors, however, this thesis has also shown how the 
introduction of devolution, and the connected territorialisation of the UK-state, has had a 
considerable impact on fostering a reactive dynamic between the four component parts of the 
UK. In this regard, this thesis has concluded that devolution, as well as impacting the 
substantive political structure of the territorial constitution, has also had a significant effect on 
the symbolism of the UK as a unitary state; fostering disagreement, resentment and ‘devo-
anxiety’ between the four component parts of the UK.  
Reflecting upon these points, the central research question of this thesis has been to understand 
as to ‘how far devolution has changed the constitutional dynamics within the territorial 
constitution?’ This conclusion will now deliver an answer to this question through the 
identification of three thematic points which pervade throughout this thesis: 
 
1. A State of Unions, and a Unitary State 
The first point pertains to the reality that, in legal theory, the United Kingdom remains a unitary 
state. However, in making this assertion, this thesis also argues that while this doctrine 
continues to rule discussion on the territorial constitution from the perspective of the UK 
Government, the existence of devolution, and the political capital of the devolved 
administrations, has increasingly called into question its longevity.  
On this point, this thesis contends that, in constitutional terms, the UK is no longer a purely 
unitary state, but a State of Unions. While this has been recognised as a theoretical certainty 
by many political sciences for many years, this thesis contends that the idea of the State of 
Unions has now come – at least in part – to inform the reality of the dynamics of the territorial 
constitution. In making this argument, this thesis contends that this shift has not instigated a 
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full normative change, but has created a scenario whereby the arrangement of power and 
authority in the territorial constitution is continually open to uncertainty and competition 
between the two levels of government. A scenario which in itself has had a significant impact 
on the dynamics of the territorial constitution, and perpetuates the continuing era of 
unsettlement.  
 
2. Devolution in Context 
The second thematic conclusion reached in this thesis, has been the recognition that devolution 
– its causes and effects – does not exist in a vacuum, but within a much broader catalogue of 
political and normative challenges to the state. Central to this point has been the recognition of 
two factors; the increasing pluralisation of forms of political identity, and the normative 
challenges associated with the rubric of ‘globalisation’. In analysing these two points, this 
thesis has shown devolution to be a valuable window on much broader issues effecting the 
state.  
On the one hand, arguments made across each of the chapters in this thesis have highlighted 
how the gradually diluting salience of Britishness as the primary political identity for citizens 
in the UK, has had considerable repercussions on the normative dynamics and balance of power 
in the territorial constitution. Fundamentally, this thesis has demonstrated how changes in 
political identity leave a lasting impact upon the territorial constitution, and catalyse arguments 
for further devolution and the fragmentation of the UK-state.  
On the other hand, devolution also serves as an example of the wider trend across liberal 
democracies on the emergence of multi-level governance structures. Read in tandem with the 
increasing pluralisation in patters of political identity, this thesis has demonstrated how the 
recent changes in the territorial constitution linked to the devolution process have wider 
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influences, and are motivated in part by the reduced position of the state within the global – 
and particularly the European – political sphere.   
 
3. Pervasive ideologies between Westminster and the Periphery  
As a final thematic conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that throughout the period(s) of 
Union, a distinct constitutional ideology has come to dominate territorial relations across the 
UK. Bulpitt framed this as the English ‘official mind’, whereby autonomy was granted to the 
periphery in exchange for sovereignty being maintained at the centre – a relationship which 
Bulpitt argued would endure until the periphery went ‘rogue’.  
Over the course of this thesis, an argument has been presented that the essence of this ideology 
continues to inform the dynamics of the territorial constitution. Indeed, even in relation to the 
period after devolution, this thesis has demonstrated that the ‘official mind’ has continued to 
dictate the constitutional strategy adhered to by the UK Government; self-government to the 
periphery with few accompanying measures for shared rule.  
Reflecting on this issue, however, this thesis has also documented the increasing 
unsustainability of this approach in regards to the devolved and non-devolved parts of the UK. 
Indeed, this thesis has documented that the evolution of devolution, and the extent of powers 
transferred to the periphery, has reached a level whereby considerable questions are continually 
posed as to the realities of the UK Government’s ability to unilaterally dictate the substantive 
terms of the balance of power within the UK.  
On this point, this thesis has outlined that the lack of equality and security now experienced by 
the devolved administrations – as highlighted by the Brexit process – has created a scenario 
whereby constitutional shocks and unsettlement have become the norm. To a significant extent, 
this thesis has contended that the existence of devolution has created a new constitutional 
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dynamic, whereby the ‘official mind’ is unsustainable as a doctrine of absolute final authority 
for central government. Instead, this thesis has recognised that within the new post-devolution, 
multi-level ordering of the UK constitution, the dynamics of the territorial constitution are 
increasingly influenced by a variety of different sources – a reality which the UK Government 
must now realise if it is to re-achieve a condition of constitutional settlement between the four 
component parts of the UK.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
By way of a final conclusion, this thesis contends that while devolution has had little effect on 
the formal legal structure of the territorial constitution, its introduction and evolution since 
1998 has had significant effects on the political understanding and operation of the territorial 
constitution.  
This thesis contends that through the introduction of devolution, a distinct shift has occurred in 
the constitutional dynamics of the UK. The UK can no longer conceive of itself as a purely 
unitary polity, and the essence of devolution has created a condition of territorialising the UK-
state, and setting it on a course of arguably irreversible decentralisation.   
Thus, it is argued that the dynamics of the UK’s territorial constitution are now constructed on 
a multi-level system, conditioned by external as well as internal influences, and open to a 
distinctly uncertain future. Indeed, moving forward, the essence of division within the 
territorial constitution is increasingly attached to the ability to find a compromise between the 
new interpretations of the balance of power within the UK – a conclusion which if not achieved, 
will continue to perpetuate unsettlement in the four component parts of the UK.   
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The Original Contribution of this Thesis  
As noted in the introduction, the aim of this thesis has not been to provide a definite solution 
to the current unsettlement in the territorial constitution. Rather, the aim of this thesis has been 
to assess as to how far devolution has influenced the current changes taking place in the UK’s 
constitutional dynamics, and to greater understand some of the causes, catalysts and effects of 
these changes.  
The original contribution of this thesis has been to assess these changes through a UK-wide 
frame of analysis. In part, this has been a process of tying together the already voluminous 
catalogue of nation-specific perspectives on recent constitutional change, and to present their 
findings on a UK-wide frame. More importantly, in the completion of this task, the original 
contribution of this thesis has also been to recognise that there exist several similarities in the 
normative experiences of each of the four component parts of the UK, in response to the 
introduction of devolution.  
Central to this point has been the argument presented on the ‘reactive dynamics’ of the 
devolution process; as experienced in all four of component parts of the UK. In making this 
original contribution to the literature, it is argued that the conclusion of these findings would 
have been greatly impeded had it not been for the UK-wide approach used in this thesis. 
Through this reframing of the lens of contemporary enquiry into the territorial constitution, it 
is hoped that the original contribution of this thesis has been to highlight the value – and need 
– of a UK-wide approach when addressing the issues associated with the UK’s constitutional 
dynamics.  
It has been the conviction of this thesis to strive to answer its central research question through 
a broad lens of interdisciplinary enquiry. It is hoped that through implementing this approach, 
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this thesis can serve to influence future investigations into the dynamics of the UK territorial 
constitution.  
 
Limitations of this Thesis 
The first limitation of this thesis relates to the methodology employed in the historical 
discussion of the UK constitution. As is the case in any research project that seeks to deal with 
a process of broad historical transition, the breadth of the period that it seeks to investigate 
places certain limitations upon the ability to acquire the preferred depth in all areas of historical 
discussion. This project is no exception. While every effort has been made to pay due attention 
to the key aspects of the constitutional and political history of the British Isles necessary to 
answer the research question, it must be acknowledged that certain events were not given the 
scope of debate that perhaps they deserve.  
A second limitation relates to the timing and political context of this thesis. By consulting an 
issue of such contemporary significance, the scope of this thesis is instantly susceptible to 
changes within the architecture of the territorial constitution. No more so was this seen than in 
the exercise of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, and the subsequent events of the Miller case 
and the EU (Withdrawal) Act. This thesis sought to deal with these issues, and concluded them 
within the corpus of Chapter Five. However, it must be acknowledged that from a wider 
perspective, the scope of this research question has been a limitation. In future research, it is 
recognised that the scope of normative discussion on contemporary issues should be reduced 
to the extent of mitigating the effects of changes upon the context of the thesis, as potentially 
influenced by changes in the political sphere.  
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Questions for the Future 
As with any research project, the realisation at its completion is that academic enquiry is a 
continuous process. While it is hoped that this thesis has provided some valuable insights into 
the relationship between devolution and the changing dynamics of the territorial constitution, 
there remain several unanswered questions on these points. Most notably, the Brexit process – 
a still ongoing event at the time of writing this thesis – has provided several new challenges to 
the stability of the UK’s constitutional order, and provides a smorgasbord for potential new 
lines of UK-wide analysis. It is hoped that this thesis lends itself as a useful resource for 
assisting future research projects on these issues.  
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